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FOREWORD
On February 27, 2010, a devastating magnitude 8.8 earthquake struck off the coast of the Maule
region of Chile, affecting a large area that included Chile’s two most populated cities: Concepción
and Santiago, the Chilean capital. A transportation infrastructure reconnaissance team (TIRT)
was organized by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and performed a thorough
postearthquake investigation of highway infrastructure from April 4 to 13, 2010. TIRT was
assisted by Chile’s Ministry of Public Works and two local universities: Pontifical Catholic
University of Chile and University of Chile, both located in Santiago. This report presents the
preliminary findings of the earthquake’s effects on the transportation infrastructure, including
bridges and other highway structures that the team visited during the reconnaissance. This
project was funded by FHWA’s Innovative Bridge Research and Deployment program.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Over the course of the last century, Chile has experienced several strong earthquakes. According
to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), M8.2 earthquakes struck the nation in 1906, 1943,
and 1960, and an M8.0 earthquake hit in 1985. The M8.2 earthquake in 1960 was a foreshock that
occurred the day before the largest earthquake ever recorded, the M9.5 Chilean earthquake. The
offshore Maule earthquake on February 27, 2010, was measured at M8.8 and lasted more than
2 min. It is estimated that this earthquake was approximately 500 times more powerful than the
earthquake that devastated Haiti in January 2010. Several aftershocks, including nine events with
a magnitude exceeding 6.0, occurred in the days following the Chilean earthquake.(1) The M8.8
event is the fifth largest earthquake recorded in modern times and was characterized by its long
duration and strong ground motion, which also caused tsunamis across the region. Many bridges
and tunnels constructed with seismic design codes similar to the 1983 U.S. and European codes
were damaged in the earthquake.
Because of the size of the event, the intensity of the ground shaking, the geological similarity of
the Maule region and the Northwestern United States (e.g., Washington and Oregon’s subduction
zones), and the comparable nature of the infrastructure construction and seismic design codes
used, the performance of transportation infrastructure during this earthquake provided valuable
lessons in earthquake engineering. In March 2010, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
contacted Chile’s Ministry of Public Works (MOP) and worked with University Transportation
Center, Washington State Department of Transportation, University of Nevada, and Missouri
University of Science and Technology to organize the transportation infrastructure reconnaissance
team (TIRT). TIRT and a member of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) were
dispatched to Chile on April 3 to perform a comprehensive earthquake reconnaissance. TIRT was
supported by local bridge engineers from MOP and local researchers from Pontifical Catholic
University of Chile and the University of Chile.
TIRT visited more than 32 transportation infrastructure sites, including highway bridges and port
facilities from Santiago down to Tubul, a small city near Concepción. The specific locations visited
are shown in figure 1 and listed in table 1 with site names, Global Positioning System (GPS)
coordinates, and city and county names.
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Figure 1. Map. Site locations visited by TIRT.
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Site
No.
1a
1b
2a
2b
3
4
5
6a
6b
6c
6d
7
8
9a
9b
9c
10a
10b
11
12
13a
13b
14
15
16
17
18
19a
19b
20
21

Table 1. Specific sites’ structural names and GPS locations.
Latitude Longitude
(S)
(W)
Site Name
Location
(degrees)
(degrees)
Américo Vespucio/Miraflores eastbound
Américo Vespucio/Miraflores westbound
Santiago
-33.39
-70.77
Américo Vespucio/Lo Echevers eastbound
Américo Vespucio/Lo Echevers westbound Santiago
-33.38
-70.75
I-5/14 de la Fama
Santiago
-33.40
-70.68
Pedestrian bridge over Route 5
Santiago
-33.34
-70.71
Quilicura railway crossing at Avenida
Santiago
-33.37
-70.70
Manuel Antonio Matta
Américo Vespucio/Independencia
westbound
Américo Vespucio/Independencia
eastbound
Américo Vespucio/Independencia
westbound exit ramp
Américo Vespucio/Independencia
Santiago
-33.37
-70.69
westbound entrance ramp
Avenida Romero Acceso Sur overpass
Paine
-33.86
-70.72
Avenida Chada Acceso Sur overpass
Paine
-33.87
-70.73
Maipú River (local access bridge)
Maipú River (current Route 5 bridge)
Maipú railroad crossing
Buin
-33.69
-70.72
Route 5 railway crossing at Hospital
westbound
Route 5 railway crossing at Hospital
Buin
-33.86
-70.75
eastbound
Estribo Francisco Mostazal (Avenida
Independencia)
Mostazal
-34.03
-70.72
Las Mercedes Route 5 overpass
Rancagua
-34.07
-70.76
Claro River
Claro River
San Rafael
-35.18
-71.39
Pichibudis
Iloca
-34.88
-72.16
Mataquito
Iloca
-35.05
-72.16
Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez
Constitución
-35.34
-72.39
Llacolen
Concepción
-36.83
-73.07
Chepe railroad bridge over Biobío River
Concepción
-36.82
-73.07
Puerto de Coronel Muelle Norte
Puerto de Coronel Muelle Sur
Coronel
-37.03
-73.15
Raqui 1
Raqui
-37.25
-73.44
Raqui 2
Raqui
-37.25
-73.44
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Site
No.
22
23
24a
24b
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Table 1. Specific sites’ structural names and GPS locations—Continued.
Latitude Longitude
(S)
(W)
Site Name
Location
(degrees)
(degrees)
Tubul
Raqui
-37.23
-73.46
El Bar
Arauco
-37.26
-73.24
Ramadillas (west, old)
Ramadillas (east, new)
Arauco
-37.31
-73.26
Juan Pablo II
Concepción
-36.82
-73.09
Biobío River (old)
Concepción
-36.84
-73.06
La Mochita
Concepción
-36.85
-73.06
Vía Elevada 21 de Mayo/Cruce Ferroviario Concepción
-36.82
-73.07
Rotonda General Bonilla
Concepción
-36.81
-73.03
Itata River
Coelemu
-36.47
-72.69
San Nicolás
San Nicolás
-36.50
-72.21
Muros Talca (SW)
Talca
-35.48
-71.67

1.2 THE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM
1.2.1 Objective
TIRT’s mission was to conduct a thorough postearthquake investigation concentrating on highway
bridges, tunnels, and retaining walls in the areas affected by the earthquake, including the cities
of Concepción and Santiago. Performance of these structures, including damaged and undamaged
conditions, were carefully documented and analyzed. The information gathered from this effort
will be studied, and the results will be used to assess, refine, and improve current design codes
and standards that benefit the United States, Chile, and the general engineering community.
1.2.2 Team Members
TIRT included six members led by the FHWA Office of Infrastructure Research and Development,
including three FHWA representatives, one representative of the American Association of State
and Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO), and two university representatives. Juan G.
Arias, a student representing EERI, joined and assisted the team in the investigation. The team
was coordinated by FHWA’s Sheila Duwadi throughout the preparation, reconnaissance, and
postreconnaissance reporting. The U.S. team members were fully supported by their Chilean
colleagues. Figure 2 shows the team members and local participants. Pictured from left to right are
Daniel Alzamora (FHWA Resource Center), Dr. Ian Buckle (University of Nevada), Dr. Phillip
W. Yen (FHWA team leader), Genda Chen (Missouri University of Science and Technology),
Juan G. Arias (University of Nevada), Rodrigo Oviedo (Pontifical Catholic University of Chile),
Dr. Jeffrey Ger (FHWA Florida Division), Tony Allen (Washington State Department of
Transportation), Sandra Achurra (MOP), and Mauricio Guzman (MOP).
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Figure 2. Photo. TIRT team members and Chilean support personnel.
1.3 REPORT ORGANIZATION
This report presents the preliminary reconnaissance findings of the earthquake performance of
transportation infrastructure based on available information, visual observations, and preliminary
analysis. Chapter 2 describes the seismic details of the earthquake. Chapter 3 presents a summary
of Chilean seismic design codes studied by TIRT, and chapter 4 provides the findings of the
investigation of structural performance. Chapter 5 documents the geotechnical observations of
infrastructure performance, including bridges, retaining walls, and other structures. Chapter 6
presents the lessons learned from this reconnaissance, and chapter 7 offers conclusions and
recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2. GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND GROUND MOTIONS
2.1 BACKGROUND
The USGS Web site and a report provided by the Geotechnical Extreme Events Reconnaissance
(GEER) team were used to provide necessary background information regarding the seismic and
geologic setting for the sites specifically investigated by TIRT.(1,2) Additional information not
available at the time of the USGS posting and the GEER report (e.g., boring logs, ground motion
data, etc.) is also included in this chapter.
2.2 GEOLOGY AND SEISMOLOGY
The offshore Maule earthquake occurred on February 27, 2010, at 3:34 a.m. (local time) at the
boundary between the Nazca and South American tectonic plates.(1) The location of the earthquake’s
epicenter is shown in figure 3 relative to the sites investigated by TIRT, shown as white dots with
black centers and white numbers. The earthquake epicenter, located at 35.909 °S, 72.733 °W, was
approximately 208 mi (335 km) southwest of Santiago, 65.2 mi (105 km) northeast of Concepción,
and 71.4 mi (115 km) west-southwest of Talca. The depth of the earthquake hypocenter was
22 mi (35 km).

© Google, Europa Technologies, DMapas, and Inav/Geosistemas SRL

Figure 3. Map. Location of epicenter, seismic recording stations, and TIRT sites.
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Chile has a long history of severe earthquakes along its approximately 1,860-mi (3,000-km)
coastline. Since the beginning of the 20th century, five earthquakes of M8.0 or higher have
been recorded in Chile: M8.2 in 1906, M8.2 in 1943, M8.0 in 1985, and an M8.2 foreshock that
preceded an M9.5 earthquake in 1960. Since 1973, there have been 13 events of M7.0 or greater.
The February 27, 2010, earthquake originated about 140 mi (230 km) north of the source region
(the point of initial rupture) of the M9.5 earthquake of 1960, the largest instrumentally recorded
earthquake in the world. The 2010 earthquake was approximately 190 mi (300 km) south of the
source region of the M8.2 earthquake of 1906 and approximately 540 mi (870 km) south of the
source region of the M8.5 earthquake of 1922.
Figure 4 shows the spatial relationship between previous earthquakes (M6.5 or greater, 1900–1963
and M5.5 or greater, 1964–present) and the 2010 M8.8 offshore Maule earthquake (depicted by a
yellow star) and its associated aftershocks (depicted by yellow circles). The points of initial rupture
for the M8 or larger earthquakes are denoted by red circles with thick black borders. The estimated
rupture zones of the 1922 M8.5 and 1960 M9.5 earthquakes are marked in white. These rupture zones
were defined by the areal extent of aftershocks or by geological and macroseismic observations.
The 2010 M8.8 earthquake ruptured the portion of the South American subduction zone between
these massive historical earthquakes, with the 1906 and 1922 megaquakes to the north and the 1960
megaquake to the south. The offshore Maule earthquake rupture zone was over 370 mi (600 km)
long and 81 mi (130 km) wide. The last time this portion of the subduction zone ruptured may
have been the 1835 event experienced by Charles Darwin.

Figure 4. Map. Historic seismicity for Chile.(1)
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The 2010 offshore Maule earthquake occurred as thrust faulting on the interface between two plates,
with the Nazca plate moving down and landward below the South American plate. The slip rate
between the two plates is estimated to be approximately 2.7 inches/year (70 mm/year).(3) This rate
is much higher than the slip rate for the Cascadia subduction zone located along coastal Washington
and Oregon (approximately 1.4 inches/year (35 mm/year)), which explains the more frequent
occurrence of this type of event along the Chilean coastline.(4) Ruegg et al. estimated that at least
33 ft (10 m) of slip deficit had accrued on this segment of the plate boundary since the last time
this portion of the subduction zone ruptured in 1835.(3) GPS measurements indicate that the actual
horizontal movement of the overriding plate was as much as 12 ft (3.7 m) to the southwest at
Concepción, 15 ft (4.7 m) at Constitución, and approximately 2 ft (0.5 m) at Santiago.
This type of earthquake is illustrated conceptually in figure 5. Overall, a tectonic plate descends, or
“subducts,” beneath an adjoining plate in a stick-slip fashion. Between earthquakes, the plates slide
freely at great depth, but at shallow depth, they stick together. A key aspect of this type of earthquake
is the buildup of stress at the stuck portion of the boundary. As the upper plate attempts to override
the lower plate, it deforms and is uplifted until the stress is too great. At that point, the stuck
portion of the boundary catastrophically ruptures, allowing the front portion of the upper plate to
spring seaward and upward while the rest of the upper plate relaxes, causing subsidence. Field
observations reported by GEER indicate that the coastline from the vicinity of the epicenter south
to the Arauco peninsula experienced uplift up to approximately 7 ft (2 m), whereas areas north of
Constitución to Bucalemu experienced subsidence of up to about 3 ft (1 m).(2) Observations made
by TIRT at the sites investigated appear to confirm these findings. This type of coseismic
deformation has historically been accompanied by the generation of tsunamis. For the offshore
Maule earthquake, a tsunami that severely impacted the coast north of the epicenter was produced.
As the area to the north of the epicenter also experienced significant coseismic subsidence, tsunami
run-up was increased, resulting in greater onshore damage.

Figure 5. Illustration. Conceptual diagram of a subduction zone earthquake.(2,4)
Another key aspect of this type of earthquake is the tendency of such an event to produce many
strong aftershocks as the plates adjust to the sudden change in stresses following rupture. The
aftershocks themselves can produce a significant hazard to the structures and facilities damaged
by the main shock, as well as to the people within or near the partially damaged structures.
Figure 4 and figure 6 show maps illustrating the number and distribution of aftershocks, some of
which approached M7.0. The cross section of the aftershock locations as a function of depth and
distance in figure 6 illustrates the location of the rupture surface. The hypocenter of the main
shock is marked with a star.
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Figure 6. Illustration. Offshore Maule earthquake aftershock distribution with depth.(5)
2.3 GROUND MOTIONS
The actual ground motions experienced at a particular site depend on the soil type and density
present, as well as the three-dimensional aspects of the local geologic structure beneath and around
the site. In general, as soils become softer or looser, the ground motions tend to increase, especially
at longer periods. Basin effects can also amplify ground motions at a particular site. As the team
traveled throughout the region impacted by the earthquake, it was apparent that damage to
transportation and other structures was concentrated in specific areas, with areas in between showing
little or no damage. GEER reported similar observations and attributed the difference to the
presence of softer silts and clays at the affected sites and, in some cases, to basin effects.(2)
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At the time of this report, the available ground motion data from the offshore Maule earthquake was
limited, and ground motion records were only available from some of the stations identified in
figure 3, shown as small rectangles with blue accelerograms. White icons denote stations where no
accelerogram was available. Yellow icons denote stations where an accelerogram was available but
digital records of the ground motion were not available. Pink icons (only one, in Concepción)
denote stations where digital records of the ground motion were available.
The available records, summarized in table 2, are uncorrected and may be influenced by the
structures in which the measurements were taken. The ground motion records are from two
different sources, Boroschek, et al. and the University of Chile Department of Geophysics.(6,7)
Boroschek, et al. indicated that all ground motion monitoring equipment was in one-story structures,
but in some cases, other types of structures were nearby.(6) All of these records require careful
evaluation due to potential soil-structure interaction effects.(6,7) Specifically, Boroschek, et al. noted
that the high accelerations at the Maipú site were being reviewed for soil-structure interaction
effects. Soil classifications at each of these monitoring sites were being investigated at the time
of this report.(6) Boroschek, et al. also cautioned that the quake data recorder (QDR) only recorded
the first 100 s of motion.(6) However, the motion actually lasted about 140 s. Therefore, the last
40 s of motion is missing from these records. QDR equipment was used for all of the ground
motion records in table 2, except Universidad de Chile Deptartamento de Ingeniería Civil (interior
building); Estación Metro Mirador, Santiago; and Colegio San Pedro, Concepción. Examples of
these ground motions and their respective response spectra (where available) are provided in
figure 7 through figure 14.
Table 2. Summary of available earthquake records for the offshore Maule earthquake.(6)
Maximum
Maximum
Horizontal
Vertical
Source of
Acceleration Acceleration
Location of Monitoring Station
Information
(g)
(g)
Universidad de Chile, Depto.
Ing. Civil (interior building)
RENADIC(6)
0.17
0.14
(6)
Estacion Metro Mirador, Santiago RENADIC
0.24
0.13
CRS Maipú RM
RENADIC(6)
0.56
0.24
(6)
Hospital de Tisné RM
RENADIC
0.30
0.28
Hospital Sótero de Río RM
RENADIC(6)
0.27
0.13
(6)
Hospital de Curicó
RENADIC
0.47
0.20
(6)
Hospital de Valdivia
RENADIC
0.14
0.05
Vina del Mar, Marga Marga
RENADIC(6)
0.35
0.26
(6)
Vina del Mar (Centro)
RENADIC
0.33
0.19
Red Sismológica
0.65 NS,
Colegio San Pedro, Concepción
Nacional
0.58 EW
0.60
San Pedro de la Paz, Colegio
0.65 NS,
Concepción
USGS(8)
0.61 EW
0.58
NS = North-south.
EW = East-west.

11

Figure 7. Illustration. Accelerogram from Universidad de Chile, Depto. Ing. Civil
(interior building).(6)

Figure 8. Illustration. Response spectra from Universidad de Chile,
Depto. Ing. Civil (interior building).(6)
12

Figure 9. Illustration. Accelerogram from CRS Maipú RM.(6)

Figure 10. Illustration. Response spectra from CRS Maipú RM.(6)
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Figure 11. Illustration. Accelerogram from Hospital de Curicó.(6)

Figure 12. Illustration. Response spectra from Hospital de Curicó.(6)
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North-South Direction

PGA = 0.65g Horiz.

East-West Direction

PGA = 0.61g Horiz.

Up-Down Direction

PGA = 0.58g Vert.

Figure 13. Illustration. Accelerogram from San Pedro De La Paz, Colegio Concepción.(8)

Sa for 5% damping
East-West Direction
Sa for 5% damping
Up-Down Direction

Figure 14. Illustration. Response spectra from San Pedro De La Paz, Colegio Concepción.(8)
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Figure 13 is the only time history for which a digital file was available at the time of this report.
For the east-west direction in that time history, the bracketed duration (i.e., A > 0.05 g) was 152 s
and the duration of significant shaking based on normalized Arias intensity was approximately
76 s. Visually and in terms of peak values, this ground motion record is very similar to the one
obtained at Colegio San Pedro. Figure 15 through figure 19 are maps marked with accelerograms
and TIRT structure sites to show the location of the ground motion recording stations relative to
the structure sites visited. The symbols used in figure 3 are also used in these figures. See chapter
1 and chapter 3 for a more detailed description of each structure site.

© Google, Inav/Geosistemas SRL, DMapas, and GeoEye

Figure 15. Map. Locations of ground motion sensors and structures visited by TIRT—
Santiago vicinity.
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© Google, Inav/Geosistemas SRL, DMapas, GeoEye, and DigitalGlobe

Figure 16. Map. Locations of ground motion sensors and structure visited by TIRT—
Santiago to Rancagua.
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© Google, Cnes/Spot Image, DMapas, GeoEye, and DigitalGlobe

Figure 17. Map. Locations of ground motion sensors and structures visited by TIRT—
Curicó, Talca, Iloca vicinity.
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© Google, Inav/Geosistemas SRL, DMapas, and GeoEye

Figure 18. Map. Locations of ground motion sensors and structures visited by TIRT—
Concepción vicinity.
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© Google, DigitalGlobe, DMapas, and GeoEye

Figure 19. Map. Locations of ground motion sensors and structures visited by TIRT—
Maule epicenter to Tubul vicinity.
GEER provided geologic information that can be used in combination with the subsurface
information gathered by TIRT to preliminarily assess the potential effect subsurface conditions
may have had on ground motion severity.(2) The subsurface information gathered by TIRT is
reported in appendix A. For example, the GEER report indicates that relatively soft silts and clays
and, in some cases, ash deposits are likely to be encountered in the western sector of Santiago,
where structure sites 1–6 are located.(2) A boring log obtained for the original bridge design at
sites 1 and 2 indicates that subsurface soils there consist of 16 ft (5 m) of soft to medium stiff
clay underlain by more than 33 ft (10 m) of stiff to very stiff silty clay with layers of fine sand.
Based on the AASHTO and National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) seismic
site classification systems, these soils would likely be classified as Site Class E soils, and significant
ground motion amplification would be expected. The eastern sector of Santiago, where most of the
available earthquake ground motion measurements were taken, generally consists of sands and
gravels. It could therefore be expected that, in general, ground motion measurements in the eastern
sector of Santiago should be less severe than those obtained in the western sector because of better
soil conditions in addition to being farther away from the earthquake epicenter. A comparison of
the ground motions in figure 7 with those in figure 9 appears to support this conclusion—the
peak accelerations in figure 7 (0.17 g) are considerably less than those in figure 9 (0.56 g). The
other ground motion records obtained in the eastern sector of Santiago range from 0.24 g to 0.30 g,
still considerably lower than the peak measured at CRS Maipú RM (see figure 9). The response
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spectra also seem to indicate the potential effect of softer soils in that the peak spectral acceleration
is pushed out to longer periods and the spectral acceleration magnitude is two to four times higher
than that of the eastern sites. Based on the location of the first six sites, a reasonable preliminary
conclusion is that the acceleration time history and response spectra for CRS Maipú RM, shown
in figure 9 and figure 10, are most representative of the ground motions that occurred at the first
six bridge sites. Once subsurface geotechnical data for these earthquake ground motion monitoring
sites becomes available and the soil-structure interaction effect is fully investigated, these
preliminary conclusions can be confirmed.
The next set of structure sites, sites 7–10, are probably on the margin of the poorer soil conditions
based on the geologic data published by GEER.(2) However, some geotechnical boring information
is available at sites 7, 8, and 10 indicating the presence of at least 33 to 49 ft (10 to 15 m) of
medium to stiff silty clays or sandy silts, with stiff to hard silts and clays and some dense sand or
gravel layers at depth (see appendix A). Based on the AASHTO and NEHRP classification systems,
these soils would likely be classified as Site Class D or E soils, and significant ground motion
amplification would be expected. Again, the CRS Maipú RM ground motions (shown in figure 9
and figure 10) appear to be the most applicable to these structure sites with due consideration
given to the cautionary issues previously discussed.
Sites 11–13 and 32 are far enough away from Santiago that closer ground motion records should
be used. The only ground motion record available in this area is the one at Curicó (see figure 11
and figure 12). The GEER report does not provide specific geologic information, but deposits at
Talca (south of Curicó) are likely to be alluvial and marine sediments and are probably highly
variable.(2) Therefore, the strength of the ground motions in this region is likely to be highly
variable, as indicated by the inconsistent damage to structures and facilities.
South of Talca and closer to the coast, the ground motion records in the interior may not be
representative of the ground motions experienced, considering proximity to the epicenter and
subsurface conditions present. Fortunately, two ground motion records are available in Concepción
(see figure 13). According to GEER, Concepción has both poor soils (loose alluvial and marine
deposits) and a geologic structure, due to major faults running through the area, that could contribute
to amplification of ground motion (see figure 20 and figure 21).(2) Damage due to the offshore
Maule earthquake was particularly severe in Concepción. The spatial distribution of the damage
is apparently similar to the damage seen during the 1960 M9.5 event, trending along parallel linear
zones. This similarity shows the effect geologic basin structure and soil deposits may have had on
the ground motions. The location of the Colegio San Pedro monitoring station is shown in
figure 21. This monitoring station is located in between two significantly damaged areas. Therefore,
it is not clear if the Colegio San Pedro ground motion record, which is similar to the San Pedro de
la Paz record provided in figure 13, represents the most damaged areas. Considering the high peak
acceleration of 0.65 g in the horizontal direction and 0.60 g in the vertical direction, the long
duration, and the similarity to the San Pedro de la Paz ground motion, a reasonable preliminary
conclusion is that these two ground motion records are representative of what occurred in the
significantly damaged areas. While it is unknown if there are any geologic basin issues for the
sites farther south (e.g., sites near Tubul), the soil conditions are obviously poor and probably
similar to conditions in parts of Concepción (see chapter 5). Therefore, this ground motion
should be considered applicable to sites 17–29.
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1 km = 0.621 mi

Figure 20. Illustration. Geologic cross section of Concepción.(2)

Figure 21. Map. Damaged sections in downtown Concepción.(2)
Not much information is available on the subsurface conditions of sites 15, 16, and 30–32, and there
are no nearby ground motion records for those locations. Until more is known, a compromise
between the Curicó and Concepción ground motions could be used for preliminary analyses.
Once more ground motion records and geotechnical subsurface data are available to confirm these
conclusions (based primarily on geologic mapping), the ground motions most applicable to each
structure site can be better assessed.
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CHAPTER 3. OVERVIEW OF BRIDGE PERFORMANCE AND SEISMIC DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS IN CHILE
3.1 OVERVIEW OF BRIDGE PERFORMANCE
3.1.1 Damage Statistics
Of the nearly 12,000 bridges in Chile, about 200 were damaged in the offshore Maule earthquake,
including 20 structures with one or more collapsed spans. These 12,000 bridges include about
4,750 culverts and pedestrian overcrossings and 7,250 highway bridges. Of the highway bridges,
6,800 are publicly owned by MOP and 450 are owned by private companies called concessions,
which have designed and constructed several major toll roads in Chile. Table 3 shows some
damage statistics.
Table 3. Number of damaged bridges.
Number of Number of
Number of damaged
collapsed
1
2
Owner
bridges
bridges
bridges3
MOP
6,800
103
10
Concessions
Total

450
7,250

100
203

8
18

1

Excluding culverts and pedestrian overcrossings.
Including bridges with collapsed spans.
3
Bridges with one or more collapsed spans.
2

3.1.2 Bridges Visited By Reconnaissance Team
As noted in chapter 1, TIRT visited 41 damaged bridges at 32 sites in Chile from Santiago to
Arauco over a 9-day period from April 4 to 13, 2010. Table 4 provides a summary of the bridges
visited along with brief notes about the observed damage. The locations of these sites are shown
in figure 1 and figure 3.
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Table 4. Bridges visited by reconnaissance team.
Site
No.
1a
1b
2a
2b
3
4

5
6a

24

6b

6c

6d
7
8
9
10a
10b
11
12

Site Name
Américo Vespucio/
Miraflores eastbound
Américo Vespucio/
Miraflores westbound
Américo Vespucio/
Lo Echevers eastbound
Américo Vespucio/
Lo Echevers westbound
I-5/14 de la Fama
Pedestrian bridge over
Route 5
Quilicura railway crossing
at Avenida Manuel Antonio
Matta
Américo Vespucio/
Independencia westbound
Américo Vespucio/
Independencia eastbound
Américo Vespucio/
Independencia westbound
exit ramp
Américo Vespucio/
Independencia westbound
entrance ramp
Avenida Romero Acceso
Sur overpass
Avenida Chada Acceso Sur
overpass
Maipú River
Route 5 railway crossing at
Hospital westbound
Route 5 railway crossing at
Hospital eastbound
Estribo Francisco Mostazal
(Avenida Independencia)
Las Mercedes Route 5
overpass

13a
Claro River
See notes at end of table.

Location

Structure Description

Year
Built

Type

Geometry

Damage

3 spans, PC-PSC, 5-column bents, seat abutment, MSE walls, tie downs

Skewed

Collapsed

3 spans, PC-PSC, 5-column bents, seat abutment, MSE walls, tie downs

Skewed

Collapsed

3 spans, PC-PSC, 5-column bents, seat abutment, MSE walls, tie downs

Skewed

Collapsed

3 spans, PC-PSC, 5-column bents, seat abutment, MSE walls, tie downs
15 spans, PC-PSC, 5-column bents, seat abutment, MSE walls, tie downs

Skewed
Straight

Moderate
Moderate

Santiago

3 spans, 2 SG, single columns

Straight

Collapsed

Santiago

3 spans, 5 SG, 5-column bents, seat abutment, CIP walls

Skewed

Collapsed

6 spans, PC-PSC, 5-column bents, seat abutment, MSE walls, tie downs
4 spans, PC-PSC, flared bents, diaphragms, seat abutment, MSE walls,
seismic bars

Straight

Severe

Straight

Moderate

4 spans, PC-PSC, 1-column bent, seat abutment, MSE walls, tie downs

Curved

Minor

3 spans, RC box girder, single-column bents, seat abutment, CIP walls
2 spans, PC-PSC, 4-column bents, seismic bars, seat abutment, earth
embankment
2 spans, PC-PSC, 4-column bents, seismic bars, seat abutment, earth
embankment
13 spans, RC girders, A-shaped RC piers, diaphragm

Curved

Minor

Skewed

Collapsed

Straight
Straight

Severe
Severe

2 spans, PC-PSC, 3-column bents, seat abutment, tie downs

Skewed

Collapsed

Santiago

Santiago
Santiago

2004

Santiago

2004

Paine

2001

Paine
Buin

2001
1970

Buin

2001

2 spans, PC-PSC, wall-pier bents, seat abutment, diaphragms, tie downs

Skewed

Minor

Santiago

2001

Skewed

Minor

Rancagua

2001

1 span, PC-PSC, seat abutment, seismic bars
2 spans, PC-PSC, 2-column bents, seismic bars, seat abutment, earth
embankment

Straight

Severe

San Rafael

1870

7 spans, brick masonry arch (1870)

Straight

Collapsed

Table 4. Bridges visited by reconnaissance team—Continued.
Site
No.
13b
14
15
16
17

18
19a
19b
20

25

21
22
23
24a
24b
25
26
27

Site Name
Claro River
Pichibudis
Mataquito
Cardenal Raúl Silva
Henríquez
Llacolen
Chepe railroad bridge over
Biobío River
Puerto de Coronel Muelle
Norte
Puerto de Coronel Muelle
Sur
Raqui 1

Location
San Rafael
Iloca
Iloca
Constitución
Concepción

Concepción

Year
Built

2008
2002
2000
1889,
retrofitted
in 2005

Coronel
Raqui

Raqui 2
Raqui
Tubul
Raqui
El Bar
Arauco
Ramadillas (west, old)
Ramadillas (east, new)
Arauco
Juan Pablo II
Concepción
Biobío River (old)
Concepción
La Mochita
Concepción
Vía Elevada 21 de
28
Mayo/Cruce Ferroviario
Concepción
29
Rotonda General Bonilla
Concepción
30
Itata River
Coelemu
31
San Nicolás
San Nicolás
32
Muros Talca (SW)
Talca
LRB = Lead-rubber bearing
PC-PSC = Precast prestressed concrete I-girders.
SG = Steel girders.
RC = Reinforced concrete.
MSE = Mechanically stabilized earth walls.
CIP = Cast-in-place RC walls.
Note: Blank cells indicate unavailable data.

1964
1943
2005

2010
1990

Structure Description
Type
5 spans, RC arch, approach spans seat abutment
1 span, 2 SG, seat abutment
4 spans, PC-PSC, 3-column bents, seat abutment, diaphragm, seismic bars

Geometry
Straight
Straight
Straight

Damage
Minor
Moderate

22 spans, 3 SG, multicolumn bents, seat abutment
Long bridge, PC-PSC, multicolumn bents, seat abutment

Straight
Straight

Moderate
Collapse

Long bridge, truss, steel-pipe column supports, CIP walls

Straight

Moderate

Wharf with steel pile bents and RC deck

Straight

Moderate

Wharf with steel pile bents, RC deck, LRB base isolation system
2 spans, SG, wall-type bents, seat-type abutment

Straight
Straight

None
Minor

4 spans, SG, wall-type intermediate bent, seat-type abutment
8 spans, 3 SG, wall pier bents, seat abutments, diaphragm, seismic bars
1 span, 2 SG, seat abutments, retrofitted bridge
14 spans, pier-wall bent, 4 steel beams, seat abutment
8 spans, 3 SG, wall pier bents, seat abutment, diaphragm, seismic bars
Multispan bridge, PC-PSC, multicolumn bents, seat abutment
Multispan bridge, 3 steel beams, pier-wall bents, seat abutment (1943)
4 spans, PC-PSC, 2-column bents, seat abutment, seismic bars

Straight
Straight
Straight
Straight
Straight
Straight
Straight
Straight

Collapsed
Collapsed
Moderate
Collapse
Settlement
Settlement
Collapsed
Severe

2 spans, RC beams, multicolumn bent, seat abutments
5 spans, 5 SG, 6-column bents, seat abutments
22 spans, 2 SG, pier-wall bents, seat abutments
2 spans, PC-PSC, pier-wall bent, seat abutments
1 span, PC-PSC, seat abutment, diaphragm, seismic bars

Skewed
Straight
Straight
Straight
Skewed

Collapsed
Minor
Moderate
Severe
Moderate

3.1.3 Damage Summary
The following principal types of damage were observed:
•

Span unseating due to lack of transverse diaphragms and shear keys in precast pretressed
concrete superstructures.

•

Span unseating due to skew and insufficient support length.

•

Span unseating due to ground movement caused by liquefaction-induced spreading.

•

Girder distortion, column damage, and heavy scour due to tsunami wave forces.

•

Column failure due to ground movement caused by liquefaction-induced spreading.

Detailed descriptions of the damage types are given in chapter 4 and chapter 5.
Many of the bridges built by concessions used precast prestressed concrete girder superstructures
without diaphragms or shear keys for transverse restraint. Vertical rods called seismic bars and
hold-down ties were used to prevent uplift after high vertical ground accelerations were recorded
during the 1985 earthquake. These rods and ties were largely ineffective in the transverse direction,
and many spans slid sideways on their cap beams. This lack of restraint also allowed a number of
two-span bridges to rotate about a vertical axis through the pier and slide off their abutment seats.
In addition, several skewed spans with diaphragms and shear keys rotated about a vertical axis
and were unseated in their acute corners due to insufficient support length. Straight bridges built
before the concession era and those with cast-in-place (CIP) diaphragms and concrete shear keys
performed well.
Despite higher than anticipated spectral accelerations, column damage was slight, perhaps because
the lack of transverse restraint and insufficient support length allowed many superstructures to
separate from their substructures, limiting the demand on the columns. When the superstructure did
not separate, column damage was more likely to occur, such as with the shear failures due to
imposed displacements from liquefaction-induced lateral spreading in several columns under the
approach spans to the Juan Pablo II bridge across the Biobío River in Concepción.
In addition to this bridge, liquefaction-induced lateral spreading or settlement is believed to be
responsible for the collapse or serious damage of many other structures along the coast, including
the Llacolen, Chepe, Ramadillas, and Tubul bridges.
Bridges on coastal highways also sustained tsunami damage, such as the lateral distortion of the
superstructure of the Pichibudis bridge just north of Iloca, the undermining of several piers due
to scour, and the puncture of steel pile bents by floating debris in the Cardenal Raúl Silva
Henríquez bridge across the Maule River at Constitución.
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3.2. SEISMIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR BRIDGES
In Chile, as in other highly seismic countries, earthquake engineering has evolved over time, and
advancements can be linked to the occurrence of large earthquakes.
According to Rodrigo Flores, the first step toward modern seismic design in Chile occurred after the
1906 Valparaiso earthquake, when the government created the Chilean Seismological Institute.(9)
After the 1928 Talca earthquake, another important step was taken with the passage of the 1931
Act of Construction and Urbanization, which established basic requirements for the seismic design
of buildings. This document evolved over time until the 1972 creation of the Chilean Seismic Code
for Buildings, which was based on U.S. and Japanese seismic codes. After the 1985 earthquake,
studies were conducted to develop uniform risk maps for the country and three seismic zones were
established, with the highest risk occurring along the Pacific Coast. This zoning was reflected in
a 1996 update of the seismic building code.
Seismic design methodologies for bridges have also been based on U.S. and Japanese experience.
According to Alex Unión and Rodolfo Saragoni, the design of concrete bridges in Chile before
1950 was based on the handbook published by Alberto Claro Velasco, Normas para el Cálculo y
Proyecto de Puentes Carreteros de Hormigón Armado (Standards for the Design and Protection
of Reinforced Concrete Road Bridges). After the mid-1950s, most designs were based on the
AASHTO Standard Specifications for Highway Bridge Design.(10)
Before the mid-1980s, the seismic design coefficient for bridges was 0.12. This coefficient was
increased to 0.15 following the 1985 earthquake, and a modified version of Division I-A of the
AASHTO Standard Specifications was adopted in 1998. The design coefficient was not changed
until 2001 when three seismic zones were introduced with peak ground accelerations (PGAs) of
0.2, 0.3, and 0.4 g (see figure 22). In addition, the soil factors were modified along with the response
modification factors, and an allowance for the effect of scour was introduced. Column design was
required to be in accordance with the AASHTO requirements for Seismic Performance Categories C
and D of Division I-A.(10) These provisions can be found in section 3.1004 of the MOP Manual
de Carreteras (Highway Handbook) and are summarized in appendix B.(11)
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Figure 22. Map. Seismic zone map for central Chile.(11)
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CHAPTER 4. STRUCTURAL PERFORMANCE OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
4.1 OVERVIEW
General observations of damage to highway bridges are reported in this chapter. The bridges are
organized according to bridge type, such as concrete and steel girder superstructures, arches, and
trusses. They are further divided into regular and irregular structures in terms of skew angle and
curvature. The bridge site numbers are provided for reference.
The following bridges are discussed in section 4.2, Performance of Straight Concrete Bridges:
•

Independencia (sites 6a–6d).

•

Avenida Chada (site 8).

•

Las Mercedes (site 12).

•

Llacolen (site 17).

•

Juan Pablo II (site 25).

•

Ramadillas (sites 24a and 24b).

The following bridges are discussed in section 4.3, Performance of Skewed and Curved Concrete
and Steel Bridges:
•

Miraflores (sites 1a and 1b).

•

Lo Echevers (sites 2a and 2b).

•

Avenida Romero (site 7).

•

Route 5 railway overcrossing at Hospital (sites 10a and 10b).

•

Matta Quilicura (site 5).

The following bridges are discussed in section 4.4, Performance of Straight Steel Bridges:
•

Tubul (site 22).

•

Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez (site 16).

•

Biobío River (old) (site 26).

•

Pichibudis (site 14).

•

El Bar (site 23).
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•

Itata (site 30).

•

Pedestrian bridge over Route 5 (site 4).

Lastly, the following bridges are discussed in section 4.5, Performance of Other Bridge Types:
•

Claro River (sites 13a and 13b).

•

Chepe railroad bridge over Biobío River (site 18).

•

Maipú River (sites 9a–9c).

4.2 PERFORMANCE OF STRAIGHT CONCRETE BRIDGES
4.2.1 Américo Vespucio/Independencia
Two bridges oriented in the east-west direction and two ramps connected to westbound traffic
were inspected at this site. The eastbound bridge, built in 2004, is a four-span structure with five
discontinuous precast prestressed girders and a continuous deck. It almost collapsed during the
earthquake, experiencing a lateral offset of greater than 1.6 ft (0.5 m), as indicated by the use of
temporary heavy supports shown in figure 23 through figure 25. The superstructure had steel
stoppers but no intermediate or end diaphragms. As shown in figure 24 and figure 25, both the
curtain wall of the abutment and the steel stoppers were significantly damaged. Each stopper was
anchored with two bolts embedded in the cap beam at a depth of 35 inches (900 mm), as shown
in figure 26. Steel stoppers were mainly used to restrain the vertical movement of girders.

Figure 23. Photo. Damage to eastbound Independencia bridge.

Figure 24. Photo. Curtain wall at east abutment of eastbound Independencia bridge.
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Figure 25. Photo. Damage to steel stoppers on eastbound Independencia bridge.

Source: MOP

Figure 26. Illustration. Details of steel stoppers.
The westbound bridge, built in 1997, is a four-span structure with six discontinuous precast
prestressed girders and a continuous deck. Each bent has two flared wall piers, as shown in
figure 27. The bridge was designed with both intermediate and end diaphragms. The bridge
survived the earthquake with excessive deformations in the seismic bars and damage to concrete
shear keys at abutments and intermediate bents (see figure 28 through figure 30).
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Seismic bars

Figure 27. Photo. Typical flared wall pier of westbound Independencia bridge.

Figure 28. Photo. Displaced seismic bar on westbound Independencia bridge.

Figure 29. Photo. Shear key damage at abutment of westbound Independencia bridge.

Figure 30. Photo. Shear key damage at intermediate bents of westbound
Independencia bridge.
In comparison to the eastbound bridge, the presence of diaphragms seems to have helped maintain
the structural integrity of the westbound bridge. More importantly, the concrete shear keys of the
westbound bridge served their design purpose during the earthquake, as opposed to the steel stoppers
in the eastbound bridge. No visible foundation damage was observed for either structure.
Additional views of the shear key damage in the westbound bridge and its entrance ramp are shown
in figure 31 through figure 33. As shown in figure 31, shear key failures occurred in almost the
entire structure. The entrance ramp next to the bridge is supported on two hammerhead piers at
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the intermediate bents, as shown on figure 32. The shear keys at the abutment were damaged.
Figure 33 shows an approximately 1.5-inch (38-mm)-wide gap between the abutment and the
surrounding soil caused by strong ground shaking.

Figure 31. Photo. Westbound Independencia bridge.

Figure 32. Photo. Entrance ramp to westbound Independencia bridge.

Figure 33. Photo. Shear key damage at entrance ramp abutment.
The exit ramp for westbound traffic remained in service after the earthquake. Minor damage due
to pounding in the corner of the beam recess was observed on a flared wall pier close to the
westbound bridge, as shown in figure 34 and figure 35.

Figure 34. Photo. Flared wall pier of exit ramp from westbound Independencia bridge.
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Figure 35. Photo. Close-up of damage to exit ramp from westbound Independencia bridge.
4.2.2 Avenida Chada Acceso Sur Overpass
The two-span Chada overpass, shown in figure 36 through figure 39, is oriented approximately
east-west. The bridge superstructure was displaced significantly and rotated counterclockwise in
plan during the earthquake. The transverse offset between the deck and abutment seats ranged from
25 to 30 inches (640 to 780 mm). The longitudinal gap between the end of girders and the abutment
was 3.5 inches (90 mm). The bottom flange and web of the exterior precast girder that hit the
curtain walls at each abutment failed in shear, as shown in figure 36. The failure of the bottom
flange can be seen in figure 37. The two curtain walls at the intermediate bent were both damaged,
as shown in figure 38. The bridge experienced strong shaking, indicated by an induced gap around
the columns, as shown in figure 39. No structural damage was observed in the bridge columns.

Figure 36. Photo. Curtain wall shear failure at abutment of Chada bridge.

Figure 37. Photo. Bottom flange damage to Chada bridge.

34

Figure 38. Photo. Curtain wall damage at bent of Chada bridge.

Figure 39. Photo. Soil separation from column of Chada bridge.
Although the bridge is not skewed, significant rotation was observed in its superstructure, as
illustrated in figure 40. In the absence of restraint at the abutments (i.e., no diaphragm), the period
of the rotational mode of vibration was shorter than the translational modes and appeared to have
been strongly excited in the earthquake either by the translational components of the ground
motion or by the rotational component. If the former, some degree of eccentricity between the
centers of mass and stiffness would need to be present, which is quite likely given the slumping
of the abutment fills and the duration of shaking.

64cm

78cm
1 cm = 0.39 inches

Figure 40. Illustration. Plan view of superstructure rotation of Chada bridge.
4.2.3 Las Mercedes Route 5 Overpass
The two-span Las Mercedes overpass is oriented approximately east-west and is a concrete-girder
structure with a slight skew, as shown in figure 41. The superstructure comprises three precast
prestressed girders and is supported on a two-column intermediate bent and two seat-type
abutments, all resting on drilled shafts. Two seismic bars (deformed rebar) were installed
between pairs of adjacent girders at all supports. Like the Chada bridge, the Las Mercedes bridge
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experienced a significant counterclockwise rotation during the earthquake. The exterior girders
rotated off their abutment seats at both ends, resulting in a longitudinal crack between the
exterior and interior girders in the deck slab.

Figure 41. Photo. Las Mercedes bridge and girder unseating at abutments.
In addition, one transverse crack across the bridge deck was observed at the intermediate bent.
The curtain walls were severely damaged when struck by the bridge superstructure. Temporary
supports were provided for the unseated exterior girders, as shown in figure 41.
4.2.4 Llacolen Bridge Over Biobío River
The Llacolen bridge, a major crossing over the Biobío River in Concepción is oriented
approximately northeast-southwest and is a multispan, simply supported concrete girder bridge.
Each span consists of a deck slab and six precast prestressed girders that are supported on two
five-column bents with an inverted-T cap beam. Two seismic bars are provided between each
pair of adjacent girders. Figure 42 shows a general view of the bridge.

East
abutment

Biobío River

West
abutment

Figure 42. Photo. Llacolen bridge looking south-southwest.
As shown in figure 43, a simply supported span in the eastern approach to the bridge dropped from
its seat at the river end of the span, and a temporary Bailey bridge was erected to give traffic access
to the main crossing. As shown in figure 44, the end bent supporting the unseated span remained
intact except for concrete spalling underneath the cap beam, as shown in figure 45. The seismic
bars shown in figure 44 were deformed almost 180 degrees as the span collapsed and they were
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pulled from the diaphragms. The columns supporting the cap beam experienced flexural cracks
at the level of the rock rip rap on the bank below the bridge (see figure 46 and figure 47). The
cracks appeared on the river side of the columns, where tension developed as the superstructure
held the columns against the lateral movement imposed on the foundations by liquefaction-induced
lateral spreading of the banks. The bent and columns at the opposite end of the unseated span
were undamaged. However, as shown in figure 48, the nearby ground settled up to 1.3 ft (0.4 m)
and experienced significant shaking, resulting in a 0.82-ft (0.25-m) separation between the
columns and their surrounding ground.

Bailey bridge

Figure 43. Photo. Unseated simply supported span in eastern approach to Llacolen bridge.

Deformed
Seismic Bars

Figure 44. Photo. Abutment at unseated end of span in eastern approach to Llacolen bridge.

Seismic bars
Concrete spalling

Figure 45. Photo. Concrete spalling beneath cap beam of eastern approach to Llacolen bridge.
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Figure 46. Photo. Flexural cracks at the level of rip rap
on eastern approach to Llacolen bridge.

Figure 47. Photo. Close-up view of cracks at the level of rip rap
on eastern approach to Llacolen bridge.

Settled 1.3 ft (0.4 m);
separated 0.82 ft (0.25 m)

Figure 48. Photo. Ground settlement and lateral movement
of eastern approach to Llacolen bridge.
The entrance ramp for westbound traffic is a three-span simply supported box girder bridge. The
girders are supported on wall piers with neoprene pads and fitted with seismic bars. The ramp
was almost unseated at the river end of the last span, as shown in figure 49 and figure 50. At one
intermediate bent, the seismic bars were rusty and the neoprene pads had degraded, as shown in
figure 51 through figure 53.
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Figure 49. Photo. Exterior face of westbound ramp to Llacolen bridge at the river end.

Figure 50. Photo. Interior face of westbound ramp to Llacolen bridge at the river end.

Figure 51. Photo. Bent of westbound ramp to Llacolen bridge.

Seismic bar

Figure 52. Photo. Seismic bar condition on westbound ramp to Llacolen bridge.
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Neoprene pad

Figure 53. Photo. Neoprene pad degradation on westbound ramp to Llacolen bridge.
At the west end of the Llacolen bridge, soil settlement and liquefaction were observed at multiple
locations near the bridge bents, as shown in figure 54 and figure 55. Pounding-induced damage was
also observed at the supports of precast girders, as shown in figure 56 and figure 57. Minor damage
also occurred when the girders engaged the concrete keys on the west abutment (see figure 58).

Figure 54. Photo. Columns with soil marks indicating ground settlement
at west end of Llacolen bridge.

Figure 55. Photo. Sand boils near columns at west end of Llacolen bridge.

Figure 56. Photo. Spalling in deck slab at west end of Llacolen bridge.
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Figure 57. Photo. Horizontal crack in web of end girders at west end of Llacolen bridge.

Figure 58. Photo. Spalling of shear key at southwest abutment of Llacolen bridge.
4.2.5 Juan Pablo II Bridge Over Biobío River
The Juan Pablo II bridge is another major crossing over the Biobío River in Concepción. It is
oriented northeast-southwest. The northern approach to this bridge is part of an interchange that
provides access to the bridge from a riverfront highway, as shown in figure 59. In addition to exit
and entrance ramps, the interchange comprises a two-span approach structure and a two-span
highway overpass. Each bridge superstructure consists of discontinuous precast prestressed
girders and a continuous deck.

Juan Pablo II Bridge

Two-span bridge

Biobío River

Figure 59. Photo. Approaches to Juan Pablo II bridge.
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Bridge over riverfront highway

Although the riverfront overpass was generally undamaged, the two-span approach structure was
damaged both globally and locally at the intermediate bent. As shown in figure 60 through figure 62,
the intermediate bent had settled with respect to the two end bents, leading to a substantial depression
in the roadway surface. This intermediate bent comprises two rectangular columns that most likely
experienced uneven liquefaction-induced settlement during the earthquake (see figure 63). The
consequential change in stiffness between the two columns shifted the longitudinal seismic force
from one column to the other, which then failed in shear, as shown in figure 64. The transverse
reinforcement of the failed column was spaced at 17.8 inches (457 mm). Figure 65 and figure 66
show the soil surface prior to the earthquake on the face of undamaged column and cracking in
the cap beam above.

Figure 60. Photo. Southwest view of northern approach to Juan Pablo II bridge,
facing Biobío River.

Figure 61. Photo. Northeast view of northern approach to Juan Pablo II bridge,
facing away from Biobío River.

Figure 62. Photo. Intermediate bent of northern approach to Juan Pablo II bridge.
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Column settled with
surrounding soils

Figure 63. Photo. Column settlement under approach to Juan Pablo II bridge
(cracks on far side).

Column failed
in shear

Figure 64. Photo. Reduced column height due to shear failure under approach
to Juan Pablo II bridge.

Soil surface
prior to earthquake

Figure 65. Photo. Soil surface on far side of undamaged column under approach
to Juan Pablo II bridge.
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Figure 66. Photo. Cracks on far side of undamaged column under approach
to Juan Pablo II bridge.
Consistent with the behavior of the approach structure, the spans of the main bridge also appeared
to have experienced uneven support settlement, which tilted the columns and rotated the bridge
deck about the centerline of the bridge, as seen in figure 67.

Cracks
Bridge
Settlements

Figure 67. Photo. Differential settlement underneath first span over water
at northern end of Juan Pablo II bridge.
In addition, lateral spreading of the northeast bank pushed the columns of the bent toward the river.
However, this movement was restrained by the superstructure, and the columns were consequently
placed in single shear. One failed catastrophically (see figure 68 through figure 70), and the other
was seriously damaged (see figure 71). The difference in behavior between the two columns might
have been due to the uneven settlement and rotation of the bridge deck. The longitudinal movement
of the first column was approximately 21.8 inches (559 mm) at the top of the shear plane and
15.8 inches (406 mm) at the bottom. Similar behavior was also observed in the Llacolen bridge, but
the damage to the columns was not as severe.
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Figure 68. Photo. Shear failure in upstream column at northern end of Juan Pablo II bridge.

Figure 69. Photo. Front face of failure plane at northern end of Juan Pablo II bridge.

Figure 70. Photo. Back face of failure plane at northern end of Juan Pablo II bridge.
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Figure 71. Photo. Shear failure in downstream column at northern end
of Juan Pablo II bridge.
4.2.6 Ramadillas Bridges
Two bridges cross the Piteateo River close to the town of Ramadillas in Arauco (see figure 72).
The bridges are generally oriented north-south. The east bridge is a relatively new structure with
total length of approximately 853 ft (260 m) comprising eight spans spaced at 105 ft (32 m). The
superstructure is composed of three parallel precast prestressed girders simply supported between
piers and a reinforced concrete deck. The substructure is composed of two seat-type abutments and
seven intermediate wall-type piers (see figure 73 and figure 74). Reinforced concrete diaphragms
are used at each abutment and intermediate pier with vertical restrainers and shear keys. This
structure has two lanes, one for each direction of traffic.

© Google and GeoEye

Figure 72. Photo. Satellite image of Ramadillas bridges.
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S. Abutment

N. Abutment

Wall-type pier
n
Figure 73. Photo. Side view of east Ramadillas bridge.

RC Diaphragm

Shear key

Wall-type pier

Figure 74. Photo. Wall-type pier beneath east Ramadillas bridge.
During the earthquake, the piers near the river settled due to liquefaction, causing vertical
misalignment of the deck, as shown in figure 75. Sand boils appeared at the bottom of some
piers, as shown in figure 76.

Settlement
Figure 75. Photo. Deck misalignment under east Ramadillas bridge.
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Sand boils
Figure 76. Photo. Sand boils close to pier under east Ramadillas bridge.
The west Ramadillas bridge is an older structure that was closed to vehicular traffic at the time of
the earthquake. The total length is approximately 850 ft (260 m) with 14 spans of about 60.7 ft
(18.5 m). The superstructure is composed of four parallel steel girders simply supported at the piers
and a reinforced concrete deck. The substructure is composed of two seat-type abutments and
13 intermediate wall-type piers (see figure 77 and figure 78). Steel X-braced cross frames were
provided at the ends of each span as well as at midspan locations. The girders were anchored to the
piers by two anchor bolts, one on each side of the bottom flange.

Steel girders
and X-bracing
Wall-type pier

Figure 77. Photo. Overview of west Ramadillas bridge.
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Steel girders
and X-bracing

Concrete spalling
Figure 78. Photo. Abutment damage beneath west Ramadillas bridge.
In addition to large inertial forces, significant settlement and lateral flow occurred due to
liquefaction during the earthquake. As a consequence, one of the wall piers tilted significantly,
and the adjacent span was unseated, as shown in figure 79 and figure 80.

Column rotation

Collapsed slab

Figure 79. Photo. Pier rotation in collapsed span of west Ramadillas bridge.

Sand boils
Figure 80. Photo. Sand boils near collapsed span in west Ramadillas bridge.
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The largest settlements and lateral flows were observed in the river bank under the south
abutments of both bridges. Figure 81 through figure 83 show the extent of these effects.

Soil surface
before
earthquake

Soil sliding

Figure 81. Photo. Settlement at south abutment under east Ramadillas bridge.

Soil sliding

Figure 82. Photo. Sliding at south abutment under west Ramadillas bridge.

Soil sliding
Soil sliding

Figure 83. Photo. Block flow toward river due to liquefaction on south bank
of Ramadillas bridges.
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4.3 PERFORMANCE OF SKEWED AND CURVED CONCRETE AND STEEL BRIDGES
4.3.1 Américo Vespucio/Miraflores
At the Miraflores bridge site, two parallel bridges collapsed, as shown in figure 84 through figure 88.
These bridges for southwest-bound and northeast-bound traffic did not have end diaphragms and
appear to have had an S-shaped superelevation. Each three-span precast prestressed girder bridge
had five discontinuous girders and a continuous deck slab. The abutments and two intermediate
piers were skewed to approximately 20 degrees. Each girder was supported on a neoprene pad
and a concrete pedestal at both ends. The girders were restrained by a pair of steel stoppers with
0.4- and 2-inch (10- and 50-mm) gaps for vertical and horizontal motions. Details of the steel
stoppers are shown in figure 26.

NE abutment
Top view

Bottom view
Source: MOP

Figure 84. Photo. Northeast end of Miraflores bridge.

SW abutment

Source: MOP

Figure 85. Photo. Southwest end of Miraflores bridge.

Source: MOP

Figure 86. Photo. Top view of Miraflores bridge from far side
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Source: MOP

Figure 87. Photo. Bottom view of Miraflores bridge from near side.

Source: MOP

Figure 88. Photo. Collapsed span of Miraflores bridge.
During the earthquake, one end span of each bridge fell from its seat-type abutment support. The
other end span of one bridge was partially unseated. After the spans were removed, it was clear that
the entire bridge superstructure rotated clockwise in plan as the acute corner of the bridge moved
away from its supporting abutment (see figure 89 through figure 91). As a result, the curtain walls
on all abutments suffered damage in the acute corners. The steel stoppers experienced little
bending deformation, but their anchor bolts were either substantially deformed or sheared off.

Abutment curtain
walls damaged
NE abutment

Figure 89. Photo. Miraflores bridge after removal of superstructure.
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Acute corner (damage
on curtain wall)

Steel Stopper

Figure 90. Photo. Acute corner of southwest abutment of Miraflores bridge.
Obtuse corner (no damage
on curtain wall)

Concrete Pedestal

Figure 91. Photo. Obtuse corner of southwest abutment of Miraflores bridge.
4.3.2 Américo Vespucio/Lo Echevers
At the Lo Echevers bridge site, two parallel bridges had spans of 91.3, 119.1, and 91.3 ft (27.84,
36.32, and 27.84 m). As shown in figure 92 and figure 93, the southwest-bound bridge suffered
minor damage while the northeast-bound bridge collapsed. The bridges did not have end
diaphragms and appeared to have had an S-shaped superelevation. Each three-span precast
prestressed girder bridge had five discontinuous girders and a continuous deck slab. The
abutments and two intermediate piers were skewed approximately 33 degrees. Each girder was
supported on a neoprene pad and a concrete pedestal at both ends. The girders were restrained by
a pair of steel stoppers with 0.4- and 2-inch (10- and 50-mm) gaps for vertical and horizontal
motions. Details of the steel stoppers are shown in figure 26.

Source: MOP

Figure 92. Photo. Collapsed northeast-bound Lo Echevers bridge.
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Source: MOP

Figure 93. Photo. Three unseated spans of northeast-bound Lo Echevers bridge.
During the earthquake, the bridge superstructure rotated clockwise in plan as the acute corners of
the bridge moved away from their supporting abutments. Some of the anchor bolts fractured, as
shown in figure 94, and the elastomeric bearings seemed to have been displaced during the
earthquake, as shown in figure 95. These bearings showed significant lateral bulging and may
have been overstressed under gravity loads.

Figure 94. Photo. Failure of a steel stopper on Lo Echevers bridge.

Figure 95. Photo. Displaced elastomeric bearing on Lo Echevers bridge.
Since the two bridges seem identical and experienced similar ground motion, it was unclear from
visual inspection why one collapsed and the other did not. A numerical analysis of a complete
model of the bridge may better explain the damage pattern.
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4.3.3 Avenida Romero Acceso Sur Overpass
The Romero overpass is a two-span bridge with discontinuous precast prestressed girders, a
continuous deck slab, and spans of 96.8 ft (29.5 m) each. Oriented approximately east-west, the
bridge is similar to the Chada overpass described in section 4.2.2 except that it has a skew angle
of 31.3 degrees. The bridge has five girders but no diaphragms. Two seismic bars were provided
between each pair of adjacent girders. As shown in figure 96, the intermediate bent has four
columns that are supported by four drilled shafts with a pile cap between the columns and the
drilled shaft foundation. Each abutment also rests on four drilled shafts. During the earthquake,
the superstructure moved toward the west abutment and rotated counterclockwise away from the
acute corner of the bridge. Both spans were unseated at their abutments, as shown in figure 97,
which also shows lateral shear failures that occurred in the webs of the exterior girders over the
bent due to excessive transverse loads.

Figure 96. Illustration. Intermediate bent details for Romero bridge.
View on
far side

Out-of-plane block
shear failure

View on
near side
Source: MOP

Figure 97. Photo. Collapse of Romero bridge.
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These observations are supported by the pounding marks on the west abutment, the damage pattern
in the curtain walls of the two abutments, and the orientation of the remaining seismic bars at the
intermediate bent and two abutments, as shown in figure 98 through figure 100. Figure 101 shows
damage to the back wall and wing wall resulting from the girder impact on the west abutment.
This damage pattern may have resulted from the combined effects of ground motion characteristics
and the skew configuration. More specifically, the rotational mode of vibration of the bridge
seemed very sensitive to the ground motions, which can be augmented by the skewed abutments.
In addition, rotational ground motion is another plausible reason for superstructure rotation but
needs to be verified by examination of the ground motion records.

Curtain wall
intact

West abutment

Seismic bars
Curtain wall
damaged
Drilled shaft

Figure 98. Photo. Seismic bars at west abutment of Romero bridge.
Curtain wall damaged
East abutment

Shear key
intact

Curtain wall intact

Seismic bars

Shear key
knocked off

Figure 99. Photo. Seismic bars at east abutment of Romero bridge.

Pounding
marks

Figure 100. Photo. Pounding at west abutment of Romero bridge.
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Damages
West abutment

Figure 101. Photo. Back wall and wing wall damage at west abutment of Romero bridge.
4.3.4 Route 5 Railway Overcrossing at Hospital
The Route 5 railway overcrossing at Hospital comprised three parallel bridges over two railway
tracks and a local road. The bridges were oriented northwest-southeast. One bridge had a steel
plate girder superstructure, and the other two had precast prestressed girders. The two concrete
bridges carried northbound and southbound traffic on Route 5. During the earthquake, the
southbound bridge collapsed, as shown in figure 102 and figure 103.

Figure 102. Photo. Three bridges (one demolished) at Route 5 overcrossing at Hospital.
South abutment

Source: MOP

Figure 103. Photo. Collapse of bridge at Route 5 overcrossing at Hospital.
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As shown in figure 102, plastic hinges appear to have developed at the top of the columns of the
steel plate girder bridge with cross frames and shear keys. The fact that hinges formed at the top
of the columns implies that strong shaking occurred transversely (i.e., in the direction of the
skew). This is one of the few bridges for which column damage was observed, but field data is
minimal because the bridge was demolished for safety reasons soon after the main shock. The
only bridge to remain standing at this site after the earthquake had diaphragms but no skew.
The collapsed concrete bridge was a two-span structure skewed approximately 40 degrees. The
superstructure comprised four precast girders but no diaphragms. The intermediate bent comprised
three columns that rested on drilled shafts. At the bent and two abutments, the bridge deck was
vertically tied to the substructure by seismic bars between pairs of adjacent girders. As shown in
figure 103, the south span partially fell from the south abutment. The north span was completely
unseated. The superstructure appeared to have rotated clockwise away from the acute corner, an
observation confirmed after the bridge deck had been removed (see figure 104 and figure 105).

Acute corner curtain
wall knocked off

Pounding
on backwall

Figure 104. Photo. Damage at north abutment of Route 5 overcrossing at Hospital.
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Obtuse corner
curtain wall intact

Acute corner curtain
wall knocked off

Figure 105. Photo. Damage at south abutment of Route 5 overcrossing at Hospital.
4.3.5 Quilicura Railway Overcrossing at Avenida Manuel Antonio Matta
The Quilicura railway overcrossing at the Avenida Manuel Antonio Matta, located north of
Santiago, is a three-span steel bridge with five discontinuous girders, a continuous deck slab,
and seat-type abutments, as shown in figure 106. The abutments and two intermediate piers are
skewed approximately 45 degrees. Steel diaphragms are provided at each support, and cross
frames and stiffeners are evenly spaced along the spans, as shown in figure 107 and figure 108.
The intermediate piers have five circular columns and a bent cap where the simply supported
girders are anchored.

Figure 106. Photo. Overview of Quilicura railway overcrossing.
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Cross frames

Steel diaphragm

Figure 107. Photo. Cross frames on Quilicura railway overcrossing.

Stiffeners

Bent columns

Figure 108. Photo. Stiffeners on Quilicura railway overcrossing.
During the earthquake, the superstructure moved both longitudinally and transversely and rotated
away from the acute corner of the bridge. The end span on the east side was unseated at the abutment
(see figure 109), and the span on the west side was laterally displaced and almost unseated (see
figure 110). For safety reasons, this span was lifted off the abutment about a day after the main
shock and was lowered onto a bank of sand placed under the bridge, as shown in figure 111.
Curtain wall
damage

Bridge
acute corner

Figure 109. Photo. East abutment of Quilicura railway overcrossing.
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Acute
corner
Curtain wall
damage

Figure 110. Photo. West abutment of Quilicura railway overcrossing.

Sand
Figure 111. Photo. West span of Quilicura railway overcrossing lowered onto sandbank.
Due to the transverse displacement and rotation of the superstructure, the curtain walls at the
acute corners of the bridge sustained pounding damage. In addition, the lateral forces on the
superstructure damaged the girder anchor bolts and buckled some cross frames, as shown in
figure 112 and figure 113.

Anchor bolt
failure

Figure 112. Photo. Damage to anchor bolts on Quilicura railway overcrossing.
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Cross frame buckling

Figure 113. Photo. Damage to cross frame on Quilicura railway overcrossing.
4.4 PERFORMANCE OF STEEL BRIDGES
4.4.1 Tubul Bridge
The Tubul bridge is an eight-span simply supported steel girder bridge oriented north-south with a
span length of approximately 92 ft (28 m). Each span consists of three steel girders with concrete end
diaphragms, as shown in figure 114. Shown in the inset of figure 114 are four seismic bars between
the end diaphragm and the wall pier. The bridge is most likely supported on pile foundations. All
the spans were unseated at their south end, resulting in the northern-most span punching into the
north abutment and in the buckling of nearby pavement, as shown in figure 115 and figure 116.
With the exception of span 6, all the spans were in general alignment in the north-south direction.

Span 2
Span 8
Span 6

N. abutment

Span 3
Seismic bars

End diaphragm

Figure 114. Photo. Unseating at southern ends of each span of Tubul bridge.

Figure 115. Photo. Punching of Tubul bridge deck into back wall
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Figure 116. Photo. Buckling of pavement at north abutment of Tubul bridge.
Local damage to the various piers and spans was inspected by boat. As shown in figure 114,
span 6 lost support at its north end. Local residents confirmed that this span was like the others
immediately after the main shock, but the north end collapsed during an aftershock during the
first week, probably due to rigid body rotation of the wall pier. This difference in span 6 may
be attributable to the fact that the span rotated from the north to the northeast, creating load
concentration on the north support. Figure 117 shows watermarks on one of the wall piers. The
concrete below the high watermark showed signs of deterioration, probably due to wet and dry
cycles, particularly in the mid-height of the wet area at the average watermark.

High watermark
Average watermark
Top of footing

Span 6

Figure 117. Photo. Span 6 of Tubul bridge, unseated at north end during an aftershock.
In general, the bottom flange of the girders buckled, as shown in figure 115 and figure 118, and
the tops of the wall piers were damaged locally, as shown in figure 118 and figure 119. All of the
piers were tilted toward the north abutment and were significantly damaged either by flexural
effects at the top of the footing due to the maximum moment as the bridge deck pushed against
the wall during the earthquake or by shear effects around the average watermark where the concrete
was severely deteriorated (see figure 119 and figure 120). Concrete spalling associated with both
a shear crack and a vertical crack on the wall pier are shown in figure 121. The pile cap holding
the dropped span was cracked, as shown in figure 122, probably due to the impact of the falling span.
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Figure 118. Photo. Bottom flange buckling and concrete spalling on Tubul bridge.

Figure 119. Photo. Shear crack in Tubul bridge.

Figure 120. Photo. Tilting wall pier on Tubul bridge.
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Figure 121. Photo. Spalling due to shear action and vertical crack in Tubul bridge.

Figure 122. Photo. Crack in footing of Tubul bridge.
4.4.2 Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez Bridge
The Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge, built in 2002, is a 22-span steel girder structure that
crosses the Maule River in the northeast-southwest direction near Constitución. It is supported by
2 seat-type abutments and 21 intermediate bents (see figure 123). The first five bents from the
northeast abutment are supported on two reinforced concrete columns and drilled shafts. The next
six bents are supported on three reinforced concrete columns and drilled shafts. The following
eight bents are steel pile bents with three legs (one vertical and two inclined) and horizontal struts
and diagonal braces interconnecting the legs in each bent. The last two bents are supported on
three reinforced concrete columns that rest on footings. The superstructure comprises two
continuous segments of 11 spans each. There are fixed joints at each abutment and an expansion
joint at the middle of the bridge over bent 11. Note that girders with fixed bearings at an abutment
seem to defeat the purpose of having expansion joints at the abutment. At each abutment, the
bottom flanges of the three girders are welded to masonry plates embedded in the abutment seat.
An elastomeric pad is provided over each intermediate bent to permit longitudinal movement.
Transverse and vertical movements are restrained by steel stoppers, as shown in figure 124.
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Figure 123. Photo. Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge looking south.

Figure 124. Photo. Elastomeric pad and stopper over bent
on Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.
During the earthquake, the northeast portion of the bridge moved from west to east in the transverse
direction. All steel stoppers were deformed, and girders were displaced from their elastomeric
pads. The transverse diaphragms at the intermediate bents and abutments buckled, as shown in
figure 125 and figure 126. At the northeast abutment, the webs and bottom flanges were fractured
in all three steel girders, and both bearing stiffener and web buckling occurred, as shown in
figure 127. The exterior girder also experienced web and flange bending about its weak axis, as
shown in figure 128. Web buckling was observed in the longitudinal direction in the same girder.
This type of damage is evidence of large longitudinal loads in the superstructure being attracted
to the fixed bearing at this abutment and that these loads changed sign from tension to compression
several times during the long-duration event. The weld between the girders and the masonry
plate did not fail.
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Buckling o f
end diaphragm

Figure 125. Photo. Girder offset and cross frame buckling
on Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.

Buckling of end
diaphragm

Figure 126. Photo. Cross frame buckling on Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.
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Figure 127. Photo. Girder damage at northeast abutment
of Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.

Figure 128. Photo. Temporary repair at northeast abutment
of Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge
To maintain traffic on the bridge, a temporary cross frame was installed at the northeast abutment,
as shown in figure 128. Due to severe damage in the girder webs and flanges, a steel beam was
used to transfer loads from the girder flanges to the abutment seat, bypassing the webs.
As previously noted, nine spans of the southwest portion of the bridge are supported on tall steel pile
bents, as shown in figure 129. The legs of these bents are fabricated from 4.9-ft (1.5-m)-diameter
tubes with a wall thickness of 0.55 inches (14 mm). Their overall heights from pile tip to soffit
range from 146 to 169 ft (44.5 to 51.5 m). The maximum clear height above water is about 82 ft
(25 m). This portion of the structure appeared to have performed well during the earthquake but
suffered local damage at several locations due to tsunamis. Four major waves were recorded nearby,
with arrival times ranging from 4 to 5.5 h after the earthquake. Wave heights ranged from 22.6 to
36.7 ft (6.9 to 11.2 m), passing under the superstructure. Nevertheless, the waves eroded river
sands and gravels from around the piles to a depth of about 15 ft (4.5 m), and waveborne debris
punctured a hole in the wall of one of the legs of one of the bents (see figure 130 and figure 131).
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Source: MOP

Figure 129. Photo. Spans and pile bents of southwest portion
of Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.

Source: MOP

Figure 130. Photo. Erosion of alluvial material around bent legs
of Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.

Source: MOP

Figure 131. Photo. Debris-impact hole in bent leg of Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.
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Although the details are similar, the damage to the girders at the southwest abutment was not as
severe as at the northeast abutment and was limited to the buckling of the bearing stiffeners. The
reason for this difference is probably that the fillet welds connecting the girder flanges and bearing
stiffeners to the masonry plates failed during the earthquake and large longitudinal loads were not
attracted to this abutment (see figure 132 through figure 134).

Source: MOP

Figure 132. Photo. Fillet weld fractures at the girder-to-abutment connection on the
Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.

Source: MOP

Figure 133. Photo. Close-up of girder end on Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.

Source: MOP

Figure 134. Photo. Close-up of transverse stiffeners on Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge.
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4.4.3 Biobío River Bridge
The first bridge over the Biobío River in Concepción was built in 1925 and consisted of 108 simply
supported spans of approximately 49 ft (15 m) each. Each span had a timber superstructure
(beams and deck) and rested on concrete piers that were supported on battered timber piles. After
40 years of service, the Chilean Highway Authority decided to replace the bridge with a steel-girder
structure of 90 spans (approximately 49 ft (15 m) each), which were also supported on wall piers
and timber pile foundations. During the 1960 earthquake, the five spans closest to Concepción
collapsed. In 1965, an additional three spans collapsed due to scour effects. As a result, most of
the pile foundations were replaced in the mid-1960s with steel pipe piles and concrete cap beams.
In 1994, Japanese consultants evaluated the structural integrity of the bridge and investigated
various retrofitting options. It was concluded that the bridge should be closed to traffic and was
too expensive to retrofit due to the deterioration of many structural components. Nevertheless,
local authorities decided to keep the bridge open for limited traffic such as pedestrians and
bicycles. After additional studies, the bridge was completely closed in 2002, and all traffic was
detoured to the Llacolen bridge, which had been built in 2000. In 2009, MOP contracted the firm
Q&R Ingeniería to conduct a preliminary study for the replacement of the Biobío bridge.
The historic multispan bridge over the Biobío River is oriented approximately east-west. As seen
in figure 135 and figure 136, the bridge superstructure consists of multiple simply supported spans
with four steel girders and a concrete deck. Intermediate and end X-braced cross frames were
provided in each span. Each end of a steel girder was restrained by two anchor bolts through the
bottom flange, one on either side of the web. As shown in figure 137, lateral spreading due to
liquefaction was observed near the north end of the bridge approaches. Many spans moved
longitudinally and fell from their seats after shear failure of the anchor bolts. Some piers also
collapsed in the longitudinal direction, as shown in figure 138, possibly due to liquefactioninduced vertical settlement in combination with longitudinal seismic forces. These movements
may have caused the multiple cracks visible in the pile caps (see figure 139).

Figure 135. Photo. Collapsed spans in Biobío River bridge.
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Figure 136. Photo. Unseated spans in Biobío River bridge.

Figure 137. Photo. Lateral spreading near east end of Biobío River bridge.

Figure 138. Photo. Collapsed spans and piers of Biobío River bridge.

Figure 139. Photo. Cracks in pile caps of Biobío River bridge.
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4.4.4 Pichibudis Bridge
The Pichibudis bridge is located on a coastal road (Route J-60) in Punta Duao near Iloca. The
bridge crosses a stream 980 ft (300 m) before the stream flows into the sea (see figure 140).

© Google, DigitalGlobe, Inav/Geosistemas SRL, and DMapas

Figure 140. Photo. Satellite image of Pichibudis bridge.
The single-span bridge has a total length of approximately 98 ft (30 m). The superstructure is
composed of two parallel 62-inch (1,600-mm)-tall plate girders and a reinforced concrete deck
slab. The girders are detailed with cross frames and stiffeners evenly spaced along the span, as
shown in figure 141 and figure 142. The supports are seat-type abutments, reinforced concrete
diaphragms, and concentric braces fabricated from steel reinforcing bars. The bottom flange of
each girder sits on rubber pads at each abutment.

Figure 141. Photo. Cross frames in Pichibudis bridge.
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Figure 142. Photo. Web stiffeners in Pichibudis bridge.
The bridge was overtopped by one or more tsunami waves, and the deck slab suffered a permanent
lateral displacement of about 7 inches (180 mm) at the south abutment (see figure 143 and
figure 144). At this abutment, the seaward girder rotated about the bottom flange and suffered
flexural and torsional deformations about the weak axis of the section.

18 cm
Girder
rotation
To the sea
1 cm = 0.39 inches

Figure 143. Photo. Offset in girder top flange of south abutment of Pichibudis bridge.

18 cm
Lateral Offset
Figure 144. Photo. Offset in handrail on south abutment of Pichibudis bridge.
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At the same location, damage was also found in the concrete diaphragm and bracing system, with
tension rupture in one bar and compression buckling in the other one (see figure 145 and figure 146).

Tension
rupture

Compression
buckling

Figure 145. Photo. X-braces damage in south abutment of Pichibudis bridge.

Diaphragm
damage

Girder
damage

Figure 146. Photo. Diaphragm crushing in south abutment of Pichibudis bridge.
According to local residents, the tsunami was characterized by three waves starting approximately
10 min after the main shock. Since the clear height of the bridge from the water level is about 4.9 ft
(1.5 m), the tsunami waves passed over the bridge, inducing large lateral forces on the girders. In
addition, a visual inspection of the connecting elements at the south abutment revealed corrosion
in the girders, cross braces, and vertical restrainers in the reinforced concrete diaphragms (see
figure 147). Due to the corrosion, the capacity of the structural components of the south abutment
was less than at the north abutment, making this abutment more likely to suffer damage.
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Figure 147. Photo. Damage on south abutment due to corrosion in Pichibudis bridge.
4.4.5 El Bar Bridge
The El Bar bridge is located on Route 160 in Arauco and crosses a small lake in the province of
Carampangue, as shown in figure 148.

© Google, GeoEye, and DMapas

Figure 148. Photo. Satellite image of El Bar bridge.
Originally designed as a single-span bridge with a total length of approximately 98 ft (30 m), an
intermediate support had recently been added (see figure 149). Apparently, this bridge suffered
structural damage during flooding in 2006 and was retrofitted accordingly. In addition to the
midspan support frame, two new plate girders were added parallel and adjacent to the existing
girders. The new girders were connected to the existing girders using welded steel angles, as
shown in figure 150. The connection between the new beams and the deck slab was made using
steel angles and bolts anchored with epoxy, as shown in figure 151.
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New girder

Midspan structure
Figure 149. Photo. Side view of El Bar bridge.
Old girder

New girder

Connector

Figure 150. Photo. Retrofit girder connections on El Bar bridge.
Deck connectors

Bearing stiffener
Figure 151. Photo. Retrofit deck connections on El Bar bridge.
Earthquake damage at the south abutment included a lateral permanent deformation of 9.8 inches
(250 mm), girders dislodged from their neoprene pads, and damage to the concrete back wall (see
figure 152 and figure 153). When the bridge was retrofitted after the 2006 floods, a rebar X-brace
system and a new concrete diaphragm were added at the north abutment. The diaphragm was
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anchored to the abutment seat using vertical restraining bars (seismic bars). Earthquake damage
observed at this support included large deformations in the rebar of the X-brace system (tension
yielding and compression buckling), lateral deformation of the seismic restrainers, and concrete
crushing of the original abutment back wall (see figure 154 and figure 155).

25 cm
25 cm

1 cm = 0.39 inches

Figure 152. Photo. Lateral deformation at south abutment of El Bar bridge.

Girder
sliding off

Back wall
damage

Rubber
pad
Figure 153. Photo. Damage at south abutment of El Bar bridge.

Figure 154. Photo. Damage to rebar X-brace system on north abutment of El Bar bridge.
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Damage on the back wall
Figure 155. Photo. Damage to north abutment back wall of El Bar bridge.
4.4.6 Itata River Bridge
Built in 1980s, the Itata River bridge crosses the river near Coelemu (see figure 156). The total
length of the bridge is approximately 2,160 ft (660 m) made up of 22 98-ft (30-m) spans. The
superstructure is composed of two parallel steel plate girders simply supported between piers
and a reinforced concrete deck slab. The substructures include two seat-type abutments and
21 intermediate 39-ft (12-m)-tall wall-type piers (see figure 157). The two girders have equally
spaced web stiffeners and are interconnected by inverted chevron-type cross frames. Reinforced
concrete diaphragms are provided at the abutments and over each pier.

© Google, DMapas, DigitalGlobe, Inav/Geosistemas SRL

Figure 156. Photo. Satellite image of Itata River bridge.
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W. Abutment
Cross frames
E. Abutment

RC Diaphragm

Wall-type pier

Wall-type pier.

Figure 157. Photo. Side view and superstructure details for Itata River bridge.
Each girder sits on a reinforced concrete bracket at the top of each pier (see figure 158). These
brackets were designed to transfer the axial and lateral forces to the piers, which are founded on
rectangular pile caps.
During the earthquake, the entire structure moved both longitudinally and transversely, with larger
displacements occurring in the transverse direction. As a consequence, many of the concrete brackets
suffered damage at their connections to the piers. The damage was characterized by shear cracks,
concrete spalling, and bar buckling, as shown in figure 159. At the time of inspection, a temporary
steel structure was under construction to retrofit the brackets and allow traffic on the bridge.

RC Brackets
Figure 158. Photo. Girder supports at each pier of Itata River bridge.
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Shear cracks
Bar buckling

Concrete spalling

Figure 159. Photo. Damage to girder supports of Itata River bridge.
4.4.7 Pedestrian Bridge Over Route 5
Several pedestrian bridges over Route 5 collapsed during the earthquake. All appeared to have
similar details and to have failed in a similar manner. The collapse of the pedestrian bridge at
KM 13.8 of Route 5 North is described in this section. The bridge consisted of two approach
ramps on each side of the highway and a two-span overpass oriented approximately east-west.
As shown in figure 160, the two spans fell from their supports during the earthquake and were
subsequently moved to the sides of the highway. Each 70.1-ft (21.4-m)-long span consisted of a
concrete deck supported by two steel plate girders and four uniformly spaced cross frames. The
end of each girder rested on a neoprene pad, as shown in figure 161. Each cross frame was composed
of X-bracing, a top chord, and a bottom chord, as shown in figure 162. The main span was
anchored at each end to a hammerhead pier by two 1-inch (25-mm)-diameter bolts through the
flange of the bottom chord. Failure occurred when the anchor bolts pulled out of the bottom chord
and there was insufficient seat width to prevent the girders from collapsing (see figure 163).

Figure 160. Photo. Damaged Route 5 pedestrian bridge.
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Figure 161. Photo. Steel girder on neoprene pad at abutment of Route 5 pedestrian bridge.

Figure 162. Photo. End cross frame near collapsed span of Route 5 pedestrian bridge.
Broken anchor bolt

Cross frame

Figure 163. Photo. Anchor bolt failure (shear and pull out) on Route 5 pedestrian bridge.
4.5 PERFORMANCE OF OTHER BRIDGE TYPES
4.5.1 Claro River Bridges
Three arch bridges cross the Claro River just south of Curicó. Two of these are shown in figure 164:
a reinforced concrete highway arch that carries northbound and southbound lanes of Route 5 and
a set of unreinforced masonry arches. Built in 1870, the masonry bridge is a historic structure. It
has survived numerous strong earthquakes in its lifetime, including the 1960 and 1985 events.
The reinforced concrete arch suffered only minor damage during the 2010 earthquake, but the
masonry bridge collapsed completely (see figure 165).
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Figure 164. Illustration. Highway bridges crossing Claro River before earthquake.
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Figure 165. Photo. Collapse of masonry arch bridge at Claro River.
The masonry bridge consisted of a set of seven back-to-back arches oriented approximately
northeast-southwest. Two piers survived the earthquake, and all foundations appeared to be
intact, as shown in figure 165 and figure 166.

Figure 166. Photo. Close-up view of collapsed bridge at Claro River.
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Figure 167 through figure 169 show details of various components of the bridge. The deck slab
was approximately 8 to 10 inches (203 to 254 mm) thick, and the arch crown was approximately
4 ft (1.2 m) thick. The ribs and piers were constructed from solid brick with some stone fill above
the brick ribs, as shown in figure 167 and figure 168, and faced with stone blocks or plastered
with cement to give the appearance of stonework. Close inspection of the piers found some cracks
between the bricks and stone facades, possibly due to shaking, but, in general, the masonry was
in excellent condition. The foundations of the bridge were most likely made of stone blocks and
seemed to have experienced little or no damage during the earthquake (see figure 169).

Stone fillers

~ 4 ft

Brick arch

1 m = 3.28 ft

Figure 167. Photo. Deck slab and crown of arch on Claro River bridge.

Figure 168. Photo. Pier of Claro River bridge.
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Figure 169. Photo. Foundation of Claro River bridge.
As shown in figure 166, the collapsed spans and other debris, including arches and piers, fell
directly into the river below the bridge and were not thrown sideways, upstream, or downstream.
Therefore, one scenario is that the collapse was caused by the failure of a pier with deteriorated
masonry during strong shaking along the axis of the bridge. Another scenario is that the elevation
difference between the end support of the arch bridge and its nearby pier caused stress concentration
in two end spans along the axis of the bridge, resulting in cracks in the ribs and falling of various
pieces. The collapse of two end spans reduced the inward thrust of each intermediate arch span
and triggered progressive collapse. Since no deterioration of the masonry was observed in the
rubble in the river bed, the second scenario is most likely.
Based on field observations, the progressive collapse of the entire masonry bridge could have
occurred in four steps, as shown in figure 170. The figure shows the pre-earthquake condition of
the bridge, indicating the horizontal inward thrust of each arch under gravity loads. Due to the
difference in support conditions in the two end spans, the bending moment distribution along the
axis of the arch bridge was quite uneven under the earthquake load. The maximum moment most
likely occurred in the end spans. As a result, each end arch was subjected to cracking, leading to
loss of various pieces (see step 1 of figure 170). As the end spans collapsed, the sudden loss of
thrust for the adjacent spans caused significant force redistribution in a short time, resulting in
cracking and collapse of the spans under gravity or earthquake loads, as illustrated in step 2.
Similarly, the next spans collapsed, as shown in step 3.
Next, the center span experienced force redistribution due to the collapse of its adjacent spans.
However, the change in horizontal thrust for the center span was likely smaller than that in the
other intermediate spans. In addition, the earthquake excitation was likely over by that time.
Therefore, the arch collapsed mainly due to its own weight while the two piers supporting the
center span remained, as shown in step 4. When compared with figure 165, this collapse matches
the field observations.
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Figure 170. Illustration. Scenario for the progressive collapse of Claro River bridge.
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4.5.2 Chepe Railroad Bridge Over Biobío River
The Chepe railroad truss bridge over the Biobío River was built in 1889 and retrofitted in 2005.
Oriented northeast-southwest, the bridge has two continuous through-truss spans at the north end
and multiple truss spans for the river crossing (see figure 171 through figure 173). The throughtruss structure is supported on the north abutment and two intermediate bents. Each bent comprises
two concrete-filled steel tubes that are 72 inches (1,807 mm) in diameter, as shown in figure 174.
All the river spans are supported on steel towers. Each tower comprises six steel circular piles
that are cross-braced for lateral strength and stiffness (see figure 172 and figure 175). A view
underneath the through-truss spans and a sectional view of the remaining spans are shown in
figure 174 and figure 175.

Figure 171. Photo. North end of Chepe railroad bridge over roadway.

Bent with six
steel piles

Figure 172. Photo. River spans of Chepe railroad bridge.

Figure 173. Photo. South end of Chepe railroad bridge.

Concrete-filled
steel tube

Figure 174. Photo. Bottom view and cross section on north end of Chepe railroad bridge.
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Figure 175. Photo. Section on south end of Chepe railroad bridge.
At the northeast end, the bridge spans over Route O-60, which runs in a trench between two retaining
walls, as shown in figure 176. The roadway slab is supported by micropiles that are approximately
20 ft (6.1 m) long. During the earthquake, the steel tube bent behind the river-side retaining wall
settled approximately 12 inches (300 mm) and moved laterally toward the river for approximately
26 inches (660 m). It also tilted toward the river about 5 degrees, as shown in figure 177. In the
vicinity of the steel tube bent, the soils behind the wall settled approximately 51 inches (1,300 mm)
relative to the steel bent, as shown in figure 177. The retaining wall settled over 12 inches (300 mm),
as shown in figure 178, and moved laterally toward the river for approximately 26 inches (660 mm),
as shown in figure 176. As a result, the seal between the roadway and toe of the retaining wall
sustained damage, creating the possibility for water to flood the roadway as the river level rises
during the winter. The movement of the steel tubes and retaining wall was due to liquefactioninduced ground spreading.
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Figure 176. Illustration. Settlement and lateral movement of wall and bent due to ground
spreading under Chepe railroad bridge.
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Figure 177. Photo. Settlement and tilting of bent on Chepe railroad bridge.
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Figure 178. Photo. Settlement behind retaining wall on Chepe railroad bridge.
At the south end of the bridge, several bracing rods were broken, and at least two steel piles were
fractured, possibly due to ground spreading, as shown in figure 179 and figure 180. A temporary
support comprising a stack of timber ties had been erected near the damaged bent, as shown in
figure 173.
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Figure 179. Photo. Ruptured cross bracing at south end of Chepe railroad bridge.

Figure 180. Photo. Fractured steel piles at south end of Chepe railroad bridge.
4.5.3 Maipú River Bridges
Three bridges cross the Maipú River just south of Santiago: a railway bridge, a highway bridge
(Route 5), and a local access road bridge (see figure 181).

Figure 181. Photo. Three parallel bridges crossing Maipú River south of Santiago.
The railway bridge seemed to be undamaged by the earthquake. Likewise, the Route 5 bridge
sustained only minor damage despite being built in 1970. However, the Route 5 bridge is susceptible
to scour, and the foundations were being retrofitted at the time of the reconnaissance visit. The local
access road bridge was severely damaged in the earthquake.
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Built in 1960s, the Maipú River bridge has four continuous segments of 3, 3, 3 and 4 spans, for a
total of 13 spans. The segments are separated by expansion joints. Each reinforced concrete span is
composed of three girders with end haunches, six intermediate diaphragms, and two end diaphragms.
The superstructure is supported by A-shaped reinforced concrete piers, as shown in figure 181.
Oriented approximately north-south, the bridge was used to carry trucks loaded with gravel dredged
from the river. Field observations indicated the existence of shear cracks near the ends of many
of the girders, probably caused by heavy truck loading (see figure 182 and figure 183). Some of
these cracks appeared to have been repaired prior to the earthquake.

Figure 182. Photo. Crushing of haunches at pier 3 of Maipú River bridge.

Figure 183. Photo. Shear cracks at span 1 of Maipú River bridge.
During the earthquake, the haunches of three girders over pier 3 were severely crushed, as shown
in figure 182. Some concrete diaphragms, such as those at piers 2 and 3, were also cracked
significantly, as shown in figure 184. After the earthquake, two temporary frames were installed
underneath span 1, and lightweight traffic was permitted on the bridge. Most likely, the crushing
of the girder haunches was mainly due to a combined effect of seismic-induced longitudinal shear
force and vertical load, as shown in figure 184.

Figure 184. Photo. Longitudinal and vertical seismic forces in haunches at pier 3
of Maipú River bridge.
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CHAPTER 5. GEOTECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
OF TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
5.1 OVERVIEW
Geotechnical issues influencing the degree of damage to the transportation infrastructure include
amplification of ground motions due to the presence of soft soil or basin effects, excessive lateral
foundation flexibility due to soft or loose soil conditions, settlement, lateral ground movement, and
ground failure. Settlement, lateral ground movement, and ground failure appeared to be primarily the
result of soil weakening due to liquefaction but, in some cases, were due to seismically generated
inertial forces acting on the soil mass for existing soil slopes that may have been marginally stable.
A significant portion of this chapter is devoted to the effect liquefaction can have on transportation
infrastructure. Liquefaction is the significant loss of soil strength and stiffness resulting from the
generation of excess pore-water pressure in saturated, predominantly cohesionless soils. Kramer
provides a detailed description of liquefaction, including types of liquefaction phenomena,
evaluation of liquefaction susceptibility, and effects of liquefaction.(12)
As the pore-water pressure in the soil builds up during liquefaction, loss of soil strength occurs.
Then, settlement of the liquefied soil occurs as the excess pore-water pressures dissipate after the
earthquake. The potential effects of strength loss and settlement include the following:
•

Slope failure, flow failure, or lateral spreading. The strength loss associated with porewater pressure buildup can lead to slope instability. If the soil liquefies, the soil strength
reduces to a very low residual value, and the slope can become unstable. The lateral loads
due to soil movement created by the unstable soil mass can cause bridge substructure
distortion and unacceptable deformations and moments in the superstructure.

•

Reduced foundation bearing resistance. The residual strength of liquefied soil is often
a fraction of non-liquefied strength. This loss in strength can result in large displacements
or foundation bearing failure.

•

Reduced soil stiffness and loss of lateral support for deep foundations. This loss in
soil strength can change the lateral response characteristics of piles and shafts under
lateral load, making them much more flexible. This increases deformations and forces in
the superstructure.

•

Vertical ground settlement as excess pore-water pressures induced by liquefaction
dissipate, resulting in downdrag loads on and a loss of vertical support for deep
foundations. When liquefaction-induced downdrag occurs, it can cause significant
foundation settlement, depending on the resistance of the soil at the tips of the
foundation elements.(13)

In this chapter, these geotechnical issues are addressed for transportation facilities including
bridges, pier structures, retaining walls, embankments, and roadway cuts.
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5.2 GEOTECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING BRIDGE AND PIER
STRUCTURES
Of the 32 sites visited, 15 exhibited signs of liquefaction. Bridge performance tended to be
poorer when liquefaction occurred than when it did not. The primary cause of transportation
infrastructure performance problems resulting from liquefaction is the movement of the ground
laterally and vertically in the vicinity of those facilities. However, liquefaction is not the only
cause of ground movement during earthquakes. Relatively weak, sensitive clays can also lose
strength during earthquakes, resulting in potentially large lateral ground movement that can have
an impact on structures, walls, and roadway fills. Severe ground movements due to the presence
of weak, sensitive clays were observed at 4 of the 32 sites (i.e., liquefaction was not the cause of
the movements). There are still some cases of severe bridge damage or collapse among the 13 sites
where neither liquefaction nor ground movement due to weak, sensitive clays appeared to have
occurred. This damage was primarily due to structural weaknesses; though in many of those
cases, performance problems may have worsened due to the presence of soft or loose soils.
Overall, the breakdown of observed geotechnical problems is as follows:
•

Liquefaction: 15 sites (sites 15–22, 24–28, 30, and 31).

•

Ground movement due to weak, sensitive clays: 4 sites (sites 7, 8, 10, and 12).

•

Ground motion amplification likely but no ground movement due to liquefaction or
weak, sensitive clays: 9 sites (sites 1–6, 11, 23, and 32).

The breakdown of the types of geotechnical issues and problems affecting the bridges visited is
as follows:
•

Excessive lateral dynamic foundation movements due to the presence of loose or soft
soil resulting in structural damage or collapse (without liquefaction): Evidence was
directly observable at 1 bridge site (site 8) but probably occurred at other bridge sites visited.

•

Abutment fill settlement or lateral ground movement due to the presence of weak,
sensitive clays: In all cases, it appeared that the lateral soil movement did not significantly
impact the bridge (i.e., the bridge abutments did not move); 4 sites (sites 7, 8, 10, and 12).

•

Abutment fill settlement or lateral ground movement due to liquefaction, but with
minimal liquefaction-induced foundation settlement or ground failure-induced
foundation lateral displacement and bridge damage: 8 bridge sites (sites 15, 16, 17
(southwest end), 18 (southwest end), 20, 21, 28, and 30).

•

Bridge pier settlement or lateral movement due to liquefaction and ground failure
resulting in significant bridge damage or collapse: 1 pier (wharf) and 10 bridge sites
(sites 17 (northeast end), 18 (northeast end), 19, 21, 22, 24–27, and 31).

•

Other geologic effects potentially impacting bridges, including regional ground uplift
or subsidence and tsunami damage: 5 bridge sites (sites 20–22 for regional uplift and
possibly others to a lesser degree, and sites 14 and 16 for tsunami).
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5.2.1 Non-Liquefaction Geotechnical Issues Observed for Bridges
Bridge damage was generally more common in areas with poorer soils, resulting in greater
amplification of ground motions. Bridges damaged in the Santiago area appeared to follow this
pattern, with the heaviest damage observed in the western sector. As discussed in chapter 2, peak
accelerations in the ground motions from the eastern side of Santiago were only one-third to onehalf the peak accelerations measured in the western sector, based on the preliminary ground
motion data available. This observation is similar to those summarized in GEER, not only for the
Santiago area but also for other locations.(2) Depending on the variability of the soil profile below
each bridge, the amount of amplification may have varied from bridge to bridge, even within a
given bridge site. Furthermore, the extent of the damage depended on the bridge geometry,
details used, and design code followed.
5.2.1.1 Bridge Sites 1–6, North and West Santiago
The bridges located on or in the vicinity of the northwestern portion of the Américo Vespucio,
the beltway around the Santiago metro area, are examples of locations where ground motion
amplification due to the presence of softer or looser soils was the primary geotechnical issue
affecting the damage observed (see appendix A for boring logs that provide examples of subsurface
conditions in the area). These include bridges at sites 1–6. Figure 92 and figure 93 show examples
in which the superstructure was damaged or collapsed while the substructure was not significantly
damaged. In these cases, weaknesses in the superstructure design (lack of shear restraint, inadequate
bridge seat width, etc.) helped reduce dynamic stresses and damage in the substructure as the
superstructure lost its connection to the substructure during the vigorous shaking.
The bridge design and details were similar for bridge sites 1–3. All of these bridges were likely
supported on 4.9-ft (1.5-m)-diameter drilled shafts, with the exception of the footing-supported
Lo Echevers bridges (see appendix A). Why some of these bridges suffered severe damage and
others did not is unknown at this point, but it is possible that differences in soil conditions beneath
these bridges may have resulted in different degrees of ground motion amplification and therefore
differences in the observed bridge performance. That is, the stronger the ground motions at a site,
the more likely that bridge damage occurred.
5.2.1.2 Bridge Sites 7–10, South Santiago
At the south end of the Santiago area, soft or loose to medium dense soils were present based on
the available geologic maps and boring logs (see chapter 2 and appendix A). The boring log
obtained at sites 7, 8, and 10 illustrate that the upper 38 to 58 ft (11 to 16 m) of soil consists of
soft to stiff clays or loose to medium dense sandy silts and silty sands (AASHTO and NEHRP
Site Class D or E), which would provide maximum amplification of ground motions, based on
the AASHTO guidelines for seismic load and resistance factor design (LRFD).(14) However, this
area is on the margin of a region with better soil conditions (granular medium-dense to dense soils),
and therefore, subsurface conditions may be more varied, causing ground motion amplification
and bridge performance to be more varied. In general, this applies to sites 7–12. For all of these
bridges, the damage observed was primarily in the superstructure, with no apparent substructure
damage. The foundations for the bridges at sites 7, 8, and 10 consisted of four 4.9-ft (1.5-m)-diameter
drilled shafts extending into the dense soil (about 36 to 98 ft (11 to 30 m) below roadway grade),
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based on as-built plans produced in 2000 and 2001 (see appendix A). Figure 185 shows an
example in which the substructure was left intact with little or no damage. However, one of the
foundations supporting one of the bridge abutments appears to be less vertical than would be
expected, though no specific evidence of foundation damage (e.g., cracking) was observed.
However, in one of the bridges (site 8, Avenida Chada overpass), dynamic lateral movement of
the center pier shaft foundation had occurred (on the order of about 7.8 inches (200 mm)) and
lateral foundation movement likely contributed to bridge superstructure damage (see figure 186).
Figure 187 shows additional evidence that may point to the transverse rocking that occurred at
the Avenida Chada overpass. The pavement crack shown in the figure is directly below the
centerline of the bridge. While it is possible that the foundations supporting the bridges at all or
most of the bridges at sites 1–10 exhibited significant lateral movement due to the presence of
soft soils, it was not directly observable, except at site 8.

Fill settlement

Damaged shear walls

Figure 185. Photo. Damage at Romero bridge and shaft foundation supporting abutment
(collapsed superstructure removed).
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Figure 186. Photo. Interior pier of Chada structure with 5.8- to 7.8-inch (150- to 200-mm) gap
in soil transverse to bridge centerline.

Figure 187. Photo. East abutment of Chada structure showing large pavement crack
directly below bridge centerline.
Another problem that occurred at these bridge sites was settlement of the approach fills, where
total approach fill settlement was on the order of 3 ft (1.0 m). However, for bridge sites 7 and 8,
this settlement seems to be entirely from within the fill due to the fill slumping during shaking.
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The fill slumping did not appear to be caused by liquefaction. It is possible that during shaking,
the base of the fill slid away from the embankment centerline due to some type of block failure,
possibly at the boundary with relatively soft clay soils, allowing the embankment to slump.
Figure 188 is a diagram of fill slumping, and figure 189 shows one of the actual abutment fills.
The type of fill material used here and how well it was compacted is unknown.
Before
After

Figure 188. Illustration. Fill slumping observed for bridge sites 7 and 8.

Severe fill
settlement

Shear wall
failure

Figure 189. Photo. Fill slumping observed at Romero bridge.
Significant roadway fill settlement and lateral movement also occurred at bridge site 10 (see
figure 190). However, the difference between this site and sites 7 and 8 is that at site 10, it appears
the soil beneath the roadway embankment failed, possibly in bearing, though the failure appears
to be fairly shallow. Lateral movements of over 7 ft (2 m) appear to have occurred, considering
the distortion in the sign bridge, and uplift of the soil surface beyond the toes of the approach fill
also appears to have occurred (see figure 191). Lateral movement of the fill and soil below the fill
at site 10 is rather complex and will require further investigation to determine what really happened.
However, based on the available boring log, the upper soils consist of weak and likely sensitive
clays (see appendix A). These clays are probably the source of the fill stability problems observed
at this site. In any case, the bridge abutment at site 10 appeared to be unaffected by the observed
approach fill movement, although the superstructure for one of the bridges at this site collapsed.
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Source: MOP

Figure 190. Photo. View of roadway fill failure from abutment
of Route 5 railway crossing at Hospital.

Source: MOP

Figure 191. Photo. Close-up of approach fill failure and damaged sign bridge.
5.2.2 Liquefaction Impact on Performance of Bridge and Pier Structures
All of the following general conditions are necessary for liquefaction to occur:
•

The presence of groundwater, resulting in a saturated or nearly saturated soil.

•

Predominantly cohesionless soil that has the right gradation and composition.
Liquefaction has occurred in soils ranging from low plasticity silts to gravels.
Clean or silty sands and non-plastic silts are most susceptible to liquefaction.
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•

A sustained ground motion that is large enough and acts over a long enough period of
time to develop excess pore-water pressure equal to the effective overburden stress,
thereby significantly reducing effective stress and soil strength.

•

Soil characterized by a density that is low enough for the soil to exhibit contractive
behavior when sheared undrained under the initial effective overburden stress.(13,14)

Since detailed, site-specific subsurface data were not available for most of the sites visited, heavy
reliance was placed upon visual surficial evidence that liquefaction had occurred to help interpret
the structure performance observed. This section summarizes examples of those observations, how
the liquefaction issue has been dealt with in the past, and the observed performance of various
structures. That performance is interpreted with consideration of the local geology (and subsurface
and ground water data if available), the likely extent of liquefaction, and the effect of the local
topography on soil stability and deformation.
5.2.2.1 Signs of Liquefaction Observed
As previously mentioned, 15 of the bridge sites visited exhibited signs of liquefaction resulting
from the offshore Maule earthquake. These liquefaction signs included lateral ground movement
and cracking (i.e., lateral spreading or flow failure), ground settlement, and sand boils or otherwise
ejected sand or silt in fissures. Structures at such sites tended to display the most damage and
the poorest seismic performance due to the heavy demands such conditions placed on them,
with a few notable exceptions. In some cases, surface expressions of liquefaction could not be
directly observed (e.g., piers located in rivers), so liquefaction had to be inferred based on bridge
performance observations such as settlement or tilted piers and columns that could be explained
in no other way.
Examples of liquefaction signs and effects are provided in figure 192 through figure 199. Figure 192
shows lateral spreading that occurred at the Mataquito bridge site (site 15). Lateral movements of
up to 7 to 8.2 ft (2 to 2.5 m) and vertical settlement of up to 3 ft (1 m) (average of 1.6 ft (0.5 m)
across embankment near bridge abutment) appear to have occurred at the northeast end of the
structure, involving the abutment fill and over 300 ft (100 m) of gently sloping ground to the river
bank. However, as can be seen in figure 193, the lateral deformation directly beneath the bridge
was less than the deformation just outside the edges of the bridge, indicating that the bridge
foundations may have helped to restrain lateral movement of the soil. This also means that lateral
soil loads may have been acting on the bridge foundations. Similar lateral spreading failures were
observed at the opposite end of this bridge, although in that case, the abutment fill was not involved
in the lateral spreading. Based on surface observations, it appears that these lateral spreading failures
at the Mataquito bridge are relatively shallow in depth, probably on the order of 7 to 8.2 ft (2 to
2.5 m). A similar example of relatively shallow lateral spreading failure is provided in figure 194
for Ramadillas bridge (site 24), where the buildup of soil behind the bridge pier can be observed.
Based on the pattern in the ground cracks, it appears that the soil was fluid enough to attempt to
flow around the pier but was only partially successful in doing so.
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Approx. 2 to 2.5 m
lateral movement

Direction of
movement

Approx. 1.5 to 1.8 m
high

1 m = 3.28 ft

Figure 192. Photo. Lateral spreading at Mataquito bridge.

Lateral spreading lobes
“pooched out” on both
sides of bridge, but not
directly under bridge
Figure 193. Photo. Lateral spreading at Mataquito bridge with lateral movement
beneath and around bridge.
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Lateral spreading
flow directions

Figure 194. Photo. Lateral spreading and ground failure at old Ramadillas bridge.
Figure 195 and figure 196 provide examples of sand boils and ejected sand from ground fissures
due to liquefaction. In figure 195, the southwest end of the Llacolen bridge, the ground water depth
is relatively shallow (less than 3 to 7 ft (1 to 2 m)). In figure 196, La Mochita bridge, the ejection of
sand through ground fissures due to elevated pore pressures from liquefaction appeared to be more
vigorous, considering the greater depth to the water table (approximately 13 to 16 ft (4 to 5 m)).

Sand boils

Figure 195. Photo. Sand boils at southwest end of Llacolen bridge.
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Ejected sand due
to liquefaction

Direction of
movement
Ground
failure

Figure 196. Photo. Ejected sand due to liquefaction and ground failure at La Mochita bridge.
Figure 197 and figure 198 provide examples of more severe ground failure caused by liquefaction.
In these cases, the ground water needed for liquefaction was 7 to 16 ft (2 to 5 m) below the
ground surface, and the remaining soil above that layer was non-liquefied crust. Due to the
weakness of the liquefied soil, a slope failure ensued. This type of failure can cause the greatest
damage to bridges due to the significant volume of stronger, heavier soil moving laterally into
the bridge foundations and vertically along the foundations. Because the non-liquefied crust is
stronger than the liquefied soil, it is less able to flow around the foundations and is more likely to
force the foundations to bear the full brunt of the lateral soil force.
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Pier settled and
moved laterally

Direction of ground
movement

Slope crest

Graben

Reverse
scarps

Figure 197. Photo. Severe ground failure at La Mochita bridge.
Fill settlement relative
to bridge pier

Lateral spreading of
approach fill

Figure 198. Photo. Lateral spreading and ground failure at Raqui 2 bridge.
Figure 199 shows an example in which a center pier in the middle of the river settled (about 1.9 to
3.1 inches (50 to 80 mm)), but, because of the water in the river, no specific evidence of liquefaction
could be observed. It is likely that liquefaction is the cause of this kind of effect on the bridge,
although it is also likely that the liquefied layer is not extensive because the amount of deformation
in the foundation is relatively small.
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Pier settlement of
5 to 8 cm

1 cm = 0.39 inches

Figure 199. Photo. San Nicolás bridge center pier settlement probably
due to liquefaction of soil layers beneath river.
5.2.2.2 Use and Performance of Ground Improvement to Mitigate Liquefaction Effects
According to engineers at MOP and Chilean universities, bridges and other transportation
structures have historically not been designed to resist the effects of liquefaction. Until the 2010
offshore Maule earthquake, liquefaction had only been reported in limited areas of hydraulically
placed fill, and the problems resulting from that liquefaction had been minimal. This was not the
case for the Maule earthquake. Liquefaction problems were widespread and, in some cases, resulted
in significant failures of structures and other facilities (see GEER for additional information).(2)
The only ground improvement the team was made aware of to address liquefaction was deep
dynamic compaction (DDC) conducted beneath some of the approach fills near the north end of the
Juan Pablo II bridge in Concepción. Based on field observations at that site, the ground improvement
was only partially successful, as shown in figure 200 and figure 201. DDC is generally not very
effective for stabilizing deeper liquefaction in soils below the water table (i.e., water is virtually
incompressible, and, in finer sandy or silty soils, the water does not have time to escape during
DDC impacts, preventing reduction of pore volume). However, the specific limits of the DDC
and the subsurface conditions are not known, so the apparent lack of success of the DDC cannot
be fully investigated at this time.
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Vertical
settlement
of fill
Ground cracks
and settlement

Figure 200. Photo. Ramps at Juan Pablo II bridge where existing ground
was improved with DDC.

Lateral movement of
fill has compressed and
crumpled guardrail
Ground
cracking in slope

Figure 201. Photo. Lateral movement of fill in ramps at Juan Pablo II bridge.
5.2.2.3 Site-Specific Impacts of Liquefaction on Bridge Performance
Among the sites visited by TIRT, the impact of liquefaction on bridges and their approaches
varied from no impact to structure collapse. The specific reasons why some bridges performed
reasonably well despite signs of liquefaction cannot be determined without subsurface data to
assess the depth of liquefaction and what should have been expected regarding settlement and
lateral spreading or flow failure. However, it is possible to summarize the damage trends that are
likely the result of liquefaction effects.
Liquefaction can result in vertical and lateral bridge foundation movements that exceed a bridge’s
ability to tolerate them as well as stresses in foundation and substructure elements that can result
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in component damage or failure. Liquefaction can reduce lateral soil stiffness (i.e., p-y curves),
create downdrag loads on foundation elements due to liquefaction settlement, cause permanent
lateral displacement of foundation and substructure elements, and increase lateral forces acting
on foundation and substructure elements, which can cause the element to crack or fail. If ground
improvement to prevent liquefaction is not conducted, the foundation elements must be designed
to resist the loads placed on them due to liquefaction.
Specific descriptions of the effect liquefaction may have had on bridge performance for several
of the sites visited are provided in the sections that follow.
5.2.2.3.1 Mataquito Bridge (Site 15): The Mataquito bridge provides an example of the
performance impact caused by a relatively shallow lateral-spreading failure. In this case, the depth
of lateral spreading appeared to be approximately 4.9 to 8.2 ft (1.5 to 2.5 m) based on the surficial
expression of the soil movement. The bridge substructure/foundations were not significantly
pushed laterally, and the affected bridge spans remained intact and functional. The Ramadillas
bridge, though not discussed in detail here, provides a similar example of the effects of shallow
lateral spreading (see figure 194).
For the Mataquito bridge, it appears that the abutment fill primarily moved parallel to and around
the abutment wall rather than applying the full lateral force of the soil directly into the abutment.
Ridging along the approach fill slope toe and longitudinal roadway pavement cracking appear to
confirm that most of the soil movement was perpendicular to the roadway centerline (also identified
in GEER).(2) Significant abutment fill settlement (approximately 1.6 to 3 ft (0.5 to 1 m)) also
occurred, requiring some easily accomplished repair to the bridge approach fill (see figure 202 and
figure 203). It also appeared that the soil was able to partially flow around the pier and foundation
elements, possibly reducing the lateral loads enough that the foundations could resist them (see
figure 192 and figure 193). As shown in figure 202 and figure 203, the bridge itself was virtually
unaffected by the lateral spreading other than some minor abutment wall crushing where the
abutment and bridge deck were shoved together either during shaking or as a result of very small
lateral movement of the abutment. There was not enough movement or damage to affect bridge
operation. Settlement of the soil around the interior piers was also observed (see figure 204) and
appeared to be partly due to lateral spreading of the soil down slope as well as to possible deeper
liquefaction-induced settlement that contributed only to downdrag forces on the foundations.
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(approx. 0.7 to
0.9 m)
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abutment wall
compression
damage

Direction of soil movement

Soil appears to be
pushed up here
(0.2 to 0.3 m)

1 m = 3.28 ft

Figure 202. Photo. Abutment fill settlement of northeast abutment of Mataquito bridge.

Abutment fill
settlement (0.5 m
average, 1 m
max.)

1 m = 3.28 ft

Figure 203. Photo. Soil settlement without bridge settlement at northeast abutment
of Mataquito bridge.
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0.5 m

1 m = 3.28 ft

Figure 204. Photo. Soil settlement at interior pier at northeast abutment
of Mataquito bridge.
Specific details regarding the foundations of the bridges were not available, but considering the
recent construction date for the bridge (2007–2008) and the size of its columns, it is likely that the
bridge was founded on drilled shafts (typical diameter of 4.9 ft (1.5 m)) that are deep enough to
reach denser soil. This may explain why the bridge itself did not settle, but that hypothesis will
need to be confirmed once bridge foundation details and soil subsurface information are available.
5.2.2.3.2 Raqui 1 bridge (Site 20): The Raqui 1 bridge is somewhat transitional with regard to
the effects of liquefaction. The primary impact of liquefaction for this bridge was abutment fill
settlement, though evidence of relatively minor lateral spreading below the abutment fills was
present. Figure 205 shows approximately 3 ft (1 m) of fill settlement at the northwest abutment.
The southeast abutment shows a similar amount of settlement. However, figure 206 shows that some
lateral movement of the northwest abutment may have occurred (approximately 2.9 to 3.9 inches
(75 to 100 mm)), severe enough to cause crushing of the abutment wall against the bridge girders
and deck but not to shut down the bridge once the abutment approach fills were rebuilt to match
the bridge deck elevation. A small concrete gravity wall adjacent to the abutment also displaced
and tilted laterally down slope toward the river (see figure 206). It also appeared that more lateral
movement occurred on one edge of the northwest abutment than on the other, indicating that some
twisting of the abutment occurred. The abutment wall crushing could be partially due to strong
shaking of the superstructure, forcing the bridge girders and deck into the abutment. However, the
abutment wall crushing, signs of abutment fill displacement, twisting of the abutment, and lateral
movement of the gravity wall adjacent to the abutment indicate that abutment movement toward
the river occurred, likely due to liquefaction. It appeared that the southeast abutment did not move
due to the liquefaction and lateral spreading. The difference in the liquefaction effects at the two
abutments may be due to the presence of more gently sloping ground around the approach fill for
the southeast abutment than for the northwest abutment (see figure 207). There was some evidence
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that the direction of slope movement was perpendicular to the roadway centerline, especially a few
meters or more away from the abutment (see figure 208). However, since the approach fills had
been restored to the bridge deck elevation before the team’s arrival, some of the slope failure
cracking and movement patterns had been covered by new fill. The age of the bridge, the
subsurface conditions, and the foundation details were not available to TIRT. Therefore,
additional investigation is needed to more accurately assess the bridge performance.

Girders jammed
against abutment
wall

Fill settlement

Figure 205. Photo. Abutment fill settlement at northwest abutment of Raqui 1 bridge.
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Girders/deck
jammed against
abutment wall

Concrete gravity wall
tilted and displaced

Figure 206. Photo. Abutment and girders shoved into each other and deck at the northwest
abutment of the Raqui 1 bridge.

Figure 207. Photo. Raqui 1 bridge viewed from north side.
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Lateral ridging due
to ground failure

Direction of
movement

Figure 208. Photo. Evidence of ground failure perpendicular to roadway centerline
at northwest approach of Raqui 1 bridge.
5.2.2.3.3 Llacolen Bridge (Site 17): Figure 195 illustrates another case where liquefaction
obviously occurred (sand boils and evidence of minor lateral spreading). In this case, the
southwest end of the Llacolen bridge, the liquefaction had very little impact on the bridge both
in terms of foundation settlement and lateral movement of the foundations and abutment.
At the northeast end of the Llacolen bridge, the liquefaction impacts were far worse. The biggest
problem for the Llacolen bridge, as well as for other Biobío River crossings and structures, was
lateral movement of the foundations within the liquefaction-induced slope failure areas (see
figure 209 for an overview of the river crossings and figure 210 through figure 213 for the
Llacolen bridge). In general, most of the liquefaction-induced slope failure problems occurred
along the northeast side of the river, where the river channel is incised more steeply. Very few
liquefaction-induced problems occurred along the southwest side of the river even though there
was clear evidence that liquefaction had occurred, probably due to the very flat ground
conditions on that side of the river (see figure 195).
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Figure 209. Map. Aerial view of Biobío River and crossings.

Ground cracks
and settlement
observed in
these areas

Figure 210. Photo. Evidence of slope instability due to liquefaction
at northeast abutment and approaches of Llacolen bridge.
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Figure 211. Illustration. Plan view of liquefaction-induced slide at northeast abutment
of Llacolen bridge.

Gaps present
in front of pier
shafts

Ground cracks
and settlement
Figure 212. Photo. Settlement due to liquefaction-induced slope instability
at northeast end of Llacolen bridge.
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Figure 213. Photo. Settlement and lateral ground movement of interior pier
at northeast end of Llacolen bridge.
At the northeast end of the Llacolen bridge, the liquefiable layer was probably near the river
level. As the liquefiable layer weakened during shaking, the weight of the non-liquefiable soil
caused the strength of the liquefied soil to be exceeded, resulting in a slope failure. As the soil
moved laterally and downhill, it increased lateral stresses acting on the foundations, pushing
them downhill and increasing bending stresses in the columns. The lateral movement caused a
span to fall off its seat and collapse as well as excessive bending stresses to be placed on the pier
columns, causing the columns to crack at a point of maximum stress in combination with
weakness caused by a construction joint at that location. Similar observations and conclusions
were made by the GEER team.(2) This happened for several of the columns shown in figure 214
and figure 215. It is not completely clear whether the columns cracked as a result of lateral
movement of the slope caused by liquefaction or if once the pier moved and the span fell, the
impact of the falling span on the ground immediately behind the cracked columns was the final
effect that cracked the columns. In either case, the lateral ground movement significantly
increased the lateral stress on the bridge foundations and columns.
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Slope cracks

Figure 214. Photo. Lateral ground and foundation movement at interior pier and fallen
span at northeast end of Llacolen bridge.

Figure 215. Photo. Close-up of cracked column at northeast end of Llacolen bridge.
The shaft foundations supporting the bridge were approximately 98 ft (30 m) deep and were
probably bearing in dense soil. This kept the liquefaction settlement from dragging the foundations
down, limiting the liquefaction impact to lateral movement of the foundations. This was not the
case for the Juan Pablo II bridge, where shallower (59-ft (18-m)-deep) caisson foundations that
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probably did not bear on dense soil were used. Foundation settlement did occur for the Juan
Pablo II bridge, though only at specific piers (see discussion in section 5.2.2.3.5).
Additional photos and details regarding the Llacolen bridge and the impacts of liquefaction on
that bridge are provided in GEER.(2)
5.2.2.3.4 Chepe Railroad Bridge Over Biobío River (Site 18): A railroad bridge built in 1889 near
and parallel to the Llacolen bridge also suffered damage to one of its piers due to lateral movement
and settlement caused by liquefaction in the vicinity of the northeast river bank. It appeared that
the 7-ft (2-m)-diameter steel pipe pile concrete-filled foundation and column displaced laterally
about 2 ft (0.7 m) and that the ground around the foundation settled approximately 4.3 ft (1.3 m)
(see figure 177). The roadway that this bridge crosses also settled approximately 4.3 ft (1.3 m)
and moved laterally approximately 1.6 to 2 ft (0.5 to 0.7 m), though the wall top also rotated
inward towards the roadway (see figure 216). The wall itself appeared to settle only about 1 to
1.3 ft (0.3 to 0.4 m). The roadway and walls formed a seal to keep groundwater out of the roadway
(see chapter 4 for additional details). The liquefaction-caused settlement broke that seal, which
will need to be repaired before the river level rises. Even with so much deformation, these
structures did not collapse despite being seriously damaged.

Roadway settled
approx. 1.3 m

Railing/wall
displacement

1 m = 3.28 ft

Figure 216. Photo. Wall settlement due to slope movement and instability caused by
liquefaction at northwest end of Chepe railroad bridge.
5.2.2.3.5 Juan Pablo II Bridge (Site 25): Juan Pablo II bridge, another crossing of the Biobío River
parallel to Llacolen bridge in Concepción, was built in 1973. This bridge was also impacted by
liquefaction-induced slope failure as well as liquefaction-induced settlement and downdrag.
The 1973 bridge foundations consisted of 59-ft (18-m)-deep hand-excavated caissons. Severe
liquefaction-induced settlement of foundations occurred at several locations across the length of
the bridge (1.6 ft (0.5 m) or more), but many of the piers exhibited no discernable settlement.
117

Notably, a shaft-supported wall supporting fill between the approach bridge and the main rivercrossing structure settled very little, whereas the bridge approach pier settled more than 3 ft (1 m),
and the soil surrounding the end of the wall and the bridge pier also settled more than 3 ft (1 m)
(see figure 217 and figure 218). This difference is likely due to differences in the two structures
and the amount of load they carry. It was noted that the shaft-supported wall is much newer than
the bridge ramp structure and therefore may be designed to more stringent standards, as it is
unlikely that the soil would be so vastly different over such a short distance. Figure 219 through
figure 221 show the bridge settlement.

South wall

Pier supporting
approach structure
settled, but wall did not

Figure 217. Photo. Settlement of approach structure for Juan Pablo II bridge.

Bridge settlement
South wall
Figure 218. Photo. Close-up of settlement of approach structure for Juan Pablo II bridge.
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Figure 219. Photo. Roadway settlement due to settlement of approach structure
pier foundations for Juan Pablo II bridge.

Figure 220. Photo. Roadway settlement due to settlement of mainline pier foundations
for Juan Pablo II Bridge.
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Figure 221. Photo. Liquefaction-induced differential settlement of mainline
pier foundations supporting Juan Pablo II bridge.
The mainline Juan Pablo II Bridge abutment at the river bank suffered damage due to the lateral
forces caused by liquefaction-induced slope instability. Figure 222 and figure 68 through figure 71
illustrate the damage that occurred. The damage to the column in figure 68 through figure 71
illustrates the severe bending stresses and lateral force to which the column was subjected when the
northeast riverbank slope moved laterally due to loss of soil strength caused by liquefaction.
Although the bridge did not collapse due to these severe differential settlements and lateral slope
movements, it was seriously damaged and efforts were already underway to design and build a
replacement structure. Preparations for test hole drilling were being made during the TIRT visit.

Failed column
Direction of
slope
movement

Figure 222. Photo. Damage to pier columns for mainline Juan Pablo II bridge.
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Note that GEER also provided a detailed account of reconnaissance of this structure and the
damage that occurred due to liquefaction impacts. Additional photos and measurements for that
structure are provided in GEER’s report.(2)
5.2.2.3.6 Old Biobío River Bridge (Site 26): The old Biobío River bridge was built in the 1920s,
replaced in 1943, and no longer in service at the time of the earthquake. Spans and some of its
substructure units collapsed in the earthquake, probably due to a combination of inadequate structural
resistance and shallow foundations (see figure 138, figure 223, and figure 224). Various types of
deep foundations were used in various sections of the bridge. It appeared that pile foundations were
used for the northeast half of the bridge, although it was not clear if all the original timber pile
foundations used to support the 1920s structure were replaced with steel pipe piles in the 1943
replacement structure. Therefore, the northeast portion of the bridge could be supported by both
timber and steel pipe piles. Based on input from a Chilean consultant, the piers near the southwest
end of the bridge appeared to be supported by twin shaft foundations or twin hand-dug oval caissons
(33 to 39 ft (10 to 12 m) deep, although it is possible that the foundations were tipped in relatively
dense soils). Scour problems and deep liquefaction or soft soils that allowed more foundation
movement during shaking may have contributed to the weakening and collapse of the structure,
though the specific role of liquefaction in this collapse cannot be confirmed until more subsurface
data becomes available. However, ground failure and lateral soil movement were observed at the
bridge abutment for this structure on the northeast bank of the Biobío River, and the abutment
pier wall appeared to be tilted toward the river (see figure 137, figure 225, and figure 226).

Figure 223. Photo. View of collapsed spans from northeast river bank of Biobío River.
Exposed piles

Figure 224. Photo. Close-up of old Biobío River bridge showing exposed pile foundations.
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Figure 225. Photo. Ground failure near northeast abutment of old Biobío River bridge.

Lateral movement of
girders

Outward rotation
of abutment wall

Figure 226. Photo. Tilting of northeast abutment pier wall of old Biobío River bridge.
5.2.2.3.7 La Mochita Bridge (Site 27): Significant ground failure due to liquefaction also occurred
at the La Mochita bridge, located beside the Biobío River just south of the three Biobío River
crossings. The north approach fill to this structure and the soil surrounding the interior piers
exhibited the most severe ground failure. Figure 227 through figure 229 show examples of the
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north approach fill damage, and figure 196 and figure 197 show ground failure at the interior piers.
The presence of ground water is a key ingredient for liquefaction to occur, and the ground water
regime at this site was complicated by the presence of a dredging operation that pumped water
from the river into a pit adjacent to the north approach fill, possibly raising the ground water levels
in that approach fill (see figure 229). Seepage, possibly from water in the dredging spoils pit, was
observed in the riverbank slope about 7 to 10 ft (2 to 3 m) above the river level in this area. This may
have increased the severity of the ground failure observed in the north approach fill. However,
the severity of the ground failure did not seem to be as great at the bridge abutment as it was
82–660 ft (25–200 m) north of the abutment (see figure 227 and figure 228). This may have
been one of the reasons why the north bridge abutment was not significantly displaced due to
this liquefaction-induced soil movement.

Figure 227. Photo. Ground failure of north approach fill for La Mochita bridge.
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Puente La Mochita

Figure 228. Photo. La Mochita bridge north approach fill liquefaction-induced
ground failure.

Biobío River
Dredging/sluicing
operation

Figure 229. Photo. La Mochita bridge north approach fill and edge of dredging pit.
Ground failure due to liquefaction at the bridge location was most obvious at the interior piers (see
figure 196 and figure 197). While it appeared that the direction of movement was generally
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eastward, away from the main river channel, the presence of reverse scarps and vertical movement
of blocks of soil appeared to indicate the formation of a graben at and just west of the piers. This
indicates that most of the ground movement at the interior piers was vertical with limited lateral
movement. This may explain the relatively small lateral movement of the interior piers in spite of
the apparently larger lateral slope movements. In any case, as can be seen in figure 197, the interior
pier settled and tilted eastward, away from the river. The interior piers are believed to be supported
on four 4.9-ft (1.5-m)-diameter drilled shafts, but this needs to be verified. Figure 230 shows the
effect of the pier settlement on the elevation of the bridge deck.

Minor bridge deck
settlement
Lateral bridge deck
movement

Figure 230. Photo. La Mochita bridge deck and girder lateral movement.
The bridge superstructure (girders and deck) also slid laterally toward the east up to 1 ft (0.3 m),
with more movement at the south abutment than at the north abutment, possibly due to a combination
of strong shaking and the tilting of the interior pier (see figure 230 through figure 232). It appeared
that the abutments did not move. Note that one of the outside bridge girders almost slipped off the
abutment seat (see figure 232). Overall, while the ground failure was significant (lots of movement
with a thick non-liquefied crust), this bridge did not collapse. However, it was laterally displaced
and suffered damage.
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Lateral bridge deck
movement

Figure 231. Photo. La Mochita bridge deck and girder lateral movement
and approach fill settlement.

Lateral movement of
girders
Girder almost slipped
off bridge deck

Figure 232. Photo. La Mochita bridge lateral bridge deck and girder at south abutment.
Additional observations and measurements regarding the ground failure and bridge movements,
including photos, are provided in GEER. The overall conclusions made by GEER are consistent
with the observations of TIRT.(2)
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5.2.2.3.8 Raqui 2 and Tubul Bridges (Sites 21 and 22): Examples of severe bridge damage due to
liquefaction combined with inadequate structural resistance include the Raqui 2 and Tubul bridges.
For the Raqui 2 bridge, damage caused by liquefaction included severe failure and large-scale
settlement of the approach fills (see figure 198 and figure 233) and collapse of the interior bridge
spans resulting from movement and tilting of the interior pier foundations (see figure 234 and
figure 235). It was not clear if the lateral displacement of the interior piers was due to some type
of lateral soil movement or permanent displacement due to the combination of weak liquefied soils
and lateral inertial forces induced by shaking of the bridge superstructure. Even though severe
failure of the abutment fills occurred (likely due to liquefaction), it appeared that the abutments
themselves did not move significantly. Based on the lateral ridging observed along the approach
fill side slope toes and the roadway cracking pattern, it appeared that most of the lateral soil
movement was in the direction perpendicular to the roadway centerline, which could explain why
the abutments did not appear to have moved laterally.

Approximately 4.9 ft
(1.5 m) of approach fill
settlement

Figure 233. Photo. Southeast approach fill damage at Raqui 2 bridge.
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Span has shifted to left
(SW) while pier wall
did not move

Figure 234. Photo. Collapsed and shifted spans at Raqui 2 bridge as viewed
from base of southeast abutment.

Tilted substructure pier
(may have tilted during
shaking due to liquefaction
or when span fell)
Figure 235. Photo. Collapsed and shifted spans at Raqui 2 bridge due to liquefaction.
Damage caused by liquefaction for the Tubul bridge was similar to that observed at the Raqui 2
bridge, though more lateral movement of the abutments due to lateral spreading forces appeared to
have occurred. Ground cracking and deformation indicative of lateral spreading toward the river
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was observed at both ends of the bridge. Damage observed included liquefaction-induced ground
failure, large-scale settlement of the approach fills (see figure 236 through figure 240), and shoving
of the bridge girders approximately 5.9 inches (150 mm) into the north abutment, resulting in some
crushing of the abutment wall at the girder locations (see figure 240 and figure 115). The south
abutment pile cap was also damaged (see figure 239). It is possible that the north abutment was
pushed into the girder to cause the abutment wall crushing. Alternatively, the girders supported by
the interior piers could have been shoved into the north abutment due to a combination of lateral
movement of the south abutment and strong shaking (see chapter 4).

Figure 236. Photo. South approach fill damage and collapsed spans at Tubul Bridge.

Approach fill
settlement

Figure 237. Photo. Settlement of fill beside the south abutment of Tubul bridge.
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Timber pile
and damage to
pile cap

Figure 238. Photo. Overview of damage to south abutment of Tubul bridge.
Timber pile
and damage to
pile cap

Figure 239. Photo. Close-up of exposed pile and pile cap damage
on south abutment of Tubul bridge.

130

Approach fill
settlement/movement

Abutment and girder
were shoved together

Cracks due to lateral
spreading
Figure 240. Photo. Overview of Tubul bridge north abutment.
The exposed pile cap of the Tubul bridge south abutment was obviously damaged, possibly due to
lateral movement toward the north (see figure 239). It is not clear if the exposed timber pile was
embedded in the pile cap as part of the abutment foundation or was a remnant of a foundation
from an older bridge that ended up getting included in the pile cap when it was constructed.
Specific foundation details for this bridge were not available, although it is likely that this
bridge was supported on piles. In any case, it appears that the presence of the timber pile in
combination with lateral movement of the abutment due to lateral spreading forces may have
forced the exterior concrete pile cap to break and come loose. Additionally, the approach fill
settlement and lateral movement appeared to be more severe at the south abutment than at the
north abutment, providing further support that the collapse may have initiated at the south end of
the bridge. Regarding the interior piers of the Tubul bridge, damage or collapse of the pier walls
appeared to be the primary problem. The pile caps appeared to not have moved, at least in the
lateral direction. However, some of the pile caps were not visible (they were under water or mud)
and therefore could have settled or moved laterally (see figure 241).

Figure 241. Photo. Tubul bridge collapsed spans and substructure.
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The age of these bridges, the subsurface conditions, and the foundation details were not available
to TIRT. Therefore, additional investigation is needed to more accurately assess the observed
bridge performance.
5.2.2.3.9.Puerto de Coronel Muelle (Site 19): Deep liquefaction combined with lateral soil
movement can cause severe foundation element bending. This was exemplified at the Puerto de
Coronel Muelle, located south of Concepción but north of Arauco. The foundations supporting
the pier (wharf) structure were pushed laterally and displaced (see figure 242 and figure 243).
Since the foundations were deep (steel 28- to 40-inch (711 to 1,016 mm) open-ended pipe piles
driven to a depth of approximately 160 ft (50 m)), the piles were probably fairly well fixed near
the bottom. Based on the boring logs available, loose sands are present in the top 49 to 66 ft (15
to 20 m) below the ground surface. Therefore, liquefaction likely occurred to significant depth
and contributed to the foundation displacements and degrees of bending observed. The yellow
line in figure 243 traces the bending and twisting observed in the girder that was attached to the
pile foundation. See GEER for additional details regarding the effect lateral spreading had on
these and similar structures in the vicinity.(2)

Lateral soil movement
forced pile over
Figure 242. Photo. Puerto de Coronel Muelle foundation displacement and bending.

Figure 243. Photo. Close-up of Puerto de Coronel Muelle foundation displacement and bending.
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5.2.2.4 Summary of Liquefaction Performance for Bridges and Other Structures: In summary,
the primary effects of soil liquefaction on bridges and pier structures included foundation and
approach fill settlement, loss of lateral foundation support, and lateral foundation movement due
to lateral spreading and liquefaction-induced slope failure. Foundation settlement in particular
was highly variable, ranging from 0 to 3 ft (0 to 1 m) or more, even for piers that were next to
each other (e.g., Juan Pablo II bridge). Foundation settlement depends not only on the thickness
of non-liquefiable crust (affecting downdrag unit friction on the foundations) and thickness of
liquefiable soil (affecting magnitude of soil settlement) but also on the ability of the soil at the
foundation tips to resist deformation and provide the needed bearing resistance. Note that even
with such severe differential settlement, bridge collapse did not occur.
Lateral displacement of abutment walls and interior piers appeared to occur primarily when a
significant crust of non-liquefied soil slid on top of a liquefied soil layer and when the slope was
wide enough to significantly reduce or eliminate three-dimensional effects. Table 5 summarizes
the approximate slope geometry and performance of bridge abutments and interior piers. The table
entries are in general order of increasing severity of soil and structure movements and damage.
The information in the table demonstrates that abutments that form the terminus of a long, narrow
fill tend to be mostly unaffected by liquefaction and lateral ground movement, assuming that the
abutment is supported by a reasonably robust foundation. In general, site observations confirmed
that most of the soil movement was perpendicular to the roadway fill centerline and not directly into
the abutment wall. Overall, bridge abutments did well in this earthquake, even when liquefaction
and resulting ground settlement or failure was severe. However, where the bridge abutment, interior
pier, or pier structure foundations were located on a broader slope such as would occur adjacent
to a river or ocean waterfront, liquefaction-induced ground failure and lateral soil movements did
result in lateral displacement or overstress and failure of the foundations and substructure. A
possible reason for this difference in performance is the ability of the soil to either flow around
the foundations or to otherwise follow the path of least resistance or greatest driving force. This
depended on the thickness and fluidity of the failed soil mass and the slope and bridge geometry.
The greatest driving force is likely to be in the direction where three-dimensional effects have
the smallest influence and smallest contribution to the resistance to movement.

133

Table 5. Summary of performance for abutments and interior piers on slopes affected by liquefaction-induced
ground movement or settlement.
Site No., Name, and
Abutment/Pier Location
17. Llacolen bridge, SW
abutment and land side piers

Estimated
Abutment
or Slope Height
1 to 2 m

Estimated Ground Geometry
at Abutment/Pier Vicinity
~ 3-degree slope (see figure 195)
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20. Raqui 1 bridge, SE
abutment

3.5 m

15. Mataquito bridge, both
abutments

7 to 8 m

27. La Mochita ridge, both
abutments

9 to 12 m transverse
to abutment toward
river

Gently sloping to river (~ 5 degrees) (see figure 192,
figure 193, and figure 202 through figure 204)
Steeply sloping (~ 25 degrees) to river transverse to
bridge abutment wall; rip-rapped ~ 25-degree slope
below abutment to river-level north abutment and to 3 to
4 m high ridge below bridge centerline at south abutment
(see figure 197 and figure 228 through figure 232).

20. Raqui 1 bridge, NW
abutment

4m

Moderately sloping to river (~ 7-degree slope)
(see figure 207)

3 to 5 m

Ground slopes perpendicular to bridge centerline and
away from main river channel (see figure 197)

4 to 5 m

General slope toward ocean at ~ 10 degrees

4m

Two lane approach fill on gently sloping ground (see
figure 198, figure 233, and figure 234)

7 to 8 m

Pier located at top of river bank; geometry is complex
(see figure 176 and figure 216)

27. La Mochita bridge,
interior pier
19. Puerto de Coronel Muelle,
pier on sloping shoreline

21. Raqui 2 bridge, both
abutments and interior piers
18. Chepe railroad bridge over
Biobío River, NE river bank
pier
26. Old Biobío River bridge,
NE abutment and interior
piers

17. Llacolen bridge, pier on
slope below NE abutment
See notes at end of table

6 to 7 m
5 to 6 m at 20-degree
slope, then less than
10 degrees with 2-m
drop to river edge

Two-lane approach fill on gently sloping ground
(see figure 207)

Abutment on river bank slope (~ 25 degrees) (see figure
225 and figure 226)

Ground slopes down to river (see figure 210 through
figure 214)

Observed Abutment/Pier
Deformation and Performance
No movement or significant damage
No movement/significant damage to abutment. 1 m of
approach fill settlement and lateral spreading
perpendicular to the roadway centerline.
NE abutment shows minor crushing on abutment wall. If
lateral movement occurred, it was less than 20 mm. SW
abutment did not move
No abutment movement or significant damage; fill
settlement at abutments varied from 0.3 m to 0.8 m.
Lateral movement of approach fills perpendicular to
roadway centerline.
Abutment fill settled about 1 m. Abutment may have
moved laterally 75 to 100 mm and twisted. Small
adjacent wall parallel to abutment wall tilted and moved
laterally.
Pier moved laterally about 100 to 150 mm, and vertically
about 50 to 100 mm. Movement was down slope away
from Biobío River main channel.
Pile foundations moved laterally down slope about 0.5 to
0.7 m.
No abutment movement but some minor damage,
approach fill settlement up to 1.5 m, and lateral
spreading perpendicular to the roadway centerline.
Interior spans collapsed and piers tilted laterally.
Pier moved laterally 0.7 m; ground around pier settled
1.3 m.
Abutment wall tilted down slope about 150 mm.
Direction of ground movement is toward river. Some
interior piers collapsed.
Pier on river bank moved laterally about 0.25 to 0.3 m
and vertically about 0.3 to 0.4 m, causing columns to
crack all the way through and approach span to move off
bridge seat and collapse.

Site No., Name, and
Abutment/Pier Location

Estimated
Abutment
or Slope Height

Estimated Ground Geometry
at Abutment/Pier Vicinity

22. Tubul bridge, north
abutment and interior piers

4.5 to 5 m

Fill behind abutment extends out from edges of bridge
(wider than needed for two lanes); slope is 25 to 30
degrees (estimated) then flattens to 10 degrees or less in
short section to river (see figure 240)

22. Tubul bridge, south
abutment

5m

Two-lane approach fill on ~ 10-degree sloping ground
(see figure 236 through figure 240)

6 to 7 m

Pier is located mid-slope; slope drops steeply to river
(~ 30 degrees) (see figure 222 and figure 68 through
figure 71)

25. Juan Pablo II bridge, pier
on slope below NE abutment
1 m = 3.28 ft
1 mm = 0.039 inches

Observed Abutment/Pier
Deformation and Performance
Abutment may have moved laterally about 150 mm, but it
is also possible that girders were shoved into abutment due
to a combination of pier wall failures, strong shaking,
and lateral movement of south abutment. Approach fill
settled over 1 m. Interior piers collapsed.
Approach fill settled up to 1.5 m with lateral spreading
primarily perpendicular to the roadway centerline, but
turning toward river away from the abutment. Front of
pier cap was damaged at timber pile location, possibly
due to lateral abutment movement of 100 mm or more.
Interior spans collapsed.
Pier column on river bank slope moved laterally 0.3 m or
more and column failed, but span did not collapse.
Interior piers suffered severe differential settlement of up
to 1 m.
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The current design philosophy in North America is to stabilize bridge abutments to prevent
liquefaction, especially for the case of bridge abutments that form the terminus of relatively long
approach fills not located on top of a broader slope (e.g., a riverbank). This design philosophy
may be overly conservative and costly if large approach fill settlement can be tolerated for a nocollapse scenario. The approach fills can be simply and quickly rebuilt, as was done at several
bridges observed by TIRT. It appeared that three-dimensional effects had a significant impact on
the stability and movement of bridge abutments and piers subjected to liquefaction. Of course,
these conclusions about liquefaction effects are preliminary until more subsurface and structure/
slope geometry data are available and analyzed. The conclusions provided herein are based on
surficial observations, limited information about the subsurface conditions, and limited or
visually estimated ground slope geometry.
5.2.3 Effect of Regional Ground Uplift Observed for Bridges
As discussed in chapter 2, one result of subduction zone earthquakes is regional uplift and
subsidence. The effects of regional uplift were especially prevalent south of Concepción, in the
vicinity and south of Arauco, where regional uplift of approximately 7 ft (2 m) was observed.
This especially affected harbors and waterways, leaving ships on sand and gravel bars. It also left
beaches, estuaries, and wetlands without the water necessary to support plant and aquatic life.
Fishing villages that had close access to navigable waterways lost access, requiring new access
ways to be built.
Examples of the impact of rapid uplift are shown in figure 244 and figure 245. These figures show
dry ground that was once wet and boats hung up on old timber pilings that were once almost fully
submerged. However, the team was not able to confirm that these boats ended up on the pilings
as the result of the earthquake. Figure 117 shows additional evidence of the pre-earthquake water
level. One possible effect of the rapid uplift was to create rapid drawdown conditions, increasing
the instability of sloping ground that was once partially or fully underwater. These remnant pore
pressures could have combined with liquefaction effects to further decrease the stability of affected
slopes, making them more likely to fail and to experience greater lateral deformations. This scenario
needs further study once more subsurface data is obtained. The effect of rapid uplift on the bridge
itself is unknown at this point. However, if the rapid uplift created the potential for differential
movement between piers, the rapid uplift could have created additional problems for a bridge
already in distress due to strong ground motions and liquefaction-induced forces or loss of
foundation support. These near-fault effects need further consideration.
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Boats left above the
mean water level due
to regional uplift

Direction of lateral
spreading
Figure 244. Photo. View northeast from Tubul bridge south abutment showing areas
left dry and boats left above the new mean water level.
Boats left hanging
on or run through
by old piling

Figure 245. Photo. Tubul bridge with boats run through by old timber pilings.
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5.3 GEOTECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING RETAINING WALL
PERFORMANCE
In general, walls have performed very well in past earthquakes. Examples include soil nail walls
and mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) walls in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in California,
MSE walls in the 1994 Northridge, CA, earthquake, and MSE walls and modern reinforced concrete
gravity walls the 1995 Kobe, Japan, earthquake. (See references 15–18.) Koeski, et al. provide a
summary of the performance of various types of walls, focusing on geosynthetic reinforced
structures, in these and more recent earthquakes.(19) The largest earthquakes have shown some
differences in performance between relatively rigid walls such as concrete gravity walls and more
flexible, MSE-type walls, with the MSE type structures tending to outperform the concrete gravity
structures, especially older concrete gravity structures. While some damage to walls has occurred
in past earthquakes, the damage has typically included minor movement (4 inches (100 mm) or
less) or outward tipping of the wall, cracking of wall facing elements, wall corners or full-height
joints opening up and allowing backfill to spill through, unsecured blocks at the wall top toppling
off, and on rare occasions, collapse. Instances of wall collapse in past earthquakes were almost
always limited to older walls that would not meet current design standards (especially unreinforced
masonry and concrete walls) and, in a few cases, newer walls that were not designed to standards
or were already in serious distress before the earthquake due to design or construction problems.
This section presents observations regarding the performance of retaining walls. Many of the
32 sites visited had bridge embankment approaches that were either sloped embankments or
retaining walls. In addition, many sites used retaining walls to confine the soil under the bridge
abutment. For the most part, the retaining walls observed consisted of either CIP concrete cantilever
walls or MSE walls. The MSE walls observed were constructed of either precast panels with
metallic reinforcement or dry cast modular blocks with geosynthetic reinforcement.
Traditionally, CIP walls have been used to confine the approach fill near a bridge abutment. MSE
construction is a newer technology that has been used around the world since the 1960s as an
alternative to CIP walls. The advantage of MSE walls include cost, rate of construction, and
tolerance to settlement. In Chile, MSE walls have be used since 1995 (site 28 includes the first
MSE walls built in Chile). The team observed a combination of CIP and MSE walls at many of
the sites visited. In most cases, MSE walls were only used to retain the embankment approaches
and not under the abutment. Under the abutment, CIP concrete walls were typically used. Table 6
lists the sites where retaining walls were observed and includes brief descriptions. Figure 246
through figure 260 show photos of each of the walls.
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Table 6. Summary of sites with retaining walls.
Site
No.
1
2
3
5

Site Name
Américo Vespucio/
Miraflores
Américo Vespucio/
Lo Echeveres
14 de la Fama
Quilicura railway
overcrossing

18

Américo Vespucio/
Independencia eastbound
Américo Vespucio/
Independencia westbound
Maipú River bridge
Estribo Francisco
Mostazal (Avenida
Independencia)
Chepe railroad bridge
over Biobío River

21
25

Raqui 2
Juan Pablo II

28

21 de Mayo

29

Rotonda General Bonilla

32

Muros Talca (SW)

6a
6b
9

11

Wall Description
MSE wall (steel reinforcement, precast panel
faced) approaches with CIP abutment wall
MSE wall (steel reinforcement, precast panel
faced) approaches with CIP abutment wall
MSE wall (steel reinforcement, precast panel
faced) approaches with CIP abutment wall
CIP concrete abutment and approach walls
MSE wall approaches with CIP abutment walls,
both precast panel with steel reinforcement and
modular block with geogrid reinforcement
CIP concrete back-to-back semi-gravity walls for
approach ramps
Concrete block gravity wall
MSE (modular block and geogrid reinforcement)
abutment walls. Walls directly support abutment
loads from the bridge.
CIP concrete wall supporting cut for depressed
roadway
Approach ramps use CIP walls for the embankment
and abutment
Shaft-supported CIP walls retaining embankment fills
MSE wall (steel reinforcement, precast panel
faced) approaches and CIP abutment walls
MSE wall (modular block face with geogrid
reinforcement) approaches and CIP abutment wall
MSE wall (modular block facing and geogrid
reinforcement) approaches and CIP abutment wall

1 m = 3.28 ft

Figure 246. Photo. Retaining wall at Américo Vespucio/Miraflores.
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Wall
Height
(m)
6 to 7
6 to 7
6 to 7
5 to 6

6 to 7
6 to 7
9 to 11+
6.5 to
7.5
5
4
2 to 3
8 to 10
4.5 to 5
8 to 9.5

Figure 247. Photo. Retaining wall at Américo Vespucio/Lo Echevers.

Figure 248. Photo. Retaining wall at 14 de la Fama.

Figure 249. Photo. Retaining wall at Quilicura railroad overcrossing.

Figure 250. Photo. Retaining wall at Américo Vespucio/Independencia eastbound.

Figure 251. Photo. Retaining wall at Américo Vespucio/Independencia westbound.
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Figure 252. Photo. Retaining wall at Maipú River bridge.

Figure 253. Photo. Retaining wall at Estribo Francisco Mostazal (Avenida Independencia).

Figure 254. Photo. Retaining wall at Chepe railroad bridge over Biobío River.

Figure 255. Photo. Retaining wall at Raqui 2.

Figure 256. Photo. South retaining wall at Juan Pablo II.
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Figure 257. Photo. North retaining wall at Juan Pablo II.

Figure 258. Photo. Retaining wall at 21 de Mayo.

Figure 259. Photo. Retaining wall at Rotonda General Bonilla.

Figure 260. Photo. Retaining wall at Muros Talca (SW).
In general, all of the observed retaining walls performed well. There was little to no wall movement
or damage, with the exception of sites 6, 18, 25, 28, and 32. Other than these sites, the wall facing,
top-of-wall details, pavement, and other ancillary components showed no signs of distress due to
the earthquake, even though some of the bridges associated with these walls experienced significant
damage or even complete collapse of the superstructure. Although the retaining walls at sites 6,
18, 25, 28, and 32 experienced deformations or damage, they continued to perform their function of
retaining soil and maintaining a grade separation. It is expected that these walls could be rehabilitated
and placed back into service. A specific description of the problems observed at these five sites
and their probable causes are provided in the paragraphs that follow.
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The retaining walls at Américo Vespucio/Independencia (site 6) performed very well except for
the detailing at the top of the modular block walls. The top two to three block layers and the cap
block appeared to have been placed as a parapet above the ground surface at the wall top to
hide a surface water drainage ditch (see figure 261). These blocks were unsupported and
therefore only had self weight and the connection system to resist the horizontal loads. The
horizontal force generated due to the earthquake and possibly from the concrete barrier behind
the drainage ditch pushed the blocks and caused them to topple.

Drainage
ditch

Unsupported top
block being held
by connectors
Figure 261. Photo. Toppling of coping at Américo Vespucio/Independencia.
The Chepe railroad bridge over the Biobío River (site 18) is a complex system, as shown in
figure 176. A CIP cantilever wall supports a cut to form a depressed roadway. The ground water
level is above the depressed roadway elevation at times, depending on the water level in the river.
In effect, the roadway and walls in this section form a tub to keep the ground water out of the
roadway. The soil below and behind the wall settled and moved toward the river, probably due to
liquefaction-induced slope failure (see figure 262 and figure 263). This condition is consistent
with observations at other sites along this side of the Biobío River. Due to the liquefaction-induced
soil movement, the wall moved downward approximately 1 to 1.3 ft (0.3 to 0.4 m) and the top of
wall rotated into the depressed roadway section. Furthermore, the seal between the roadway and
wall was broken, which will allow water into the depressed roadway when the river rises.
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Wall Movement

Figure 262. Photo. Wall movement near Chepe railroad bridge due to
lateral spreading and settlement.

Settlement
Lateral
spreading

Figure 263. Photo. Wall settlement and rotation due to lateral spreading and settlement.
While the wall was in immediate need of repair, it is notable that the wall was still performing its
function of retaining the soil from impacting the depressed roadway despite the severe movement
caused by liquefaction. This demonstrates that even in the severe case of liquefaction below the
wall, the wall can still function and not collapse. Note that the temporary support of the bridge
superstructure placed after the earthquake may be contributing to the lateral loading of the wall.
This indicates that even though the wall was damaged, it has some reserve capacity.
The approach for the Juan Pablo II bridge (site 25) was discussed in section 5.1 and illustrated in
figure 217 through figure 219. In addition to bridge damage, there were two CIP walls retaining
the embankment fill between bridge spans (identified as north and south walls in figure 256,
figure 257, figure 264, and figure 265). The embankment between bridge spans settled due to
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liquefaction, and the bridge pier near the south wall also settled approximately 3 ft (1 m). The
slopes in front of these walls moved laterally, likely due to liquefaction (see figure 200 and
figure 201). It appears that the north wall and the embankment settled together more than 3 ft
(1 m). Although the soil in front and behind the south wall settled, the wall itself did not settle
because it was founded on deep foundations. This wall was built during a later construction
project that added the entrance and exit ramps heading east. The north wall was completed in the
original construction. Both walls continue to perform as intended after the earthquake, though
the north wall would likely need to be replaced to raise the roadway back to its original grade.
North

North

South

© Google, GeoEye, and DMapas

Figure 264. Map. Retaining walls near Juan Pablo II bridge.

North

South

Figure 265. Photo. Wall settlement near Juan Pablo II bridge due to
liquefaction-induced settlement.
The retaining walls at Vía Elevada 21 de Mayo (site 28) are a combination of MSE walls used to
retain approach and embankment fills and CIP concrete abutment and curtain walls. These walls
were built in 1995 and are probably the first MSE walls built in Chile. These MSE walls were
used as a substitute for CIP concrete walls included in the construction contract through a value
engineering proposal made by the contractor prior to construction.
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The MSE walls are composed of precast concrete panel facing and steel bar mat soil reinforcement.
There are a total of five walls on this site, and with the exception of the wall corners and full-height
joints between the MSE walls and the curtain walls, they performed very well.
Three wall locations within Vía Elevada 21 de Mayo experienced deformation and are highlighted
in this discussion (see figure 266). All three wall locations exhibited damage associated with
wall top, full-height joint, and corner details. Corner details for MSE walls are an issue because
they tend to attract seismic loads and ensuring that the joint will stay together can be difficult.
The performance issues were primarily with the joints opening up and fill escaping. Both bridges
associated with the walls at this site also experienced damage but did not collapse. However, an
older bridge parallel to these bridges did collapse.

North

Site

Site
Site
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Figure 266. Map. Vía Elevada 21 de Mayo.
Based on the design calculations available, the MSE walls at this site were designed using a
horizontal acceleration coefficient of 0.4 g and were designed in general accordance with the
AASHTO Standard Specifications available at that time. The high acceleration coefficient used
to design these walls was a bit surprising because the official implementation of the 0.4 g ground
acceleration for coastal areas did not occur until 2002. It is not known if the adjacent bridges
were designed for 0.4 g. Based on the wall calculations, the soil reinforcement length used was
approximately 90–100 percent of the wall height, likely the result of using a 0.4 g acceleration
coefficient. The corner and full-height joints where the walls connected to the bridge curtain walls
were not designed as robustly for connectivity between adjacent panels as would typically be
done today; this appears to have contributed to the performance problems observed.
Wall site 28A is a 30-ft (9-m) wall tiered perpendicular to the road alignment (see figure 267).
The wall appears to have rotated out, allowing backfill to escape out of the reinforced fill at the
full-height joint between the curtain wall and the MSE wall. Potential issues could be related to
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inadequate soil reinforcement embedment lengths or poor placement and compaction of fill due
to the tight geometry caused by the presence of the wall corner, abutments, and foundation
elements. The uniform rounded nature of the sand backfill used (a coefficient of uniformity of
less than 2 based on available laboratory test data on the backfill) may also have contributed to
reduced pullout resistance, especially during shaking. Based on eye-witness accounts of the wall
construction in 1995, the backfill soil was extremely difficult to compact to a firm condition
because of the uniform nature of the soil. Although tiered walls are aesthetically pleasing and can
help reduce stress on the lower portion of the wall, the use of such complex wall geometry can
lead to poor performance if not designed, detailed, and constructed correctly.

Figure 267. Photo. Tiered wall corner tilting outward at wall site 28A.
Wall site 28B, a 33-ft (10-m)-high wall, is similar to wall site 28A in that the wall rotated
outward, although not as severely (see figure 268). The cause of the problem is also similar to
wall site 28A, a combination of inadequate soil reinforcement embedment due to the severe bridge
skew (the acute enclosed angle between the abutment wall and MSE wall is approximately
25 degrees) and the use of uniform rounded sand. The combination potentially resulted in reduced
pullout resistance, especially near the wall top where soil confining stress is relatively low, and
in lack of a positive connection at the full-height joint between the curtain wall and the MSE wall
panels. Modern technique to design such acute corners is to create a bin structure, making sure
that the soil reinforcement is tied across to both sides of the acute angle. Since that was apparently
not done, the soil reinforcement near the acute corner was too short, allowing pullout failure to
occur and the panels to move during the earthquake.
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Figure 268. Photo. Wall corner tilting outward at wall site 28B.
The deformation at wall site 28C was the most severe of the three (see figure 269 through figure 272).
Similar to wall site A, the wall is tiered, but instead of rotating, the lower wall slid and rotated,
moving laterally outward near the lower wall top approximately 1 to 1.3 ft (0.3 to 0.4 m) (see
figure 269) and possibly 0.49 to 0.7 ft (0.15 to 0.2 m) near the wall base (estimated based on tilt
of wall face). This is the only wall observed by TIRT that exhibited signs of translational movement,
with the exception of the wall at site 18 that moved laterally due to liquefaction-induced lateral
spreading of the soil it retained. Because the upper tier was founded on the fill of the lower tier,
the upper tier moved downward once the fill retained by the lower wall spilled out through the
gap between the lower wall and the curtain wall. Figure 270 shows the back side of the upper
wall, where the loss of the fill exposed the soil reinforcement behind the panels. The reinforcement,
panel connection, and lack of geotextile between the MSE wall and curtain wall can be seen. The
function of the geotextile is to prevent fill from escaping through the joint. In this case, the gap
was probably too large for the geotextile to keep the fill from spilling. The geotextile was used at
the panel-to-panel joints. The movement of the corner panels was observed at the other corners
of these walls, although to a lesser degree.
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Figure 269. Photo. Lateral movement of lower wall top at wall site 28C.

Figure 270. Photo. Back side of upper wall at wall site 28C.
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Figure 271. Photo. Fill material from tiered wall at wall site 28C.

Panel
gaps

Figure 272. Photo. Differential settlement at wall site 28C.
As shown in figure 271, the fill was a uniform medium-coarse sand with an angle of repose of
approximately 32 degrees. This type of material may have contributed to poor soil-structure
interaction with the reinforcement. If this was not considered in the wall design, it may have
caused a lower pullout resistance than anticipated.
Figure 272 shows the wall at the opposite abutment. In this case, the wall appears to have
differentially settled, causing the panels to shift and separate and allowing some backfill soil to
spill out.
The specific cause of the excessive lateral movement and differential settlement at this location may
have been the liquefaction of the loose sandy soil below the wall. The available borings at the
site indicate that the water table is approximately 7 ft (2 m) below the ground surface and loose,
liquefiable sand extends to a depth of approximately 16 ft (5 m) (see appendix A). Soft organic silt
extends another 3 to 7 ft (1 to 2 m) below the loose sand, below which the sands become dense to
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very dense. What appeared to be ejected sand (sand boils) was present near these walls as was
some localized ground cracking and cracks in the roadway pavement, as shown in figure 273. With
regard to lateral movement on the lower wall, the width of the reinforced soil zone (approaching
100 percent of the wall height) was likely more than adequate to resist the seismically induced
lateral earth pressures behind the wall. Therefore, liquefaction is the most likely explanation for
the lateral movement. During wall construction, 7.8 inches (200 mm) of settlement of the walls
and fill occurred due to the loose sand and organic silt layer below the walls. Construction photos
of the walls show what appear to be gaps in the panels that were likely caused by differential
settlement that occurred during construction. However, it is also likely that liquefaction settlement
below the wall may have worsened the panel distortion.

Figure 273. Photo. Possible liquefaction features near wall site 28C.
The Muros Talca site (site 32) consists of four geogrid reinforced modular block MSE walls
approximately 30 ft (9 m) high with a 1.5H:1V to 2H:1V unreinforced slope on top. The MSE
walls abut to a CIP concrete abutment wall. A plan view of the bridge and walls is provided in
figure 274. The northeast corner wall experienced severe cracking of the facing blocks and an
outward lateral deformation of approximately 4 inches (100 mm). The face block cracking pattern
is shown in figure 275 and figure 276, with a linear distribution of the cracks on a 45-degree angle.
The southwest corner also had some cracked blocks with a similar pattern but to a much lesser
degree. This appears to be another example of a wall corner (or very tight radius in the wall
alignment) having problems resisting seismic loading. The significant wall height, especially for
a vertical wall, puts a lot of demand on the blocks even for static loading. Combining the wall
height plus soil surcharge with a tight radius in the wall alignment and severe seismic loading
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caused a severe demand on the facing blocks. Some additional evaluation of this wall is needed
to fully understand the effect that seismic loading had on this wall and the mode of facing failure.
However, even though the wall facing was sheared by the demands placed on it, the wall did not
collapse and is still functional, though facing repair will be needed.

Observed
cracked blocks
North

Figure 274. Illustration. Plan view of wall at Muros Talca.

Wall face
deformation
100 mm max

100 to 150
mm gap

Block cracking in
45 degree shear bands
1 mm = 0.039 inches

Figure 275. Photo. Wall with steep top slope at Muros Talca.
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Figure 276. Photo. Wall with cracked block pattern at Muros Talca.
Finally, it should be noted that the wall at Estribo Francisco Mostazal (site 11) is a geogrid reinforced
modular block wall directly supporting the abutment and bridge foundation loads (see table 6). This
type of abutment wall is what is referred to as a “true” MSE bridge abutment. The MSE abutment
walls at site 11 performed very well, exhibiting no signs of lateral or vertical movement due to
the earthquake. While the bridge suffered some relatively minor damage (see figure 277), the
damage was not caused by the walls but was probably due to the severe bridge skew angle (similar
to other bridges observed by TIRT and described in chapter 4) combined with the bridge tending
to slide down hill, as it was located on a downhill roadway grade.
Bridge railing
offset
Bridge
movement

Figure 277. Photo. Bridge supported on footing on top of block-faced geogrid wall
at Estribo Francisco Mostazal.
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In summary, the walls observed at the 32 sites visited by TIRT performed well, although a few
walls did suffer some damage. In most cases, damage was minor and repairable. Of the walls that
deformed laterally, movement tended to be greatest near the wall top with little, if any, lateral
movement at the wall base, indicating that resistance to sliding is likely much greater than
assumed in design. The most significant wall performance problems were primarily the result of
inadequate details at the corners and full-height joints and at the wall top due to inadequate coping
details. These performance problems point to the importance of using details that ensure good
connectivity between adjacent panels across a joint, which, for even current design codes such as
the AASHTO LRFD bridge design specifications, should be better described. However, in spite
of these performance problems, all of the walls met the no-collapse criterion typically applied for
seismic design, including those walls that were subjected to the effects of liquefaction.
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CHAPTER 6. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EARTHQUAKE
6.1 GENERAL
This chapter summarizes the overall performance of various bridge components, retaining walls,
and bridge sites based on the observations detailed in chapter 4 and chapter 5. The observed
performance leads to various lessons learned from the 2010 offshore Maule earthquake. It
forms the basis for several conclusions drawn from the postearthquake reconnaissance regarding
recommended seismic design and retrofit improvements and future research needs.
6.2 SUPERSTRUCTURE ROTATION
6.2.1 Skewed Bridges
The direction of bridge skew is illustrated in figure 278 for clarity in the following discussions.
Skew is defined as the direction of rotation from the transverse line (perpendicular to the bridge
centerline) to the skew side or abutment back wall of the bridge. For example, figure 278
indicates a clockwise skew and a counterclockwise skew.

Figure 278. Illustration. Notations on skew direction.
Table 7 summarizes the characteristics and earthquake-induced damage patterns of bridges with
a skew angle of 20 degrees or more. It lists the bridge name, bridge orientation, skew angle,
skew direction, material used in girder, presence of diaphragms, transverse displacement at
intermediate bents, and direction of deck rotation. The combination of these parameters helps
determine the mechanism of bridge deck rotations.
Table 7. Summary of bridges and bridge damage.
Bridge Characteristics

Site
1a
1b

Name

Orientation

Miraflores

NE-SW

2a

Lo Echevers

NE-SW

5

Quilicura

E-W

7

Romero

E-W

10b

Hospital

NW-SE

Skew and
Direction
20 degrees
counterclockwise
33 degrees
counterclockwise
45 degrees
counterclockwise
31 degrees
clockwise
40 degrees
counterclockwise

Girder/End
Diaphragm

Damage Pattern
Transverse
Movement at
Intermediate Bents
Rotation

Concrete/No

Negligible

Clockwise

Concrete/No

Negligible

Clockwise

Steel/Yes

Negligible

Clockwise

Concrete/No

Negligible

Counterclockwise

Concrete/No

Significant

Clockwise
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All of the bridges in table 7 consistently rotated about the centroid of the bridge superstructure in the
opposite direction of their skew, regardless of the bridge orientation, magnitude of the skew angle,
or presence of diaphragms. The fact that most of the bridges experienced negligible transverse
displacements also indicates that the rotation effect was dominant in these bridge superstructures,
with the acute corners of each bridge moving away from their abutments at both ends.
Based on the observations, the movement of a bridge superstructure can be illustrated in four steps,
as shown in figure 279. Under the earthquake excitations (steps 1a, 1b, and possibly 3), the bridge
superstructures first moved toward one abutment (left in figure 279) and impacted against the
abutment back wall (step 2). The reaction from the back wall then turned the superstructure in a
direction opposite to the skew direction (counterclockwise in figure 279). The rotational motion
(step 3) was amplified due to the fact that the rotational vibration mode of the bridge superstructure
is more sensitive to the ground motions, as illustrated with the acceleration response spectra
recorded at Hospital Station in Curicó, since all the concrete girder bridges listed in table 7
have superstructures supported on neoprene pads and restrained with vertical seismic bars (see
figure 280).(6) The superstructures are weakly restrained in plan with the fundamental vibration
mode in translation. With continuing deck rotations, the acute corners at two ends of the bridge
finally moved away from the abutments, knocking off the curtain walls and becoming unseated
(steps 4a and 4b). Note that the possibility of having significant rotational ground motions at the
bridge site can further amplify the rotational motion (step 3).

Figure 279. Illustration. Deck rotation of a representative bridge (two spans shown).
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Figure 280. Illustration. Rotational and translational mode responses to ground motions.
6.2.2 Straight Bridges
The bridges with little or no skew (Chada and Las Mercedes bridges) rotated counterclockwise,
as discussed in chapter 4. Unlike the skewed bridges, the deck rotation of the straight bridges
cannot be explained by the skew effect. The possible factors contributing to significant rotations
in these bridges are as follows:
•

The rotational mode of vibration of those bridges was very sensitive to ground motions.
Any accidental eccentricity between the center of mass and the center of rigidity of the
superstructure of a bridge could lead to substantial rotations.

•

The rotational component of ground motions could be significant.

•

The fault directivity effect could be significant because both bridges are approximately
oriented along the east-west direction.

Considering both the skewed and straight bridges, observations can be made on the overall reasons
for bridge deck rotation. Skew of bridges is a significant but not necessarily decisive factor
contributing to the bridge rotation. The high sensitivity of the rotational vibration mode of the
bridge to ground motion, particularly rotational excitations, could have been dominant. The fact
that all bridges experiencing significant rotations were not far from Santiago, where soil conditions
are relatively stiff, supports the possibility of rotational ground motions at the bridge sites. Further
analysis is required to understand the significance of this phenomenon.
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6.3 GIRDER DAMAGE
6.3.1 Fracture of Steel Girders
The superstructure of the Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez bridge is divided into two parts by the
center expansion joints at bent 11. The northeast portion of the bridge is supported by a concrete
substructure, and the southwest portion is mainly supported on a steel substructure. Most of the
bridge bents are supported on drilled shafts. During the earthquake, the two parts most likely
vibrated separately.
The most plausible reason for the girder damage at each abutment, as discussed in chapter 4, is
excessive longitudinal force applied on the end support. During the earthquake, the majority of the
inertia force on half of the bridge superstructure was resisted by the end support at each abutment.
The excessive force resulted in either fillet weld fractures at the southwest abutment or steel girder
fractures in web and bottom flange at the northeast abutment.
6.3.2 Failure of Concrete Girders
The exterior prestressed concrete girders of the Chada and Romero bridges, which were constructed
without diaphragms, experienced out-of-plane block shear failures due to transverse impact loads
from shear keys, as shown in figure 281. When partial diaphragms were used between the girders,
such as in the San Nicolás bridge, the bottom portion of the exterior girder still experienced
significant shear cracking, as shown in figure 282. However, with the use of even partial concrete
teeth between girders, as shown in the Llacolen bridge in figure 283, both exterior and interior
prestressed concrete girders suffered no visible damage. One interior girder in the west portion of
Llacolen bridge experienced a horizontal crack, as shown in figure 57. This was because the
concrete teeth provided sufficient lateral restraints on most of the girders, making them work
together and share the transverse seismic force.

Figure 281. Photo. Exterior girder damage at Chada bridge, no diaphragms.
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Figure 282. Photo. Exterior girder damage at San Nicolás bridge, partial diaphragms.

Figure 283. Photo. Exterior girder damage at west abutment of Llacolen bridge,
concrete teeth.
6.4 CONNECTION BETWEEN SUPERSTRUCTURE AND SUBSTRUCTURE
6.4.1 Shear Key and Steel Stopper Failures
Concrete shear keys or shear keys in integral construction with curtain walls fulfilled the function
of sacrificial devices to protect the substructure of bridges. Their failures were observed regardless
of the presence of bridge deck rotations during the earthquake (e.g., Independencia, Chada,
Romero, and Hospital bridges).
Steel stoppers used in several bridges (e.g., Independencia, Miraflores, and Lo Echevers bridges)
failed prematurely. The Independencia bridge with steel stoppers was taken out of service following
the earthquake, but the parallel bridge with concrete shear keys and diaphragms survived the
earthquake with repairable damage. It was concluded that the two-bolt connections from each steel
stopper to the cap beam was too weak to resist any significant bending moment. However, once
welded to steel girders, the steel stoppers prevented lateral movement of girders, as observed in
the Quilicura railway bridge shown in figure 112.
6.4.2 Vertical Seismic Bars
Vertical seismic bars were used in a number of bridges (e.g., Chada, Las Mercedes, Llacolen,
Romero, Hospital, and Pichibudis bridges). In general, they were flexible and underwent
significant deformations during the earthquake. All were well anchored into the cap beams and
decks. Field evidence only indicated bar pullout in bridges with fallen spans. It is uncertain
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whether the seismic bars provided vertical restraints to the bridge girders because there was no
evidence of vertical up-and-down movements of the girders. This observation may be clarified
after analyses using recorded ground motions.
6.4.3 Bridge Bearings
In general, bridge bearings functioned well during the earthquake. Several of them were displaced
significantly, such as in the Lo Echevers bridge shown in figure 95 and in the Cardenal Raúl
Silva Henríquez bridge shown in figure 125.
6.5 GIRDER SEAT LENGTH
The superstructure of a number of concrete and steel girder bridges (e.g., Llacolen, Miraflores,
Lo Echevers, Romero, Hospital, Tubul, Biobío, and pedestrian bridges) dropped off their
supports during the earthquake. In general, the support seat length is insufficient.
6.6 COLUMN SHEAR FAILURE
The pier caps and piers in all but the Llacolen and Juan Pablo II bridges received virtually no
damage during the earthquake. This represented successful design of these bridge components.
Several columns in the Llacolen and Juan Pablo II bridges failed in shear due mainly to the
ground settlement and lateral spreading.
6.7 FOUNDATION MOVEMENT AND DAMAGE
6.7.1 Overview
In general, bridge foundations performed relatively well in the earthquake. With the exception of
cases where liquefaction-induced vertical or lateral soil movement was severe, foundations did
not appear to suffer significant permanent deformations or significant damage, based on surficial
observations. Most of the newer bridges visited were supported by shaft foundations (typically
4.9 ft (1.5 m) in diameter and less than 98 ft (30 m) deep). These foundations appeared to be
relatively light compared to bridge foundations currently used in areas of high seismic hazard in
the United States. However, the foundations performed well in most cases.
To identify lessons learned regarding bridge foundations, two broad categories of geotechnical
performance issues must be considered: foundation performance when liquefiable soils were
probably not present and foundation performance when liquefiable soils were present. For those
sites where liquefaction probably occurred, geotechnical performance issues are further divided
between the effects of liquefaction-induced settlement and liquefaction-induced ground failure
and the effects of lateral movement. The observations of geotechnical performance of foundations
in the sections that follow are made within this context.
6.7.2 Sites Not Affected by Liquefaction
Seventeen of the 32 sites visited did not appear to have significant liquefaction. However, poorer
soil conditions (e.g., soft to still clays or loose sands) appeared to contribute to the amplification
of ground motions (see chapter 2) and increased foundation deformation (see chapter 5), possibly

160

increasing stress or deformation in the superstructure. In general, sites where better soil conditions
were present performed better and showed minimal damage. Near-surface soft to stiff clays
appeared to be especially troublesome, especially in terms of their effect on approach fill stability
(e.g., sites 7, 8, and 10), but did not cause movement of or damage to the bridge abutments.
6.7.3 Sites Affected by Liquefaction
None of the sites where liquefaction likely occurred (15 of the 32 sites visited) were specifically
designed to mitigate the effects of liquefaction through use of ground improvement or foundation
strengthening (see chapter 5 for additional background on this issue). This affords the opportunity
to observe the effect liquefaction can have on foundation and abutment performance for structures
that are otherwise designed using the AASHTO or similar specifications, depending on the age
of the structure.
6.7.3.1 Effects of Liquefaction-Induced Ground Failure
What was most surprising was the good performance of bridge abutments retaining 13- to 26-ft
(4- to 8-m)-high approach fills over gently sloping ground, even when severe vertical and horizontal
approach fill deformation (1.6 to 3 ft (0.5 to1 m) or more) occurred due to liquefaction of soil below
the approach fill (see table 6, specifically sites 15, 20, 21, 22, and 27). Although there were a few
cases where 1.9 to 5.8 inches (50 to 150 mm) of lateral movement of the abutment appeared to
have occurred, in most cases, no discernable movement occurred. This may be the result of
three-dimensional effects reducing the lateral forces acting on the abutment foundations relative
to what would be predicted assuming two-dimensional (i.e., plane strain) conditions. Furthermore,
the liquefaction-induced slope failure tended to follow the path of least resistance (i.e., in the
direction perpendicular to the roadway and bridge centerline). For those cases where either the
abutment or an interior pier was located on a general slope, such as at a riverbank, the beneficial
three-dimensional slope geometry was not present and foundation and substructure movement
and damage due to liquefaction-induced ground failure was more likely (e.g., sites 17, 18, 19,
and 25; see chapter 5 for details). These observations may have important implications for the
strategy used for liquefaction design of bridges both in Chile and the United States.
6.7.3.2 Effects of Liquefaction-Induced Settlement and Downdrag
Liquefaction-induced ground settlement was observed at many of the bridge sites where liquefaction
occurred. However, settlement of the bridge foundations only occurred for a few of those sites
(sites 25, 27, and 31). In general, regardless of the amount of liquefaction-induced ground settlement
that occurred, the foundations did not settle significantly if tipped in a reasonably good bearing
layer. However, if the foundation was relatively shallow and not tipped in a relatively dense
bearing layer, significant settlement of the foundation did occur.
6.8 RETAINING WALLS AND ROADWAY FILL
Three types of walls were inspected by TIRT: panel-faced MSE walls using bar mat or steel strip
soil reinforcement, modular block high-density polyethylene geogrid reinforced walls, and concrete
gravity walls. Overall, retaining walls performed well during the earthquake. Tieback and soil nail
walls appeared to suffer little or no damage based on observations made by others. True MSE
abutments, where the bridge footing foundation was directly supported on top of the MSE wall
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(e.g., site 11, see chapter 5), also performed well with no apparent deformation or damage to the
walls. Note that most of these walls were designed using the AASHTO Standard Specifications (see
chapter 3). The observed wall performance appears to indicate that the AASHTO specifications
as applied in Chile provide a safe design for seismic loading conditions.
There was no evidence of lateral sliding of the walls, the limit state that often controls wall design
for seismic conditions in North American design practice (see chapter 5). Where wall face lateral
movement was observed, the movement was primarily rotational, with the maximum movement
near the wall top. It appears that the passive resistance at the wall toe in combination with friction
along the wall base prevented significant translational movement.
Minor damage observed in several walls was due mainly to poor detailing. Inadequate coping
details allowed a few of the top blocks to topple off the wall (modular block walls). Poor wall
corner details or vertical full-height joint details (such as between the curtain wall and MSE wall
retaining the approach fill sides) allowed panels to separate and wall backfill to spill out through
the gaps in the facing. Stresses during seismic loading, especially for relatively tall walls (30 ft
(9 m) or more) appeared to be more pronounced at abrupt changes in wall geometry (e.g., corners
and small radius changes in alignment), indicating the need for more robust wall facing designs
in that type of situation. Soil reinforcement that is too short, especially near the wall top or where
uniform low shear strength medium sand is used as backfill, can contribute to excessive wall or
panel movement.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 GENERAL
Based on the overall performance of various bridge components, retaining walls, and other
structures summarized in chapter 6, conclusions can be drawn about the seismic performance
of the transportation infrastructure in Chile during the offshore Maule earthquake. Considering
the geologic conditions, earthquake settings, ground motions, and geotechnical and structural
performance of the infrastructure, recommendations are made in this chapter for both immediate
implementation and future investigation. In addition, research needs are identified for the
improvement of seismic design of bridges, walls, and other structures used in transportation
facilities. These recommendations may also be applicable for seismic retrofit purposes.
Some of the lessons learned require additional study to specifically assess how such lessons
should be implemented. Toward that end, immediate needs are identified to gather more
information and confirm assumptions and interpretations made in this report.
7.2 CONCLUSIONS ON TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE PERFORMANCE
Less than 0.15 percent of the bridges in the MOP inventory collapsed or suffered damage that
rendered them unusable. Considering the magnitude of the earthquake, the transportation
infrastructure in Chile performed relatively well and was able to support postearthquake
emergency response and recovery. Even so, improvements can be made to further enhance
the seismic performance of the infrastructure both in structural and geotechnical terms.
Many spans of precast prestressed discontinuous girder bridges with continuous decks fell from
their supports, probably due to the significant in-plane rotation of their superstructures due to
severe shaking. Lateral steel stoppers used to provide both vertical and lateral restraint to the
girders were largely unsuccessful due to their inadequate connection detail to cap beams or
abutments. Conversely, reinforced concrete shear keys served their design purpose, transferring
lateral loads to the substructures. Vertical seismic bars were widely used to restrain the vertical
motion of the spans, and they also performed well. Bridge substructures (foundation, column,
and cap beam) generally behaved satisfactorily (undamaged cover concrete and no evidence of
yielded reinforcing steel) except that several columns suffered shear failure due to ground
settlement and lateral spreading. However, the satisfactory performance of the columns generally
occurred in bridges with failed superstructure-to-substructure connections, and it is not clear
whether this superior performance was due to overdesign of the columns or to the failure of the
connections, which limited the forces in the columns to less than yield. All retaining walls
exceeded performance expectations.
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION
7.3.1 Diaphragms in Concrete Girder Superstructures
In past earthquakes, full-depth diaphragms between girders have been very effective in distributing
earthquake loads among the girders and to the bearings and substructure below. Bridges with
full-depth diaphragms again performed well in Chile, whereas those without diaphragms
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performed poorly. To minimize the possibility of lateral shear failure and transverse unseating of
girders, it is recommended that full-depth diaphragms be installed in all bridges and implemented
in all future designs
7.3.2 Support Length
Adequate support length is a proven countermeasure to the unseating of bridge spans. It is
recommended that generous seat lengths be provided in all new designs based on seismic hazard,
soil type, column height, distance between movement joints, and angle of skew. Both the AASHTO
specifications and Caltrans’ seismic design criteria have examples of such requirements. Existing
bridges with inadequate support lengths should be retrofitted with seat extenders or longitudinal
restrainers as a matter of priority
7.3.3 Lateral Seismic Restraints
Lateral steel stoppers of girders were typically anchored to their supports with two anchor bolts
aligned in the direction of the span. In this case, only one bolt was available to transfer the
overturning moment when the seismic load from the girder was applied to the stopper some distance
above the cap beam or abutment seat. This situation is quite ineffective. It is recommended that
at least four anchor bolts be used to anchor each stopper to the cap beam in a configuration that
provides both transverse and span-wise resistance to shear and overturning moments.
Unless specifically designed to fail at lateral load that is less than the capacity of the column below
(thus protecting the column), all shear keys (both steel and concrete) should be designed against
failure. This can be done in one of two ways: either the key or stopper is designed to resist the
unreduced load from an elastic analysis (strength reduction factor = 1.0 or 0.8), or it is designed to
resist the maximum shear the column can generate in its fully yielded state (i.e., with fully developed
plastic hinges and including overstrength effects). Regardless of the method, the strength of any
shear key should not be less than a specified minimum, usually expressed as a percentage of the
tributary weight at the key.
Shear keys are not necessary if the bearings are engineered to take the lateral loads and uplift
forces. In such cases, the bearings need to have sufficient internal strength to transfer the forces
without rupture and remain functional. They also need to be anchored accordingly. If it is
uneconomical to provide bearings of this type, shear keys are required. However the bearings
should be anchored to the cap beams or abutments to prevent being dislodged during shaking.
7.3.4 Substructure Design
Confinement has been demonstrated to be an effective means for preventing shear failure in
reinforced concrete columns. It is recommended that columns with inadequate transverse
reinforcing steel be retrofitted with external concrete, steel, or polymer jackets to prevent
brittle shear failures and to help ensure flexural ductile yielding.
7.3.5 Retaining Wall Design
Since retaining walls performed very well in general, new design specifications could be developed
to provide a no-analysis seismic design option for internal and external wall stability (i.e., for
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sliding, eccentricity, and bearing). Such an option might only be applicable within certain limits
of ground acceleration, wall height, and surcharge conditions and would require minimum wall
details (e.g., engineered connectivity of vertical joints in the face of the wall, especially at the
corners; use of well-graded granular backfill; and good coping details on top of the wall).
The minimum wall details developed for the no-analysis option should also be required for walls
that do not qualify for this option such as those in high seismic zones and should be considered
for inclusion in the AASHTO specifications.
Bridges supported on MSE walls also appeared to have performed well in this earthquake. It is
recommended that this cost-effective technology be investigated as an alternative to conventional,
CIP, reinforced concrete abutment walls.
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK AND RESEARCH NEEDS
7.4.1 Structural Engineering Recommendations
Conduct a rigorous study of earthquake ground motion records to look for evidence of a
rotational component in ground motion that could explain the in-plane rotation of
non-skewed symmetric bridges.
The ground motions recorded during the offshore Maule earthquake can be characterized by long
duration and multiple pulses, particularly at those stations near Santiago where soils are relatively
stiff compared to other regions such as Constitución and Concepción. Although farther from the
epicenter of the earthquake, the bridges near Santiago exclusively experienced significant in-plane
rotations in their superstructures during ground shaking. The reason for this rotation is unclear,
but one possibility is that the stiffer soils near Santiago favored the propagation and amplification
of rotational ground motions.
To the authors’ knowledge, the occurrence of rotational components in earthquake ground motions
and their effect on bridge response and safety has not been previously studied. It is recommended
that the ground motions recorded during this earthquake be rigorously analyzed and that case
studies be undertaken for the non-skewed bridges that exhibited strong rotational response.
Study the relationship between the strength reduction factor, ductility, and period of vibration
during long-duration ground motions with multiple pulses. Also study the influence of these
characteristics in the ground motion on the in-plane rotation of non-skewed symmetric
bridges. Prepare recommendations for AASHTO consideration regarding long-duration
effects and potential changes to response modification factors.
It is known that long duration and multiple pulses can have a significant effect on the inelastic
response of a bridge and can directly impact the integrity of the load path, especially if the bridge
behaves as a pure elastoplastic system. In these circumstances, the relationship between the strength
reduction factor, ductility, and period of vibration may differ from that obtained under more
conventional ground motions and may warrant the use of a different set of response modification
factors. The unique long-duration and multipulse feature of the ground motion may also affect the
rotational response of bridge superstructures. These unique features in the ground motion and the
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corresponding inelastic response in the structure and approach fills may also explain the in-plane
rotation of the superstructures in non-skewed bridges.
Considering the similarities in geologic and tectonic conditions, design specifications, and
construction practices between the Chile and the United States, indepth studies on the effect of
long-duration ground motions (with and without multiple pulses) on bridge behavior during this
earthquake would be of immediate relevance to U.S. practice, particularly in Oregon and
Washington. Research outcomes are likely to affect ground motion provisions as well as design
requirements for bridges in these states.
Validate the support length requirements in the AASHTO specifications for skewed bridges.
Many spans of skewed bridges were unseated, confirming the sensitivity of this kind of bridge to
collapse. The minimum requirements in the AASHTO specifications are based on engineering
judgment rather than rigorous analysis, and this earthquake provides the opportunity to check the
validity of these requirements, particularly for skew. Research outcomes would likely affect the
support length requirements for bridges throughout the United States.
Study the implications of combining the scour and earthquake load cases for coastal bridges
located in tsunami inundation zones
The earthquake-induced tsunami generated significant waves and currents that added both horizontal
and vertical loads on some coastal bridges and caused the erosion of soils around bridge foundations.
These additional loads may further damage a bridge that has already been damaged by earthquake
shaking. Structures may collapse and low-lying bridges may be lifted off their substructures and
swept upstream. Although designing for scour is required in U.S. specifications, the combination
of the effect of scour and earthquake effects is not required, as in the Chilean code (see appendix B).
These combined effects warrant further investigation
Conduct feasibility studies of bridges without diaphragms for potential application in
accelerated bridge construction.
Concrete blocks (or shear keys) on each side of cap beam girders are an alternative to diaphragms
for the distribution of transverse loads between girders and from the deck slab to the cap beam.
They can effectively prevent the girders from shear failure by reducing the maximum load on
each individual girder. If the joint between the top flange of the girder and deck slab can be
economically designed to transfer significant moments without distress, this alternative may be
an attractive strategy in accelerated bridge construction
Conduct case studies on the AASHTO global design strategy that permits fusing of the
super-to-substructure connection and protection of the substructures and foundations from
seismic damage.
Adjusting the strength of the shear keys in a bridge superstructure is an alternative strategy for
managing the load path and energy dissipation, thus enabling cost-effective designs that ensure
bridge substructures suffer little or no damage. This strategy is permitted in the new AASHTO
specifications for seismic design, but no comprehensive study has been done to date to prove its
viability. This earthquake provides the opportunity to fill this gap.
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Study the trade-off between lower maintenance costs with fewer joints and reduced
redundancy for longitudinal seismic loads in continuous bridges.
Jointless bridges are widely favored for their lower corrosion-related maintenance costs and the
increase in redundancy for gravity loads. However, the longitudinal distribution of load in these
continuous bridges can be a challenge, especially in those cases where the superstructures are not
monolithic with their piers (i.e., supported on bearings that allow thermal expansion). In long,
multispan bridges, very large loads can be attracted into a few structural elements, and, unless
designed for this heavy demand, failure can occur in the super-to-substructure connections at
these elements. Studies are required to understand the trade-off between lower maintenance costs
(with fewer joints) and the increased demand on a few substructures (i.e., the reduced
redundancy for lateral loads),
7.4.2 Geotechnical Engineering Recommendations
As previously noted, geotechnical conclusions in this report are based on surficial observations
and approximate geometry. Subsurface data and foundation and geometric details are required
for most of the sites visited to confirm these preliminary interpretations. These data are a necessary
first step towards deriving the most benefit from the investigation of this earthquake. Digitized
ground motion records are also required if the more detailed modeling necessary to confirm the
preliminary conclusions is to be achieved. Once site-specific data are obtained, future efforts in
the geotechnical area should focus on the following:
Develop the ground motion records from this earthquake for use in seismic design when
long-duration subduction zone records are needed and add them to databases used by
designers for conducting site-specific seismic analyses.
Achieving this goal will involve obtaining subsurface information and other site information
where the ground motions were recorded so that they can be deconvolved to base rock motions,
cleaned up, baselined, etc. in order to make them most useable. Such digital records would also
be extremely useful for design where subduction zone earthquakes must be considered (e.g., the
west coast of North America).
Conduct research to better quantify the beneficial effect of three-dimensional geometry
issues on abutment performance when liquefaction occurs.
For example, how wide does the fill need to be to eliminate the three-dimensional benefit identified
in chapter 5 and chapter 6 such that the use of a two-dimensional slope stability or lateral
spreading analysis in the direction toward the bridge is not too conservative? The case histories
summarized in this report should be used to calibrate three-dimensional numerical models to
investigate this issue more fully.
Conduct research to improve the quantification of lateral and vertical (downdrag) forces
on foundations and abutments induced by liquefaction.
Based on the foundation performance observed in this earthquake, liquefaction lateral spreading
and downdrag design with regard to their effect on foundations may be too conservative.
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Conduct research to improve the estimation of lateral and vertical ground deformation
caused by liquefaction using measured deformation data from the 15 bridge sites where
liquefaction occurred as a result of this earthquake.
Methods currently available for estimating these deformations are relatively crude. In addition, a
reasonable estimate of both vertical and horizontal ground movements due to ground liquefaction
and lateral spreading should be made available to practitioners who will implement the displacementbased design methodology to ensure that undesirable structural failure and damage modes of bridges
are removed. The fact that most liquefied sites during the Chile earthquake were not treated for
improved performance offers a good opportunity to improve the engineering estimate of
liquefaction-induced vertical and horizontal ground movements.
Use the liquefaction performance research identified above to develop a strategy from a nocollapse design objective perspective to focus liquefaction mitigation efforts on only the
more severe cases.
Judging what should be considered severe may be a challenge and may be very site-specific.
Even if such a strategy could be formulated and implemented, thorough site- and project-specific
geotechnical analyses would still be needed to assess the severity of the likely effects of
liquefaction at a given site.
Conduct research to develop more accurate lateral deformation models for walls under
seismic loading considering the likelihood of rotational rather than translational movement.
Since very little evidence of the translational movement of a wall as a rigid body was found, the
theoretical approach typically used to perform seismic deformational analysis of walls (Newmark
analysis) may not match reality.(14,20) However, the good seismic wall performance observed still
provides justification for using a reduced horizontal acceleration coefficient for design, even
considering the lack of translational movement.
Conduct research to investigate the effect of high vertical acceleration on the performance
of selected bridges and walls.
Vertical accelerations are often ignored in current seismic design practice. The effects of these
relatively high vertical accelerations on bridge and wall performance should be further
investigated and their implications to design practice determined.
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APPENDIX A. SUBSURFACE DATA
A.1 SUBSURFACE DATA
A.1.1 Subsurface Data for Américo Vespucio/Miraflores (Site 1)
One boring log was available at site 1. The specific location is not known, but its general
location is within the circle in figure 284. A copy of the boring log is provided in figure 285.

© Google, Europa Technologies, Inav/Geosistemas SRL, and GeoEye

Figure 284. Map. Image of site 1 taken prior to earthquake.
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Source: MOP

Figure 285. Illustration. Boring log at site 1.
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A.1.2 Subsurface data for Américo Vespucio/Lo Echevers (Site 2)
The location of the site 2 bridge is shown in figure 286. A copy of as-built bridge plans and one
boring log at site 2 are provided in figure 287 through figure 289.

Test Hole

© Google, Europa Technologies, Inav/Geosistemas SRL, and GeoEye

Figure 286. Map. Image of site 2 taken prior to earthquake and showing
approximate location of test hole.

Source: MOP

Figure 287. Illustration. As-built bridge plan for site 2.
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Source: MOP

Figure 288. Illustration. As-built bridge profile for site 2 showing footing foundations.
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Figure 289. Illustration. Boring log at site 2.
A.1.3 Subsurface Data for Avenida Romero Accesso Sur (Site 7)
The location of bridge site 7 is shown in figure 290. A copy of as-built drawings and one boring
log at site 7 are included in figure 291 and figure 292.
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Test Hole S-2

© Google, DigitalGlobe, and Inav/Geosistemas SRL

Figure 290. Map. Image of site 7 taken prior to earthquake and showing
approximate location of test hole.

Source: MOP

Figure 291. Illustration. As-built bridge plan for site 7.
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Figure 292. Illustration. Boring log for site 7.
A.1.4 Subsurface Data for Avenida Chada Accesso Sur (Site 8)
The location of bridge site 8 is figure 293. A copy of as-built drawings and one boring log at
site 8 are included in figure 294 and figure 295.

Test Hole SA-3

© Google, DigitalGlobe, and Inav/Geosistemas SRL

Figure 293 Map. Image of site 8 taken prior to earthquake and showing
approximate location of test hole.
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Source: MOP

Figure 294. Illustration. As-built bridge plan for site 8.
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See ASTM
D2488 for
definitions of soil
classifications

Source: MOP

Figure 295. Illustration. Boring log for site 8.
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A.1.5 Subsurface Data for Route 5 Railway Overcrossing at Hospital (Site 10)
The location of bridge site 10 is shown in figure 296. A copy of as-built drawings and one boring
log at site 10 are included in figure 297 and figure 298.

Test Hole SA-2

© Google, DigitalGlobe, and Inav/Geosistemas SRL

Figure 296. Map. Image of site 10 taken prior to earthquake and showing
approximate location of test hole.

Source: MOP

Figure 297. Illustration. As-built bridge plan for site 10.
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See ASTM
D2488 for
definitions of soil
classifications

Source: MOP

Figure 298. Illustration. Boring log SA-2 for site 10.
A.1.6 Subsurface Data for Via Elevada 21 de Mayo/Cruce Ferroviario (Site 28)
The location of bridge site 28 is shown in figure 299. Red dots indicate the location of the test
holes with the corresponding numbers labeled. Copies of three boring logs at site 28 are given in
figure 300 through figure 305.
Site A

Site B

S3
Site C
S1
S2

© Google, DigitalGlobe, Inav/Geosistemas SRL, and Europa Technologies

Figure 299. Map. Image of site 28 taken prior to earthquake and showing
approximate locations of test holes.
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Figure 300. Illustration. Boring log S-1 for site 28.
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Boring No. 1

N1 = number of blows per 15 cm.
N2 = number of blows per 30 cm.
Entre colas = depth range.
1 cm = 0.39 inches.
Source: W. Neely

Figure 301. Illustration. Detailed standard penetration test blow counts
for boring log S-1 for site 28.
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Figure 302. Illustration. Boring log S-2 for site 28.
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Boring No. 2

N1 =number of blows per 15 cm.
N2 =number of blows per 30 cm.
Entre colas = depth range.
1 cm = 0.39 inches.
Source: W. Neely

Figure 303. Illustration. Detailed standard penetration test blow counts
for boring log S-2 for site 28
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Figure 304. Illustration. Boring log S-3 for site 28.
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Boring No. 3

N1 =number of blows per 15 cm.
N2 =number of blows per 30 cm.
Entre colas = depth range.
1 cm = 0.39 inches.
Source: W. Neely

Figure 305. Illustration. Detailed standard penetration test blow counts
for boring log S-3 for site 28.
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APPENDIX B. SEISMIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR BRIDGES AND WALLS
IN CHILE
B.1 SEISMIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR BRIDGES
Section 3.1004 of the MOP Highway Handbook establishes the seismic design requirements for
small to medium span bridges (viaducts, overheads, and pedestrian bridges) with span lengths
less than 230 ft (70 m ).(11) Longer bridges and those with special structural configurations
(arches, suspension, and cable-stayed bridges) are not covered by these specifications.
The philosophy underlying these specifications is to ensure public safety, but significant damage
and disruption to service is accepted. The ground motions and design forces are calculated based
on a probability of exceedance of 10 percent in 50 years, which is equivalent to a return period of
475 years. For design purposes, the country is divided into nine regions from north to south and
in three seismic zones from east to west. These zones are determined by the value of the PGA in
stiff soil, as shown in table 8. Zonation maps are included in the seismic provisions for all of the
nine regions. The map for central Chile is shown in figure 22.
Table 8. Seismic zones.
Seismic
PGA,
Seismic
Zone
Ao
Coefficient
1
0.20 g
0.20
2
0.30 g
0.30
3
0.40 g
0.40
The effect of the soil stiffness on the values of PGA at a specific site are taken in account by
multiplying the values in table 8 by a soil coefficient defined in table 9.
Table 9. Soil coefficients.
Soil
Type
I
II
III
IV

Description
Rock with measured shear wave velocity, Vs > 2,600 ft/s (800 m/s)
Very dense soil with measured shear wave velocity, 1,300 ft/s (400 m/s) < Vs
< 2,600 ft/s (800 m/s)
Soft to medium-stiff clays and sands. Unsaturated sands with N > 20 blows/ft
Saturated cohesive soils with Su > 0.0036 ksi (0.025 MPa)

S
0.9
1.0
1.2
1.3

S = Soil coefficient.
Vs = Shear wave velocity.
N = Blow count number.
Su = Average undrained shear strength in top 100 ft (30 m).

For seismic zones 2 and 3, an importance coefficient is included in the calculation for seismic
forces. Bridges are classified as either “essential” (importance coefficient I) or “other”
(importance coefficient II).
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Since scour around or under a bridge foundation may influence its seismic behavior, the
consequences of this hazard are included in the design. Two values of a seismic scour index (PSS)
are defined. A value of PSS equal to 1 requires 75 percent of the total depths of scour to be
considered in design, and a value of 2 requires 100 percent of the total scour to be considered in
design. The depth of scour is included in the determination of the height of the superstructure
(substructure slenderness) and consequently affects the appropriate analysis method.
Four categories of seismic behavior are defined based on the PGA, PSS, and the importance
coefficient, as shown in table 12.
Table 10. Seismic behavior categories.
Importance
Coefficient
PGA, Ao
PSS
I
II
1
a
a
0.20 g
2
b
b
1
b
b
0.30 g
2
c
c
1
c
c
0.40 g
2
d
d
B.1.1 Analysis Methods
One of five analysis methods is used in to determine the elastic seismic forces, depending on the
geometry and importance of the bridge. These methods are: the seismic coefficient method, the
seismic coefficient method modified by structural response, the modal spectral analysis method,
the modal spectral analysis method using site-specific spectra, and the time history analysis
method (linear and nonlinear).
B.1.1.1 Seismic Coefficient Method
This method is applied to simply supported bridges with a maximum of two spans (each less than
230 ft (70 m) and substructure heights less than 39 ft (12 m). The substructure height is measured
between the seat and the foundation soil including the maximum scour effect. The horizontal
seismic coefficient Kh is calculated as shown in equation 1.
Kh =K1 . S .

where:
K1 = importance factor defined in table 11.
S = soil coefficient defined in table 9.
Ao = peak ground acceleration defined in table 8.
g = acceleration due to gravity (32 ft/s2 (9.8 m/s2)).
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Ao
≤0.10
2g

(1)

Table 11. Importance factor, K1
Importance
coefficient
K1
I
1.0
II
0.8
In this method, all structural components are designed to be elastic, which means the response
modification factor is equal to one. The analysis is done for both the longitudinal and transverse
directions.
B.1.1.2 Seismic Coefficient Method Modified by Structural Response
This method is applied to simply supported bridges of more than two spans (spans lengths less
than 230 ft (70 m)) and substructure heights less than 82 ft (25 m) including the maximum scour
effect. The horizontal seismic coefficient Kh is calculated as shown in equation 2.

where:

⎧1.5 K 1 S Ao
⎪
g
K h (Tn )= K K S A
⎨ 1 2 o
⎪ gT 2/3
n
⎩

Tn ≤ T1
Tn > T1

Vb ≥0.22 K1 . S .

Ao
.P
2g

K2,T1 = spectral constants, defined in table 12.
Tn = natural period determined using simplified formulas (table 13) or exact methods.
Vb = total base shear in the bridge.
P = total weight of the bridge.
Table 12. Spectral constants, T1 and K2.
Soil type
T1
K2
I
0.20
0.513
II
0.30
0.672
III
0.70
1.182
IV
1.10
1.598
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(2)

Table 13. Approximate formulas for natural periods for bridges.
Structural system Direction
Fundamental period
Simply supported
Longitudinal or Reinforced
0.3 Wp +Wu 3
bridges
transverse
concrete
Tn =2π �
H
3 Ec I g
support
Continuous bridges Transverse1
with fix supports on
intermediate
substructure and
rigid abutments.
One superstructure
end on a fix support
Longitudinal

Reinforced
concrete

0.3 Wp +Wu 3
H
Tn =2π �
3 Ec I g

Steel

Tn =2π �

Tn =

1

0.3 Wp +Wu 3
H
4.5 Ec I g

Wp 3
π
�
H
8 Ec I g

This formula should not be applied to multiple column bents.
Wp = weight of the pier or column (ton).
Wu = weight of the superstructure supported on the pier or column (ton).
Ec =elastic modulus (ton/m2).
I = moment of inertia of the file or column in the direction of analysis (m4).
H = height of the pile or column, measured as the difference in levels between the seat and the foundation soil
considering the maximum scour effect (m).

B.1.1.3 Modal Spectral Method
This method is applied to tall bridges with simple supported continuous bridges (spans lengths less
than 230 ft (70 m)) and substructure heights greater than 82 ft (25 m) including the maximum
scour effect. This method may be used in place of the seismic coefficient method and the seismic
coefficient method modified by structural response.
The absolute spectral acceleration for the vibration mode m, Sa(Tm) is calculated using equation 3.

where:

1.5 K 1 S Ao
Sa (Tm )= � K 1 K 2 S Ao
Tm 2/3

Tm ≤ T1
Tm > T1

Vb ≥ 0.20 K1. S .A0. P/g
(3)

Tm = period of mode m.
The displacements, rotations, and forces in each structural element are calculated in both the
longitudinal and transverse directions from the contributions of each of the vibration modes. The
combination of the maximum modal values to obtain elastic response values are calculated using
the expressions shown in equation 4 and equation 5.
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S=�� � ρij Si Sj
i

ρij =

where:

(4)

j

8 ξ2 r3/2

(1+r)(1-r)2 +4 ξ r (1+r)
2

r=

Ti
≤1.0
Tj

(5)

Σi Σj = summation of the contribution of the considered modes.

ρij = coupling factor.

Ti, Tj = modal periods.
ζ = damping ratio and taken equal to 0.05.

The number of modes to be included in the analysis is chosen such that the summation of the
effective mass ratios will be larger than 90 percent.
B.1.1.4 Modal Spectral Method Using Site-Specific Spectra
In special cases, MOP requires that the design of a bridge is based on the modal spectral method
of analysis based and a spectrum developed for the specific site.
B.1.1.5 Linear and Nonlinear Time History Analysis
In specific cases, especially for bridges incorporating base isolation systems, MOP requires time
history analysis, either linear or nonlinear, using synthetic accelerograms reflecting the site
seismic risk and the soil conditions.
B.1.2 Response Modification Factors (R)
The design seismic forces for members and connections are calculated by dividing the elastic
response values by a response modification factor R. Special detailing is required to accommodate
inelastic behavior and the formation of plastic hinges when R factors greater than 1 are used.
Values of these factors are summarized in table 14 for the longitudinal and transverse directions.
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Table 14. Response modification factors (R).
Longitudinal Transverse

Element
Supports
Wall-type pier
Single column with foundation cap
Column bent with foundation cap
Inclined column with foundation cap
Piles or micropiles
Individual
Batter piles
Inclined batter piles
Foundations1
Spread footing
Batter of piles
Drilled shaft
Caisson or foundation pile
Connections2
Expansion joint
Bearing plate
Shear key
Bearing

3
3
3
3

2
3
4
2

3
3
3

3
4
2

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

0.8
0.8
1
1

0.8
0.8
1
1

1

For bridges in seismic categories C or D, seismic forces are those developed by plastic
hinges in the column. These forces are frequently less than those calculated using R = 1.
2
Connections are all elements that transfer shear or axial loads from one point to another in
the structure. Moment connections are not included in this definition.

B.1.3 Determination of Elastic Forces and Displacements
For bridges classified in seismic categories C or D, the elastic forces and displacement are
calculated in both the longitudinal and transverse directions. For the case of curved bridges, the
longitudinal direction is the chord joining the abutments.
B.1.4 Combination of Forces in Two Perpendicular Directions
The forces calculated independently in two perpendicular directions are combined to take in
account the uncertainty in the direction of the seismic waves and the effect of the two horizontal
components of the earthquake. Two load stages are considered. Load stage I is shown in equation 6,
and load stage II is shown in equation 7.
F = 100% FL + 30% FT

(6)

F = 30% FL + 100% FT

(7)

where:
F = absolute value of force or moment for all structural members due to load combination.
FL = absolute value of force or moment in the longitudinal direction.
FT = absolute value of force or moment in the transverse direction.
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B.1.5 Minimum Support Length
Minimum values for support lengths of beams are shown in equation 8 for seismic behavior
categories A and B and in equation 9 for seismic behavior categories C and D.
N=(203+1.67L+6.66H)(1+0.000125 α2 ) (mm)

where:

N=(305+2.5L+10H)(1+0.000125 α2 )

(8)

(mm)

(9)

L = length of the bridge deck to the adjacent expansion joint, or to the end of the bridge deck; for
hinges within a span, L is the sum of the distances to either side of the hinge; for single-span
bridges, L is the length of the bridge deck (m).

α = angle of skew of support measured from a line normal to span (degrees).
H = 0 for abutments and single-span bridges; average height of columns supporting the bridge
deck from the abutment to the next expansion joint (m); pier height (m) for columns and
piers; average height of the adjacent two columns or piers (m) at hinges within a span.
B.1.6 Modified Design Forces for Structural Elements and Connections
The seismic design forces from load stages I and II are divided by the R factors to obtain
modified design forces. These modified forces are combined with other loads to obtain the
maximum load combination as shown in equation 10.
1.0(D + B + SF + E + EQM)

(10)

where:
D = dead load.
B = buoyancy.
SF = stream-flow pressure.
E = earth pressure.
EQM = elastic seismic forces for the load stages I and II divided by R.
B.1.7 Modified Design Forces for Foundations
The seismic design forces for spread footings, pile caps and micropiles shall be those from load
stages I and II divided by the response modification factor R = 1 to obtain modified design
forces. These modified forces are combined with other loads to obtain the maximum load
combination as previously shown in equation 10.
The load combinations are based on division I-A of AASHTO’s Standard Specifications.(10)
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B.1.8 Seismic Design of Foundations, Abutments, and Retaining Walls
The specifications for the seismic design of these elements are covered in section 3.1003 of the
Highway Handbook.(11)
B.1.9 Seismic Design of Reinforced Concrete Elements
The design and construction of CIP reinforced concrete elements (columns, foundations, and
connections) are required to satisfy the provisions of division I-A of the AASHTO specifications.
If the design is based on the allowable stress method, all the stresses are increased by 33.3 percent.
If this method is used for bridges in seismic categories C and D, conservative designs are to be
expected unless the design is based on the maximum forces developed from plastic hinging.
B.1.9.1 Requirements for Columns
Section 7.6.2 of division I-A of the AASHTO specifications for seismic performance category C
and D is followed.
B.1.9.2 Columns and/or Piers
Section 7.6.3 of division I-A of the AASHTO specifications for seismic performance category C
and D is followed.
B.1.9.3 Column Connections
Section 7.6.4 of division I-A of the AASHTO specifications for seismic performance category C
and D is followed.
B.1.9.4 Construction Joints in Piers and Columns
Section 7.6.5 of division I-A of the AASHTO specifications for seismic performance category C
and D is followed.
B.1.9.5 Reinforced Concrete Micropiles
These elements are designed for elastic forces (R = 1). Alternatively, these elements may be
designed using the maximum forces from the column or pier plastic hinges.
B.1.10 Forces from Plastic Hinges on Piers or Columns
Design forces for columns, piers, and foundations are determined from the maximum forces due
to plastic hinges. The procedure for calculation of these forces is based on section 7.2.2 of
division I-A of the AASHTO specifications.
B.1.11 Diaphragms
Due to the high values of vertical acceleration in seismic zone 3, the beams of bridges in this
zone are connected by transverse beams (diaphragms).

192

B.1.12 Anchor Bars (Seismic Bars)
No.7 (22 mm) deformed bars are provided to resist a vertical seismic coefficient of Kv = Ao/4g.
These bars are required to satisfy the provisions of ASTM A706. ASTM A 615M bars are permitted
if the difference between the true yield force and the nominal value is less than 17.4 ksi (120 MPa)
and the relationship between ultimate stress and yield stress is less than 1.25.
B.1.13 Lateral Stoppers (Shear Keys)
To avoid excessive lateral displacement of the superstructure due to seismic forces, lateral stoppers
are provided on bent caps. The design force used for these stoppers is the seismic force acting in
the transverse direction divided by four. These stoppers are required to have sufficient ductility
to avoid the deck collapse. The height of these shear keys is required to be greater than 12 inches
(300 mm) and a gap between the shear key and the superstructure is provided to accommodate
the seismic displacement plus 2 inches (50 mm).
B.1.14 Seismic Joints
Seismic joints between deck segments have a minimum spacing to allow the displacements of
the elastomeric bearings. The minimum spacing is given by equation 11:
Sj ≥6.25

Ao
+S1 +S2
g

(cm)

(11)

where S1 and S2 are the seismic displacements of each of the elastomeric bearings in cm.
B.1.15 Seismic Isolation Systems
Seismic isolation systems used as supporting elements are designed and tested according to
AASHTO’s Guide Specifications for Seismic Isolation Design.(21)
B.2 SEISMIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR WALLS
Walls that are part of the public transportation system controlled by MOP are generally designed
in accordance with the AASHTO Standard Specifications.(10) PGAs given in the Chilean design
guide for wall design are used (i.e., PGAs of 0.2, 0.3, or 0.4 g in zones 1, 2, or 3, respectively).
MOP requirements allow concrete gravity walls to be designed for a reduced acceleration,
providing that the wall can slide during shaking. For MSE walls however, MOP requirements do
not allow the design acceleration to be reduced for internal and external wall stability. For walls
not under MOP jurisdiction, design accelerations may be established as a site-specific value. In
general, however, even these walls are designed using the AASHTO Standard Specifications.(10)
For MSE walls, typical practice is to select good, frictional backfill materials and overexcavate
poorer soils, replacing them with the backfill materials. Because of this practice, a reinforcement
length of 70 percent of the wall height is typically used to meet seismic design requirements.
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